Netanyahu’s escalation with Turkiye smacks of desperation

As if Israel does not have enough unresolved conflicts, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seems determined to add another, this time with Turkiye, in what appears to be a last-ditch attempt to improve his chances in the October general election. It is almost impossible to provide an alternative explanation for this misguided decision to strike Abu Duhur airport, a Syrian military base near the Turkish border. Unlike previous Israeli military operations in Syria, this time Israel took responsibility for the attack and blamed Turkiye for planning to deploy forces at the airbase.

In an area where stability has been scarce, particularly during the past three years, it is impossible to comprehend who could benefit from a direct confrontation between two of the region’s most powerful militaries. Hence, considering Netanyahu’s past, it is inevitable that suspicions are growing that this escalation, which was followed by another airstrike in Syria a few days later, is motivated by domestic political considerations. This latest development fits the perilous pattern of behavior of Israel’s current government, which resorts to a single modus operandi: the use of force. It sees risks rather than opportunities and almost completely sidelines, if not outright neglects, diplomatic solutions to disagreements and security challenges.

The fall of Bashar Assad and the emergence of Ahmad Al-Sharaa as Syria’s new leader were unsettling for Israel. Al-Sharaa’s past naturally raised concerns. Yet, Al-Sharaa proved to be pragmatic and extremely restrained in the face of Israeli provocations.

Israel’s overreaction to the new Syrian leadership, including the seizure of additional territory, which it claimed was necessary to create a buffer zone beyond the occupied Golan Heights, and the airstrikes it carried out in December 2024, was met with a remarkably pragmatic response from Al-Sharaa, which has continued since.

The message from Damascus has been that it has no interest in confrontation or escalation with Israel. Having endured the tragically disastrous years of the Assad family’s rule, Syria wants to concentrate on rebuilding its country, economy, and society. To do so, it needs foreign investment and political support. This week’s US decision to remove Syria from its list of state sponsors of terrorism after 47 years, is a major relief for Damascus. It opens the way for greater private sector investment and closer integration with the global economy. Why would Syria risk all this through a futile confrontation with Israel?

Netanyahu claims that Israel and Syria agreed to a security status quo “which Syria was on the verge of breaching by permitting Turkish troops to deploy at an air base near Aleppo.” This claim hardly holds water, given that Israel itself has unilaterally and repeatedly altered the status quo. Turkiye, backed by the US, strongly rejected the accusation, arguing that Israel was attempting to “bait” Turkiye into a conflict ahead of the Israeli elections. Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Turkiye and special envoy for Syria, did not mince his words. In an interview, he suggested that “one theory is they were just baiting Turkiye, and it is a very aggressive, but maybe well-received, pre-election concept.”

Barrack’s other possible explanation was hardly more complimentary to Israel: that there may have been confusion between the Israeli military, Mossad, and the prime minister’s office. If true, that would suggest that Israel’s security and political leadership have learned little from the calamities of the past three years.

It was not that long ago that Israel and Turkiye were close allies, and there was considerable strategic logic to that relationship — logic that has not fundamentally changed over the years and, if anything, should once again become prominent in the calculations of both countries. Instead, the relationship increasingly appears to have become a matter of clashing personalities between the leaders of both countries, with hostile rhetoric and provocations eclipsing the national interests.

In recent months, anti-Turkish rhetoric from senior members of the Israeli Cabinet has increased significantly, despite the absence of hard evidence that Turkiye is building a military base in Syria or that its actions there are driven by hostile intentions toward Israel. The suggestion that Turkiye’s objective is to restrict the Israeli Air Force’s air superiority in Syria by permanently stationing advanced air-defense systems has neither been accompanied by conclusive evidence nor been sufficiently examined as a reflection of the Israeli government’s apparent belief that it can control another country’s airspace indefinitely.

Ultimately, there is a huge leap between a visit by a Turkish delegation to a site to assess the viability of rehabilitating it and establishing a Turkish presence there, and the assumption that such a presence would be hostile to Israel. There is an equally enormous leap between such a possibility and the aspiration to preserve the ability to violate another country’s sovereignty rather than reaching long-term understandings with it.

Above all, the change of government in Syria represents a positive development for Israel, given the close relationship between Damascus and Tehran during the Assad era. That relationship facilitated Hezbollah’s presence in Syria and the free flow of weapons from Iran to the organization’s militants in Lebanon. Reducing Iran’s influence is a common interest for both Syria and Israel, and arguably outweighs any immediate or grave threat to Israeli security. What has been taking place in Syria should be viewed as an opportunity, rather than a threat, at a time when the Middle East’s security architecture is shifting rapidly, as evidenced by the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement involving Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkiye.

Moreover, at a time when Israel’s international standing is at one of its lowest points, and when the US president has forged close relations with both Turkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Al-Sharaa, Netanyahu might find that further strikes against Syria only undermine his country’s relationship with Washington. Provoking a crisis with Turkiye, a NATO member, raises the suspicion that the Israeli leader and those close to him are becoming increasingly desperate. It also suggests that political considerations may be eclipsing sound judgment, at the cost of risking Israel’s national interests simply to keep Netanyahu in power.

If anything, this approach should deter and alienate voters who may otherwise have considered another four years under the current leadership. And who knows what he and his lieutenants might be plotting next?

• Yossi Mekelberg is a professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House.

X: @YMekelberg