The latest developments in Sudan appear to promise a successful transition from the unchecked rule of the military junta to a civilian-led government.

Presently, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) led by Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan has at least verbally agreed to a power-sharing deal that appears favorable to the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), a coalition of civilian organizations and associations representing civilians led by the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA).

In this deal, the TMC will be replaced by an 11-member sovereign council composed of 5 individuals chosen by the military and the FFC each and a civilian agreed upon by both sides. However, some reports allege that this sixth "civilian" will actually be a retired military officer. Both sides have also agreed to rotating leadership in the 39-month transition period with the military leading in the first 21 months and a civilian for the remaining 18 months.

The FFC will also appoint Cabinet Ministers who will jointly oversee the creation of a legislative council with the sovereign council. After the transition period, it is expected that the Sudanese will hold their first democratic elections since the ouster of Omar al-Bashir after 3 decades of authoritarian rule.

After the agreement was announced last week, many Sudanese took to the streets to celebrate what will hopefully be a new era in the country's quest for democracy. After all, this new phase did not come without its costs.

Ever since the fall of the Bashir regime, intensifying demonstrations and heavy-handed responses to them by security forces have resulted in multiple deaths and injuries.

The worst of these incidents will eventually come to be known as the Khartoum Massacre where more than a hundred civilians perished and many more were injured after security used live ammunition against protesters. Civilians have also had to endure harassment and assault, which disproportionately targets women and girls. In fact, even though women were major contributors and leaders in the uprisings, both the TMC and FFC have largely shut them out of their protracted negotiations betraying hopes of unprecedented inclusivity.

Despite the agreement, tensions in Sudan still remain markedly high given that some of the protesters' demands have not been met and the power-sharing deal failed to address them.

Hafed Al-Ghwell

Despite the agreement, tensions still remain markedly high given that some of the protesters' demands have not been met and the power-sharing deal failed to address them. For instance, many of the worst atrocities committed against protesters as well as the arrest of political dissidents aligned with the FFC and SPA, have been blamed on the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Protesters have vowed to intensify demonstrations calling for those forces to be withdrawn from the cities alongside helping the unarmed civilians that were targeted. There are also demands for the release of political prisoners and ending the shutdown of the Internet orchestrated by Huawei and the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), Sudan's secret police which also operates the RSF under the leadership of Lt. General Abu Bakr Mustafa.

If a recent accounting of the protests is anything to go by, the FFC and SPA have consistently shown that they do not issue idle threats. Just last month, a 3-day general strike and campaign of non-violent civil disobedience shutdown significant parts of the education, transportation, finance, legal, retail, utilities and medical sectors. Furthermore, protesters have consistently turned up in force regardless of the heavy-handed response from security forces, which has lent organizations representing them considerable leverage in negotiations as well as indirectly forcing changes in the leadership and composition of the TMC.

The new agreement brokered by Ethiopia and the African Union is likely to be accepted by both sides, which would establish transitional institutions and lay out the roadmap to the first democratic elections in October 2022. It must therefore be asked, can the military be trusted to honor its end of this grand bargain and phase itself out of government within the agreed upon timeline?

If precedent is anything to go by, there is no simple answer to that question. Firstly, the military was part of the insulation that the Bashir regime relied on to stay in power. Many of the military's senior leadership, including those who have filtered through to the present-day TMC, rose through the ranks in the Bashir era, which was far-removed from any notions of a truly accountable, inclusive and transparent democratic government. As a result, faced with stiff opposition as well as intensifying protests organized by an FFC resistant to coercion and threats, the military responded by arresting political opponents and unleashing the RSF on protesters.

Additionally, the TMC has failed to demonstrate a willingness to part with power, rejecting any proposals to place the military under civilian control. The military junta also initially desired control of the Interior Ministry, which would be responsible for Sudan's public security forces, law enforcement agencies and intelligence services.

By that design, there would be titular civilian government with actual authority vested in the military far from civilian oversight and control, much like in Egypt and Algeria, which have also undergone similar uprisings.

However, the subsequent arrest of those that were responsible the Khartoum Massacre in early June along with reports of a failed coup targeting the TMC's leadership points to the existence of rogue elements within the military. It also dashes any hopes that Lt. General Abdel Fattah Burhan, the head of the TMC and Sudan's de facto Head of State, has complete control of the military and can effectively check its propensity for violence or untoward outcomes. Without such assurances, simply imprisoning nefarious actors will do little to assuage civilian leadership of the TMC's willingness to honor its commitment through the transition phase.

It would be a little too naive to hope that the military will act according to agreed principles. As a result, it falls onto the FFC to carefully examine through written drafts of the power sharing deal with a fine tooth comb before putting pen to paper in the presence of regional leaders. Evidence points to a military that desires to exist outside the scope of democratic principles and maintain unchecked power, which necessitates their negotiating in bad faith or leaving loopholes in any agreement, written or verbal, between the two sides to exploit at opportune moments.

For now, civilian leadership has considerable leverage, which has been relied upon to effect outcomes favorable to their demands for a democratic government.

However, "resistance fatigue" is likely to set in during the 39-month transition phase should the military continue giving lip service to democratic ideals while working to undercut them.

Thus, the FFC should tread carefully and maintain its ability to effect change at least until democratic elections are held instead of unilaterally disbanding or whittling down its bargaining power. If the TMC wishes to be "trusted", more must be done to earn that trust, and so far, their record has been dismal with too few assurances of being good faith partners in securing Sudan's democracy, long-term stability and a hopefully prosperous future.

  • Hafed Al-Ghwell is a non-resident senior fellow with the Foreign Policy Institute at the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He is also senior adviser at the international economic consultancy Maxwell Stamp and at the geopolitical risk advisory firm Oxford Analytica, a member of the Strategic Advisory Solutions International Group in Washington DC and a former adviser to the board of the World Bank Group.