Russia’s new Syrian gambit

The Russian proposal, made jointly with the Arab League that there be direct talks between the opposition Syrian National Coalition and the Assad government, shows how the political ground is shifting away from the Damascus regime.
Ever since its first tentative admission last year that Assad’s forces were unlikely to be able to crush the diverse forces of the Free Syria Army, Moscow has been considering a political solution, even as it continued to pour arms and ammunition into the country to support the regime.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Arab League General Secretary Nabil Elaraby have now said that their priority is to create a transitional government to navigate a way out of the violence. At the moment it is clear that the SNC will not back down from its insistence that any such transitional body cannot include Bashar Assad or top people from his government. For his part Assad has made it clear that he will not step down from power but is adamant that he must be part of any new governmental body.
It has been his position all along that he is part of the solution. He has refused to accept that he is indeed himself the problem. With every new outrage in this two-year conflict, which has now claimed at least 70,000 lives, the chances of a role for him in Syria’s future have become ever more remote. What is not clear is how much the Kremlin’s analysis of his role has come to appreciate this.
Two key developments have proved to be game changers. The first is the slow but steady military advance of Free Syrian Army forces. Though they have not taken Aleppo as they swore they would do last year, rebel units have been overrunning increasingly significant objectives, including military depots, barracks and air force bases. In doing so, they have captured a growing arsenal of weaponry. This, thanks to the many government soldiers who have defected and joined its ranks, is allowing the rebel forces to fight off regime counter attacks as well as continue their inexorable advance.
The second game changer has been the formation and the continued political cohesion of the SNC. This is still far from a strongly united body, there are too many bitter personal and ideological rivalries for that, but the very fact that it has continued to hold together, has given the international community a single point with which to communicate with the fighters. Among those who have been talking to the SNC are indeed the Russians.
The one person of course who has not opened a dialogue is Assad himself. He claimed consistently that he wanted to talk to the opposition but was always able to protest that this was impossible, because there was no unified opposition to sit down with. This may well have been what he told the Russians. He may very well have assured his Kremlin allies that the minute there was a definable and stable opposition, he would indeed talk. Well now his bluff has been called. The SNC, for all its shortcomings, is there and the Russian themselves have entered into exploratory conversations with its people. So when is Assad going to step up to the plate?
Just as importantly, what are the Russians hoping to gain from a change of tactics? They maintain of course that having backed what they regard as the legitimate government of Syria from what they claim is a rebellion sponsored by outside interests, their concern now is to stop the death and destruction. They are indicating that they fear a Syria that will become a patchwork of warring communities and a source of deep regional insecurity.
Moscow’s extraordinary emergence as an “honest broker,” standing alongside the Arab League, whose credentials in seeking a just settlement to this horrific civil war are unimpeachable, might be a cause for smiles, were the situation not so deadly serious. The Russians are not going to give up on Assad and maybe fly him and his top echelons off into exile, without some sort of quid pro quo. Such a deal might involve the continued use of the Tartus naval facilities, which are now Moscow’s only warm water naval base. It might also be part of a charm offensive designed to restore Russia’s soiled reputation and widespread loss of credit in the Arab world.
In the circumstances, any deal Moscow offers that ends this horrific conflict should be accepted immediately. The SNC will not share transitional power with Assad. Assad will not relinquish power. The only solution is for Assad to be removed from power, one way or another. Is the Kremlin preparing to organize such a move?