Iran struggles to reclaim regional clout amid changing realities

Several Iranian cultural and social institutions have recently signed memorandums of understanding with various Arab countries in which Iran’s regime wields extensive clout. These memorandums include sociocultural agreements between Iran’s Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs and the countries with whose leaders Iran has significant influence and positive relations, such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and Palestine.

All the aspects of cooperation have revealed a genuine Iranian desire to recreate Tehran’s former model of soft power in these arenas, as seen in earlier decades. These memorandums have focused on cooperation in the fields of culture, tourism and religious affairs, as well as in scientific exchange and cooperation in the spheres of providing social and medical services. Tehran’s desire to revitalize its soft power at this juncture raises urgent questions about the regime’s motives and objectives and the potential risks of this strategy.

Since those comparatively “good old days,” however, Iran’s international image has significantly eroded, particularly in the countries where it has been relentlessly fighting for decades to obtain a foothold and significant influence. For example, the waves of protests in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon have shown how Iran’s image in these regional spheres of influence has been irreparably damaged and how the massively negative impact of its interventions in these countries has been exposed.

This unveiling of the Iranian regime’s true face and the real, horrendous damage Iran’s aggression has caused across the region has not only affected specific countries, parties or followers of a certain sect opposed to the Tehran-aligned proxy actors, but even the previously supportive Shiite community itself has become disillusioned with and angry at Iran’s policies, which have exhausted these countries and drained their resources. Iran’s ruinous policies have also plunged these countries into chaos and civil strife, allegedly paving the way for achieving Iran’s grand objectives — an approach that has led Shiites themselves to take to the streets and chant slogans against Iran’s interventions.

Due to the efforts of some faithful and patriotic elites, these countries have realized that Iran’s dark project has driven them to a state of exhaustion and chaos and plunged them into multiple crises, to the point where they have become incapable of discharging their duties. Therefore, these countries, despite their previous positive relations with Iran, have begun reappraising their policies and rejecting the toxic sectarianism in which Iran’s regional misadventures have mired them, putting them on constant collision course with their authentic identities and affiliations.

These countries’ leaders have realigned their policies to be in accordance with their own, rather than Tehran’s, national interests. The voices of the people on the street have been the chief guiding force in rectifying the course of these governments, leading to greater dialogue between neighboring countries to restore the direction of their policy compass, as well as reestablishing their prestige and standing. Here, it is essential to shed light on the new policies of the Iraqi and Syrian governments, both of which see salvation only through reuniting with the Arab sphere.

The regional realities that Iran is facing have changed, with governments embarking on a course of breaking free of the clutches of its draconian influence. The influence of Iran’s militias and proxy actors has steadily diminished, with the mental image of Iran for most in the region now being synonymous with political, economic and security crises. Iran has caused and contributed to the creation of humanitarian crises not seen since the Second World War in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, as well as in Lebanon, which has been torn asunder by war, a crumbling economy and Hezbollah.

The capabilities of Iran and its proxies have also seen a significant decline in recent years, particularly since the demise of Qassem Soleimani, the chief of the regime’s so-called Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ elite Quds Force and the architect of Iran’s malign regional project. Esmail Ghaani, Soleimani’s successor, has conspicuously failed to perform his role as cunningly as Soleimani had done. This failure by Ghaani has prompted Iran to delegate a larger role to Hezbollah in running its regional activities and coordinating ties with proxy actors in various arenas to plug the widening gap. This also indicates that Iran’s channels of communications have been dealt a severe blow, creating some sort of crisis in its relations within its spheres of influence. Even Hezbollah in Lebanon has failed to fill the void there.

Iran is likely extremely eager to restore the momentum of its influence, as well as the cohesion of the key components of its regional project — even among its closest Shiite incubators. As a result, it has embarked on efforts to strengthen the role of its social and cultural institutions to boost cooperation with peer institutions in the countries making up the so-called axis of resistance in an effort to revive its soft power, which has dramatically eroded over the past decade. Moreover, Iran has begun creating new avenues of cooperation since it has realized that its previously vast influence faces major challenges.

The Iranian regime believes that intensifying efforts to revitalize its soft power could enable it to restore its former regional influence to the levels previously seen in its heyday, or to address the growing erosion and diminishing legitimacy of its Vilayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) system among Shiites in several countries, as well as to reverse the sharp decline in popular acceptance of its militias and proxies.

Additionally, from Iran’s viewpoint, the revitalization of its social and cultural channels of communication could assist in restoring what the regime in Tehran classifies as its “resistance project,” perhaps creating new Iranian elites aligned with the regime and its project instead of those seeking to take advantage of the regional and international conditions to renounce their ties with Iran and its sectarian agenda.

Iran’s regime, which possesses extensive experience in this respect, built its regional influence over four decades through establishing cultural platforms and providing services to Shiite communities in the early stages of its expansionist project. Now, however, Iran is facing major challenges that significantly impede its ability to restore this former momentum. The regime’s policy in this respect has been thoroughly exposed and its objectives — once hidden — have become familiar and well-known at the official and popular levels.

The economic challenges Iran is facing also curb its ability to finance its cultural and development projects. The Iranian people themselves have become staunchly opposed to the regime’s ideology and the regime itself. Thus, they cannot be convinced of any supposed benefits from the regime’s extraterritorial misadventures, whose woes the people have already tasted over the past four decades.

In conclusion, the countries where Iran still wields significant influence, particularly the young people there, now look to the future with a jaded and disillusioned perspective. Knowing that the region is likely to see imminent, far-reaching changes and that regional leaders are working on major projects to advance their countries in search of a leading position in the Middle East, the region’s peoples are asking themselves: What is the benefit of blindly following in the footsteps of an Iranian regime that has miserably failed at home and has not established a model worth following externally?

• Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami is president of the International Institute for Iranian Studies (Rasanah).

Twitter: @mohalsulami