Hopes raised by the setting up of “de-escalation zones” in Syria may well be dashed by developments on the ground in the last few days that bode very ill for civilians in various parts of the country. Firstly, the zones themselves are being tested. On Friday, the one north of Homs in western Syria saw fighting between opposition fighters and the regime within just hours of the truce taking effect.
Meanwhile, the Eastern Ghouta zone outside Damascus in the southwest has seen fighting since its establishment on July 22, with 25 civilian deaths, including seven children, and dozens of injuries as of Friday. That day alone, 70 rockets fell on the opposition enclave in 24 hours, marking the heaviest bombardment since the zone was set up.
This raises the possibility that these “de-escalation zones” could go the way of all the previous cease-fires and “cessations of hostilities” that were declared but ignored from the outset.
Also on Friday, Daesh ordered the conscription of all men aged 20 to 30 in Deir Ezzor. The group seems to be reinforcing itself in the eastern province, which is almost entirely under its control, as it loses ground elsewhere in Syria (including the impending loss of its capital Raqqa), and as both regime and opposition forces prepare to attack Daesh positions in Deir Ezzor.
Those who do not heed the mass conscription “will be subjecting themselves to questioning and punishment,” said a statement by Daesh, which has never hesitated to flaunt the brutality of its “punishment.” The conscription is likely to be strictly enforced, particularly if Deir Ezzor represents the group’s last stand in Syria after the fall of Raqqa.
This raises the prospect of Syrians being killed by various forces because they have been forced to fight, or being killed by Daesh for refusing to do so. If the conscription swells its ranks, even if its new “recruits” are coerced, this could mean intensified airstrikes and ground attacks by its various enemies, with inevitable civilian casualties.
Indeed, the UN has reported a “staggering” loss of civilian life, primarily from increased US-led coalition airstrikes, in the ongoing Raqqa operation. The same fate may await civilians in neighboring Deir Ezzor.
Meanwhile in Idlib, sweeping advances by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), an extremist alliance led by Jabhat Fatah Al-Sham (formerly Al-Nusra Front), against another opposition alliance is cause for great concern regarding civilians in this north-western province. Such concern is not limited to the extremists’ repression, against which Syrians under their rule have protested.
Their advances may embolden the regime and its allies to set their sights on Idlib, which UN envoy Staffan de Mistura warned last December could become “the next Aleppo,” whose fall that month to the regime entailed war crimes and horrific levels of death, destruction and displacement.
A regime onslaught against Idlib could be as much of a bloodbath and humanitarian crisis as neighboring Aleppo was, if not more so.
Sharif Nashashibi
“The future of the north is in great danger,” Michael Ratney, the US State Department’s Syria envoy, said last Wednesday in a statement. “If (HTS’) control of Idlib is realized it will be difficult for the US to convince other international parties to refrain from necessary military measures.”
This may well be interpreted by the regime and its allies as an invitation. Indeed, not only has the US indicated it will not stand in the way, but given Ratney’s description of military measures as “necessary,” participation by the US and other coalition members is not out of the question, not least because both sides designate JFS as a terrorist group, and it has been excluded from all cease-fires.
The regime may well seize this opportunity given Idlib’s strategic significance as a major opposition stronghold bordering Turkey that is an important supply route. Capturing it would secure the Damascus-Aleppo highway, which the opposition has used as a supply route, and neighboring Latakia, Bashar Assad’s home province and a regime stronghold.
Indeed, Syrian official Ali Haidar said earlier this year that Damascus was ready for “open battle” against opposition in Idlib. The regime “is clear in its policy when it said it will not forego any patch of Syria and I think Idlib is one of the coming hot areas,” he said. This echoes Assad’s repeated vow to recapture the whole country.
There is overwhelming evidence of the regime’s and its allies’ wanton disregard for civilian life and infrastructure throughout the conflict. As such, the international community should be very concerned about the fate of civilians in Idlib, to which tens of thousands have been sent as part of forced evacuations elsewhere in the country and from Lebanon (last week, several thousand Syrians were evacuated from Arsal).
A regime onslaught against Idlib — described by Reuters last week as an “overcrowded refuge,” and with most of its population of more than 2 million in need of humanitarian aid — could be as much of a bloodbath and humanitarian crisis as neighboring Aleppo was, if not more so.
Meanwhile, Turkey and Kurdish forces are gearing up for possible escalation in northern Syria, and various ground forces are likely to fight over territory liberated from Daesh, particularly post-Raqqa (a race is already underway in this regard).
On the diplomatic front, the regime maintains its refusal to discuss a political transition; on Sunday, former war crimes prosecutor Carla Del Ponte said she is quitting a UN commission investigating human rights abuses in Syria because it “does absolutely nothing”; and 160 Syrian civil society groups complained last week in a letter to de Mistura that other countries are hijacking UN peace talks (The Guardian reported that the letter “is understood to be specially aimed at Russian interference”).
Amid all these foreboding developments and the terrible potential consequences for Syrian civilians, putting much hope in “de-escalation zones” seems more like wishful thinking than reasoned analysis.
• Sharif Nashashibi is an award-winning journalist and commentator on Arab affairs.
