India’s self-inflicted dilemma in Afghanistan

Four months have gone by since the United States signed a deal with the Taliban, opening up new political possibilities in Afghanistan. The shifting political landscape in the war-ravaged state has once again brought India face to face with an old geopolitical dilemma of whether or not to talk to the militant group.

The visit of US Special Representative for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad to New Delhi in the second week of the last month reignited the debate in the country when he advised India to engage the Taliban in talks. “India is an important force in Afghanistan,” said he in an interview to a local newspaper, “and it would be appropriate for that [India-Taliban] engagement to take place.”

Indian policymakers, genetically attuned to looking at Afghanistan from the Pakistan prism, are somewhat skeptical about the efficacy of any conversation with the Taliban. Many of them believe the US-Taliban deal will further entrench Islamabad’s geopolitical interests in Kabul. There was also a sense of unease in New Delhi about Pakistan’s role in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table in Doha. Now Indian analysts believe that any attempt to reach out to the insurgent group will not yield the desired results due to the close proximity of its leadership with Pakistan, making it difficult for their country to secure its interests in the Hindukush region.

Last month, the Taliban spokesperson, Mohammad Suhail Shaheen, tried to reach out to India and told an audience through a webinar speech that the group wanted to build its ties with India. He assured his skeptical listeners that no terror group would be allowed to use the Afghan soil to carry out operations against any other country.

However, New Delhi needs a huge leap of faith to return the Taliban gesture. There is a sense that engaging the Taliban before the start of the intra-Afghan dialogue for peace would give political legitimacy to the group that still carries the tag of a terrorist organization. India also wants the Taliban to recognize the democratically elected Afghan government before it reaches out to them.

There is, however, a bigger dilemma for New Delhi here: How will it bypass the strategically and politically friendly government in Kabul to constructively engage the Taliban? India has always favored an Afghan-owned, -led and -controlled peace deal, but any engagement with the Taliban carries the risk of antagonizing its trustworthy allies in Afghanistan and going against its own stated political policy.

India, Iran and Russia mainly propped up the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance in Afghanistan during the 1990s. New Delhi also remained steadfast in its support to the Tajik-led group even after the downfall of the Taliban in 2001 and wholeheartedly backed the regime change in Kabul.

The mandarins in New Delhi believe India risks sidelining the Afghan government and losing general goodwill among the people of that country by talking to the Taliban. They also feel that working out a deal with the militant group without taking the Afghan establishment into confidence may endanger their country’s gains of the last 15 years, compromising India’s security interests and putting at risk its $3 billion investment in the war-torn country.

With its constricted geopolitical worldview, it is not an easy choice for India to make. At the same time, it cannot afford to be a spectator in the Afghan peace process and emerging political order. Any policy adjustment will be a double-edged sword for India since it gambles losing the confidence of the Afghan government and may not get a desired outcome by talking to the Taliban.

This self-inflicted dilemma is the product of India’s overall geopolitical outlook for the region. New Delhi desires to have a friendly regime in Afghanistan since it wants to keep Pakistan on tenterhooks. Similarly, Pakistan wants “strategic depth” in its immediate neighborhood to keep itself safe from any destabilizing attempt from its eastern neighbor. This deep-seated distrust between New Delhi and Islamabad explains how they see the peace deal in Afghanistan. The question is: How long can India remain hostage to its past policy?

Any talks with the Taliban will be meaningless unless New Delhi engages and normalizes its relationship with Pakistan. The existing regime in India does not have that broadness of vision to reach out to its Muslim neighbor. Meanwhile, Kabul understands it will remain the epicenter of instability, no matter which regime rules Afghanistan, as long as India and Pakistan continue their zero-sum games. Peace deal in Afghanistan can only be sustained if there is some concord and amity between the two South Asian nuclear neighbors.

In other words, if it is the responsibility of the Afghan leadership and the Taliban to make the peace process a reality, it is the duty of their neighbors, especially India and Pakistan, to make it endure and help usher in a new era of regional stability. As a nation that harbors the ambition to play big at the international level, India’s geopolitical worldview needs to evolve to accept the inevitability of peace with Pakistan as a prerequisite to larger stability in South Asia.

*Sanjay Kumar is a New Delhi based journalist with experience of covering South Asia for more than fifteen years.  He covered Sri Lankan conflicts extensively. He is the correspondent Arab News in Delhi.

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