The return of Ayatollah Khomeini from France to Iran in 1979 constituted a pivotal event for the Arab Gulf region, which changed many policies as a result. The revolution in Iran, which overthrew the rule of the late shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, brought a new model that differed from the nature of the rule of regimes in the Gulf.

The Arab Gulf states are governed by families and sheikhdoms that depend on hereditary hierarchy, meaning that monarchy is the cornerstone of these states. The Pahlavi family in Iran shared the same system, although their experiences were different, depending on the various environments, cultures and political and security conditions.

The absence of the monarchical system and the advent of the Islamic Republic regime led to a change in the relationship between Iran and the Arab Gulf states. However, the Sultanate of Oman’s relationship with Iran was not greatly affected due to the existence of historical relations between Tehran and Muscat, and because Omani foreign policy, which, even if it is part of the Gulf Cooperation Council system, has its own style, which depends on dissociation and not entering into regional conflicts. Oman also strives to play a role that balances the various parties and seeks to build bridges between them and convey messages that ease tensions.

Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia sought to deal with the new situation realistically. King Khalid sent a special envoy to meet the leader of the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, and deliver a congratulatory message from the king. Moreover, Riyadh sent a shipment of fuel to Tehran, as Iran was suffering from a shortage.

Even when war broke out between Iraq and Iran in September 1980, Saudi Arabia opposed the conflict. King Fahd, who was crown prince at the time, advised Iraqi President Saddam Hussein not to venture into the war and told him: The decision to start the war is in your hands, but the decision to finish it is not in your hands alone. However, Saddam, with his arrogant personality, did not listen to this advice and continued a war that greatly affected the region and caused political, security and even sectarian problems, the repercussions of which are still being felt.

Institutions such as the IRGC are highly influential in these policies and can disrupt diplomatic tools

Hassan Al-Mustafa

When the Islamic Republic of Iran raised the slogan of exporting the revolution and its discourse began to be directed toward the Arab Gulf states, with some events giving indications of the existence of security and political dangers, Saudi Arabia was forced to confront these threats to preserve its national security. Therefore, when it supported Iraq in the war against Iran, it did not do so because it wanted to be a party to the conflict, as it was aware of the cost of that and knew that the war would deplete its budget. Rather, it wanted to protect its security and create a balance of power between Tehran and Baghdad that would lead, in the future, to an end to the war.

This is what happened later on, when Saudi Arabia sponsored secret negotiations that took place in the palace of Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz in the Swiss city of Geneva. Both Iraq and Iran participated and, in the presence of the Saudi ambassador to Washington at the time, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, both parties accepted the cessation of hostilities based on UN Security Council Resolution 598.

This historical background is important because it still influences Iranian foreign policy, 44 years after the so-called Islamic Revolution. Iranian foreign policy has oscillated for several years, especially during the presidencies of Mohammed Khatami and Hassan Rouhani, under the influence of several centers of power, the most important of which are: the Office of the Supreme Leader, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The audio leaks of former Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in April 2021, in which he criticized the growing foreign policy role of the former commander of the Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani, revealed the depth of the dispute between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the IRGC. Zarif considered this role to be negative and that it harmed Iran’s external image, affecting its regional interests and relations with neighboring countries. This is in addition to the fact that the IRGC, with its interventions, impeded the reaching of positive results in the dialogue between Iran on the one hand and the US and the wider West on the other.

“In the Islamic Republic, the military field rules,” Zarif said in the audiotape, quoted by The New York Times. “I have sacrificed diplomacy for the military field rather than the field servicing diplomacy.” This led to a wave of severe criticism by hard-liners against Zarif and subsequently he apologized to Soleimani’s family.

At that time, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei intervened and declared: “Nowhere in the world is foreign policy determined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rather, it is determined by governmental bodies at a higher level than the Foreign Ministry — the Supreme National Security Council in our country — and implemented by the Foreign Ministry.”

This incident shows that the role of the Iranian Foreign Ministry is very limited compared to the policies drawn up by the Office of the Supreme Leader. It also shows that institutions such as the IRGC are highly influential in these policies and can disrupt diplomatic tools.

This situation continues today in Ebrahim Raisi’s government. Despite being conservative and obedient to the orders of Khamenei, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian finds himself limited in movement due to the more stringent policies of the rest of the regime’s institutions. Many even used to call him the “son of the IRGC.” Despite this, he has been unable to bridge the gap between the points of view of the IRGC and the Foreign Ministry.

Even in the Iranian nuclear file, there are differences between Amir-Abdollahian and chief negotiator Ali Bagheri, as the latter takes more ideological and hard-line positions, while Amir-Abdollahian seeks to be relatively realistic and flexible.

These conflicting and unstable foreign policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran cause added complications in the country’s relations with its regional neighbors, especially when, as the Foreign Ministry adopts positive statements about dialogue with Saudi Arabia, the IRGC generals launch direct threats against the Kingdom.

This duplicity in the Iranian foreign policy discourse harms Iran more than it harms its neighbors. It puts Tehran in a position of mistrust, which prompts influential capitals to doubt the sincerity of its intentions. This is a problem that Iran must solve by itself before asking others to be more open to it.

  • Hassan Al-Mustafa is a Saudi writer and researcher interested in Islamic movements, the development of religious discourse and the relationship between the Gulf Cooperation Council states and Iran. Twitter: @Halmustafa