As Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrived in Tokyo on Sunday for a fifth annual summit with his Japanese counterpart, Shinzo Abe, the geostrategic implications of worsening ties between China and the US could loom large over the discussions.
Both India and Japan have been watching with wariness as relations between the world’s two largest economies seem to be in a downward spiral over issues ranging from Chinese monopolistic claims over the South China Sea and the increasingly frequent, though still non-violent, confrontations between the defense forces of the US and China.
While Japan has been a close ally of the US and has an implicit security guarantee, including against an increasingly aggressive China, India’s strategic relationship with the US is less clear cut. India’s ties with the US, at least in defense-related matters, date back less than a decade and the two sides are yet to find a comfort zone in this relationship. This is notably because India has traditionally had a strong strategic relationship with Russia, which was again witnessed during the recent visit of President Vladimir Putin to New Delhi, when India decided to buy the S-400 missile defense system from Moscow despite several open warnings against it by the US.
Though Abe is no admirer of Chinese President Xi Jinping, he has been careful about not letting Japan get totally sucked into the Trumpian tirades against China.
Ranvir S. Nayar
Security ties between Japan and India are also in the developmental phase, even though they have enjoyed a long economic relationship of more than four decades. This has seen Japanese investments in India rise sharply and also a significant increase in Japanese soft loans for infrastructure development in India. It was only about a decade ago that the two countries also began to focus on the development of strategic ties.
Over the past decade, India’s relations with Japan have literally undergone a sea change, with the two nations’ navies holding their first joint exercises in the Bay of Bengal in 2013. Since then, not only have the two defense forces been conducting regular joint exercises but, even more significantly, in 2015 India finally acceded to a Japanese request to allow its navy to join in the annual India-US naval exercises called Malabar. India had been reticent mainly because of fears that Beijing may see it as a move against China.
Besides holding joint exercises, Japan and India are also discussing agreements to broaden the exchange of information between their defense forces, as well as the use of each other’s bases for logistical support. Another key area of cooperation between India and Japan, and a highly symbolic one, is the agreement on civil nuclear cooperation. A strong critic of the Indian nuclear tests in 1998, Japan had imposed strict sanctions, which lasted three years. Though India had been lobbying for cooperation in civil nuclear technology, mainly for the construction of nuclear power plants in India with the help of Japanese firms, Tokyo had been dragging its heels on this front. Finally, the two sides signed an agreement in this domain last year.
However, Japan has yet to go all the way in its strategic relations with India, notably on arms sales. New Delhi has been keen to explore defense purchases, naval as well as missiles, which Tokyo has not yet acceded to, mainly due to the conditions imposed on its defense sales under the US-Japan peace treaty dating back to the end of World War II. These issues will definitely come up for discussion again between Modi and Abe. But even more crucial will be the perceptions and response of India and Japan to the recent developments in the South China Sea, as well as the Indian Ocean, with China beginning to assert itself in both regions, much to the discomfort of other Asian nations.
Worried they may be, but neither Japan nor India is keen to increase tensions with the Asian superpower. After nearly two years of rising military tensions, including a six-month-long standoff between the Chinese and Indian defense forces at a tri-country border they share with Bhutan, India has been mending fences with its northern neighbor. China, too, has been sending signals of peace to India, especially over the last year, as US President Donald Trump has become almost strident about China. Washington has not only imposed punishing tariffs on Chinese exports, but has also taken a more aggressive and assertive defense positioning in the East Asia region and dismissed all talk of China’s emergence as a rival to the US.
Though Abe is no admirer of Chinese President Xi Jinping, he has been careful about not letting Japan get totally sucked into the Trumpian tirades against China. Last week, he visited Beijing for the first bilateral summit between the two nations in seven years to mark 40 years of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty. Though most of the content of the visit was economic, there were enough clear signals about Japan’s desire to stabilize ties with Beijing. The two countries have agreed to fund infrastructure projects in third countries, notably under Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
That Abe went ahead with this despite the US’ clear aversion to the BRI is a signal that, though it may be allied to the US, Japan’s interests lie in peaceful relations with China; pretty much like India has done by reducing tensions with Beijing and moving the focus of their discussions to less contentious issues of trade and investment.
The two countries realize that China’s increasing power and presence in their immediate neighborhood cannot be wished away. Mending fences with the big boy in the room may turn out to be a better bet than “buying” security from another big boy who lives far away.
- Ranvir S. Nayar is managing editor of Media India Group, a global platform based in Europe and India, which encompasses publishing, communication, and consultation services.
