The US’ Iran strategy is finally out in public and a legitimate question has been raised as to whether the region’s key players, in particular the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), have a similar strategy or are they only reacting to the US’ moves?
I would argue that the GCC has had an Iran strategy in place for some time, the last articulation of which was agreed by the GCC ministers of defense, interior and foreign affairs in 2017, and endorsed by the GCC summit in April 2017. The GCC and US strategies are quite similar and their centerpiece is an enhanced GCC-US Strategic Partnership, established at the May 2016 Camp David summit of heads of state, and reconfirmed in the consequent GCC-US summits of 2016 and 2017.
In the latest issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo laid out the most detailed public articulation of the Trump administration’s strategy on confronting Iran. Pompeo outlined the “Trump doctrine,” which is that Iran is put on notice that the US will not allow its destabilizing activities to go unchecked, and is willing to use force to stop them. In addition, the Trump administration is pursuing a “maximum pressure” campaign designed to choke off revenues that the Iranian regime uses to fund violence throughout the region and to allow its agents to covertly plot around the world.
What are the most important elements of the GCC strategy toward Iran? The strategy starts by identifying the main sources of threats emanating from Iran: Military and asymmetric, as well as territorial, political, diplomatic, economic and environmental. The strategy addresses each group of threats, outlining the actions required to deal with them. Finally, the strategy includes a political process on how the confrontation could be defused.
While the GCC has been building its own defenses to stop Iran’s extraterritorial reach, it has also several times attempted to engage Iran diplomatically.
Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg
The military threats include nuclear, ballistic and conventional weapons. On Iran’s nuclear program, the GCC has expressed its support for the Trump administration in calling for a revamped deal that removes the so-called sunset clauses and establishes a more robust inspection system to ensure that it is and will remain a peaceful, non-military program.
On Iran’s ballistic missiles program, the GCC strategy calls for a strengthened international regime to supplement the restrictions outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 2231. At the same time, the GCC is building a ballistic missile defense shield in cooperation with the US.
And, finally, to face Iran’s conventional military threats, the GCC is enhancing its military capabilities in the air, on land and at sea, with considerable progress. It has built a unified military structure that includes all services. This process has been brought closer to completion with the recent appointment of Gen. Eid Al-Shalawi as commander of the GCC Unified Military Command — the first in the GCC’s 37-year history.
The most difficult part of confronting Iran is how to deal with its asymmetric threats, mainly its use of terrorism and sectarian strife to destabilize the region and beyond. On confronting Iranian-sponsored terrorism, the GCC and its partners, such as the US and the UK, have developed various tools to disrupt the work of terrorists supported by Iran, especially intercepting and weakening their funding through sanctions. To counter Iran’s sectarian speech and that of its proxies in the region — particularly in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria — the GCC has established various centers to counter the terrorists’ messaging, which is used to recruit and radicalize young people.
Territorial threats include Iran’s occupation of three UAE islands (Greater and Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa), as well as incursions into the GCC’s territorial seas, continental shelf and maritime economic zones, which are rich in oil and minerals.
Environmental threats include the risk of accidents in Iran’s nuclear reactors, especially the Bushehr nuclear plant, which came online a few years ago and is located near a major earthquake fault line. There have been close calls at the facility after some major earthquakes.
While the GCC has been building its own defenses to stop Iran’s extraterritorial reach, it has also several times attempted to engage Iran diplomatically. In 1986, the GCC articulated 10 principles based on the UN Charter and asked Tehran to commit to them, but without success, as Iran was more interested in military solutions at the time of the Iran-Iraq war. There was limited success later, during the presidencies of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and Mohammed Khatami (1997-2005). A number of security agreements were signed and a general thaw in relations took place.
That hopeful period was put in abeyance with the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but the GCC continued to engage Iran during his presidency, without success. The Arab Spring events of 2011 led to a break in the dialogue because Iran saw it as an opportunity to pursue its goals without having to change its behavior or engage with its neighbors. It succeeded in extending its hegemony to Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. It attempted to do the same thing in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia but failed.
Despite an energized Iranian interventionist policy throughout the region, the GCC has identified a political process. In response to an Iranian message in 2016 to start a new page, the GCC sent a letter through Kuwait to Iran, suggesting a course of action to build confidence and engage peacefully. Thus, while the GCC is enhancing its own elements of power — military, economic and cultural — it is also leaving the door open for a political solution to defuse the conflict with Iran.
- Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg is the GCC Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs & Negotiation, and a columnist for Arab News. The views expressed in this piece are personal and do not necessarily represent GCC views. Twitter: @abuhamad1
