Lebanon pivots toward stronger relationship with Turkiye

Lebanon’s two highest-ranking officials, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun, each visited Turkiye in July for separate meetings with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and senior Turkish officials, in what could be described as a transformative diplomatic overture from Beirut to Ankara.

Both visits, not to mention their timing within three weeks of each other, could be read as particularly crucial given that relations between the countries, though cordial, have not reached their full potential to date. That is why Salam, during his visit, stated bilateral relations needed to be elevated to “the level of a strategic partnership.”

This view was further underlined by Aoun during an interview with Turkish media ahead of his visit to the country on Thursday. The three key points he emphasized were: Turkiye’s central position in the regional order; the idea of coordination with Turkiye as a strategic necessity rather than a temporary option; and the potential support of Turkiye for efforts to strengthen the capabilities of Lebanese military institutions.

He said Beirut was “counting on Ankara” to help secure Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon and support the implementation of the framework deal with Israeli authorities. However, he also underlined the fact that any Turkish support needed to be in addition to existing US and wider international support, not an alternative to it.

For its part, Ankara has long been prepared for a deeper engagement with Beirut. In June, Erdogan stated openly for the first time that Lebanon and Syria were key to Turkiye’s national security. The statement came as a response to Israeli aggression and ambitions for regional hegemony. This positions Lebanon and Syria as strategic frontiers for Turkiye opposition to Israeli expansionism.

From the perspective of Tel Aviv, Erdogan’s warning that Turkish security interests now stretch as far as Damascus and Beirut was not a good development. Furthermore, Beirut’s openness to the idea of Turkiye carving out a more functional role in Lebanon is likely to complicate Israeli calculations.

From Ankara’s perspective, Israel is trying to draw Lebanon into its rivalry with Turkiye and Ankara not likely to allow this to happen, at any price.

Turkiye has already built strong relations with the new Syrian government, and its footprint, both economically and security-wise, in Syria has expanded in the post-Assad era. Ankara, now with the willingness of Beirut, also wants to contribute to Lebanese economic recovery and security.

Although Turkiye is not a newcomer to Lebanon, it still needs strong regional support for its policies there, and is in particular relying on its cooperative relations with Damascus and Riyadh.

The talks last month between the Lebanese leaders and Erdogan focused in particular on economic and infrastructural recovery

Dr. Sinem Cengiz

Ankara has already proved its diplomatic worth behind the scenes, particularly in talks between Syria and Lebanon, and even Syria and Hezbollah, to prevent the escalation of tensions in the Levant. During Salam’s visit, Erdogan once again stressed the importance of fostering strong neighborly relations between Beirut and Damascus for the benefit of the entire region.

The stability of Lebanon is a critical issue that aligns with Turkish and Syrian interests. This is why Turkiye has included Lebanon in the regional security alliance it leads alongside Syria’s other neighbors, including Jordan and Iraq. Within this context, Turkiye appears ready to provide all means of security support for Beirut.

Turkish troops have already participated for years in the peacekeeping UN Interim Force in Lebanon, which is preparing to conclude its operations when its mandate ends in December 2026, and withdraw from the country after nearly five decades. As a key member of NATO, Turkiye now seeks participants in the potential deployment of a new NATO force in southern Lebanon, with a significant Turkish contingent, to replace UNIFIL.

More importantly, however, Lebanon reportedly seeks to purchase Turkish defense products. Such a development is closely tied to the country’s economic recovery, which will require domestic political stability and the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Yet the mere interest alone in defense procurement signals that Lebanon is seeking to diversify its partnerships in the security and economic realms. And Turkiye appears to be a strong candidate to fill that vacuum in both areas.

Given this, the talks this month between the Lebanese leaders and Erdogan focused in particular on economic and infrastructural recovery. Lebanon seeks to be part of the planned Hejaz Railway project through the Tripoli-Homs and Beirut-Damascus lines.

This is why Syria and Saudi Arabia are key; they are not only part of the railroad project but also a partner to Turkiye on several regional issues. Lebanon is currently not involved in the Hejaz project but if it does become part of this crucial regional logistics corridor it would significantly help its economic and infrastructural recovery in the long term, particularly after its railway tracks are repaired.

From Lebanon’s perspective, the role of Turkiye involves at least three main pillars: the countering of Israeli aggression through strengthened security ties and Ankara’s leverage in Washington; support for Lebanon’s economic and infrastructural recovery through its connectivity projects; and humanitarian aid through soft-power initiatives.

Turkiye has already been engaged in Lebanon through the use of soft power via the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, the Disaster and Emergency Management Agency, and the Turkish Red Crescent, three institutions that provide humanitarian aid to Lebanon.

The aid to Lebanon has even played an influential role in the Turkiye-Armenia normalization process. For instance, the Alican/Margara border crossing between Turkiye and Armenia, which has been closed since 1993, was opened in June to ease the delivery of humanitarian aid from Armenia to Lebanon. For decades, the Armenian diaspora in Lebanon was seen as one of the obstacles to stronger Turkish-Lebanese ties; however, the normalization process between Ankara and Yerevan is now influencing perceptions of Turkiye in Lebanon, and ultimately their relationship.

Given all of this, the visits by the top Lebanese officials to Turkiye mark the beginning of a new and different process that will transform Turkish-Lebanese relations and offer an opportunity that neither Beirut nor Ankara will want to miss.