Increasing provocation by Iran and its proxies in the Gulf region demands muscular diplomacy — a more robust response, combining diplomacy with economic and military pressure. But this should be carried out as a long-term strategy, not merely as day-to-day and week-to-week tactics. While the US reaction to the latest attacks has been strong enough, it should be seen as part of a credible, long-term plan.
It is unlikely that the retaliation on Sunday by the US against Kata’ib Hezbollah militia, an Iranian proxy based in Iraq, will change Iran’s provocative behavior toward the US and its partners in the Gulf. Attacks by Iran and its proxies against US and coalition forces are part of a larger scheme aimed at intimidating the US — pushing it to retreat and weaken sanctions — while also bolstering Iran’s position in Iraq and elsewhere in the region. The response has to be equally comprehensive.
In recent weeks, Iran has escalated its activities around the region. In Iraq, it has tried to impose its own choice of prime minister against the wishes of Iraq’s president and people, and its militia allies are believed to be behind most of the gruesome killings and kidnappings of protesters. In Lebanon, it is trying to force its choice of government, while the country’s economy is haemorrhaging and political system is in tatters. In Yemen, Tehran has provided the Houthis with increasingly sophisticated missiles, encouraging the rebels to step up fighting after several quiet months. And last week Saudi Arabia foiled a terrorist attack that may also have close links to Iran.
Iran’s proxy attacks against US and coalition forces in Iraq are part of a larger scheme and are unlikely to stop unless Tehran becomes convinced that the US means business and will react forcefully to further attacks.
On Dec. 29, the Pentagon issued a statement announcing its response to “repeated attacks” by Kata’ib Hezbollah militia on Iraqi bases that host coalition forces whose task is to “ensure the lasting defeat” of Daesh, and provide advice and assistance to the Iraqi military.
The US conducted “precision defensive strikes” against three militia facilities in Iraq and two in Syria. The most recent militia attack, a 30-plus rocket strike on an Iraqi base near Kirkuk last Friday, resulted in the death of a US contractor, and injured four US and two Iraqi troops.
Kata’ib Hezbollah is known to be directly linked to Gen. Qasem Soleimani’s Qud’s Force of the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and has operated on behalf of Iran in both Iraq and Syria.
US officials have disclosed that they had been in discussions with the Iraqi government and share a “commitment to see these militia attacks cease once and for all.” However, it appears that Kata'ib Hezbollah has not adhered to government orders. Although it is part of the Popular Mobilization Units, which are nominally under government control, it frequently acts independently.
During much of 2019, Iran escalated tensions with the US and its partners, and harassed international shipping in the Gulf.
Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg
During much of 2019, Iran escalated tensions with the US and its partners, and harassed international shipping in the Gulf. In the absence of direct retaliation for its repeated attacks, it continued to up the ante. Iran’s strikes serve multiple purposes. First, they divert attention from troubles at home and in countries, such as Iraq and Lebanon, where it thought its presence was secure. Second, Tehran wants to demonstrate its ability to wreak real havoc and reveal the US as a mere paper tiger. Third, the attacks are meant to put pressure on the US to change its sanctions policy.
Iran continued its attacks because it felt that US policy makers were distracted by the impeachment process in Washington. Tehran may also have been emboldened by European attempts to circumvent US sanctions, as well as Russia’s words of encouragement.
A favorite target of attacks by Iranian-allied militias have been Iraqi military bases housing forces from the US, Iraq and other members of the anti-Daesh coalition. During the past two months, about a dozen increasingly sophisticated attacks were launched against those bases, culminating in the attack against the Kirkuk base on Friday.
However, Iraq is not the only theater for Iran’s threatening behavior as the Houthi escalation in Yemen and the foiled terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia last week show.
In Yemen, the Houthis have frustrated UN attempts to implement the Stockholm agreement to disengage from Hodeidah, and have launched attacks in the past week on government-held towns and cities following a lull of several months. On Dec. 29, a missile hit a military graduation ceremony in the town of Al-Dhalea, killing nine cadets. Houthis are believed to be behind the attack. Over the past week, Houthi militias launched attacks on government-held outskirts of Hodeida, hamlets west of the besieged city of Taiz, as well as attacks on the outskirts of government-controlled Hais, south of Hodeidha, and further south in the Mocha district
The rebel pressure on government forces is expected to continue since Iran appears to be stoking the fires there. Earlier in December, a US warship intercepted a large cache of advanced Iranian missile parts being sent to the Houthis. It is clear that Iran is dragging Yemen into its confrontation with the US and its partners.
On Dec. 25, Saudi security forces foiled a terrorist attack in the eastern city of Dammam. The would-be attackers were planning a bombing using RDX, a highly explosive substance. Two were killed in a shootout with security forces, while a third was captured. While it is too early to determine their exact links with Iran, the attackers appear to belong to an extremist fringe group linked with Tehran.
The US attack on Kata’ib Hezbollah is believed to have killed one of the militia’s leaders as well as injuring dozens of militiamen and Iranian forces. On Dec. 31, Kata’ib Hezbollah stormed the Green Zone and attacked the US Embassy with little resistance from security forces.
- Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg is the Gulf Cooperation Council’s assistant secretary-general for political affairs and negotiation, and a columnist for Arab News. The views expressed in this piece are personal and do not necessarily represent those of the GCC. Twitter: @abuhamad1
