Can Turkiye get Egypt on its side in Libya?

Turkiye’s Libya policy has evolved over recent years due to shifting dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader region. Today, Ankara is both a political and military actor in Libya. For the sustainability of its policy, it needs friends rather than rivals — or, in other words, it needs pragmatic understandings even with actors whose interests may not always align with its own.

Since the stakes are high in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, it is natural that Turkiye faces certain constraints. One previous constraint was the nature of its relations with Libyan National Army leader Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. In April, in a strategic and pragmatic move, Ankara welcomed Haftar’s son, Saddam, who met with Defense Minister Yasar Guler and other top military officials. This signaled Ankara’s willingness to engage with actors it had previously opposed.

However, this engagement did not mean a change in Turkiye’s Libya policy, but rather an acknowledgment of the evolving realities on the ground. While pursuing political and diplomatic engagement, Ankara is also determined to maintain a strong military footprint in Libya. For instance, the Turkish presidency this week formally submitted a motion to parliament for a 24-month extension of Turkish troops’ deployment in Libya.

Yet, Ankara has become increasingly aware that the sustainability of its Libya policy depends on engaging with all relevant actors rather than placing its bets on a single political partner. In the past, Turkiye paid a price for betting on a single actor, particularly in countries that remain in core political deadlock, like Libya.

The sustainability of Turkiye’s Libya policy depends on engaging with all relevant actors rather than a single political partner

Dr. Sinem Cengiz

Within this context, Turkiye is trying to pursue bilateral and multilateral engagements with key stakeholders, such as President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently hosting a trilateral summit with the Libyan and Italian prime ministers. In pursuit of a broad coalition to achieve its strategic objectives, Ankara also seeks partnerships with the UAE and Egypt, two other significant actors in Libya.

Saddam Haftar’s visit was followed by one made by Ibrahim Kalin, the head of Turkiye’s National Intelligence Organization, to Benghazi for direct talks with Khalifa Haftar. Through these visits, it was hoped that the Tobruk-based parliament, which is aligned with the senior Haftar, might approve Turkiye’s 2019 maritime delimitation deal with the UN-recognized, Tripoli-based Government of National Unity. The deal is seen by Ankara as a strategic win in asserting its rights in the region, but it has not been welcomed by several actors.

Despite Egypt’s rejection of the 2019 deal and its position on Turkiye’s general policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cairo has shown a willingness for dialogue with Turkiye. This is largely due to the expanding cooperation between the two countries in the past few years. Involving the political, economic and defense spheres, the pace of this expansion has been remarkable since their normalization of relations. Concrete steps have followed this normalization.

For instance, Turkish defense company Aselsan on Tuesday announced the opening of a regional representative office in Egypt aimed at strengthening cooperation. In September, the two countries also launched their first joint naval exercise in the Eastern Mediterranean in 13 years, marking a turning point in bilateral relations.

In April, the Turkish Embassy in Cairo hosted a discussion on NATO-Egypt relations and the NATO contact point role that Turkiye and Italy will share. The alliance has expressed an interest in helping build defense structures in Libya, but this will require cooperation with Egypt and Turkiye if it is to be done effectively.

When NATO launched a military intervention in Libya in 2011, Egypt adopted a cautious stance because of concerns about its scope and intentions. Cairo viewed the alliance’s intervention as exacerbating Libya’s instability, creating a larger security vacuum in the region. Turkiye wants to closely cooperate with Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean, a region that plays a critical role in its foreign policy and is also significant for NATO’s southern flank.

Turkiye wants to closely cooperate with Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean, a region that plays a critical role in its foreign policy

Dr. Sinem Cengiz

Egypt has been a strong backer of the Libyan National Army since the aftermath of the downfall of the Qaddafi regime in 2011. President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi met with Khalifa Haftar early this month. Egypt wants to sign a maritime boundary delimitation agreement with Libya. However, any potential deal will likely conflict with the agreement signed with Turkiye in 2019. Moreover, this may limit Turkiye’s room for maneuver in the region.

While engaging in closer ties, how Turkiye and Egypt will navigate their issues in the Eastern Mediterranean is the real question here. Compartmentalization of issues would be the safest way to keep ties on track. This does not mean they would only agree to disagree, but that they would also draw the lines where they can cooperate and avoid potential confrontation. This is not just a diplomatic preference but a strategic necessity.

Now more than ever, it is very important for the two countries to coordinate with each other to protect their rights in common areas of interest. They should be able to gain confidence in each other, because the Eastern Mediterranean is a permanent zone for all its actors and this is a reality that cannot be changed. A formula that would not be zero-sum for both Cairo and Ankara is significant, but the role of external stakeholders is also important. Ankara and Cairo should avoid their dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya being impacted by external actors. This is particularly important given that they need to cooperate on several regional dossiers, from Libya to Gaza.