The key internal messages in Khamenei’s speeches

The most recent address by Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, titled “Nowruz Message 1405” and issued on March 20, reveals that the new leader of the Islamic Republic has, from the outset of his tenure, chosen to frame the current phase as one of “comprehensive resilience.” This is evident in the title he assigned to the new year: “A resistance economy in light of national unity and national security.” This is an overtly political formulation, going beyond a mere mobilizing slogan. It places the economy squarely within an integrated security and political equation.

What the third supreme leader of the Iranian revolution intends with this formulation is not to address economic imbalances through conventional administrative means, but to transform the economy into a function of internal steadfastness during wartime, particularly in the face of mounting external pressure resulting from the Israeli-American war that has devastated much of Iran’s military capabilities and infrastructure.

Perhaps most telling in Khamenei’s message is that he does not view what Iran has endured in recent months as a single crisis. Instead, he reorganizes it into phases, stating: “In the past year, our dear people have fought three military and security wars,” adding, “the third war is the one we are currently in.”

He does not view what Iran has endured in recent months as a single crisis. Instead, he reorganizes it into phases

Hassan Al-Mustafa

This hierarchical framing reflects the new leader’s understanding that war extends beyond mere military action. It is a far more influential tool politically, socially, economically and in terms of security — one aimed at bringing about deep structural changes within the ruling system, as well as in the Iranian people’s perception of and relationship with the governing elite and its institutions.

With this assertion, Khamenei seeks to broaden the concept of “threat” facing the state to include both internal and external dimensions simultaneously. This provides the regime with a basis to justify tightening internal discipline and maintaining an iron grip, while linking societal unity to the necessities of survival — on the premise that Iran’s entire geography is under threat, not just the system of Wilayat Al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), according to the narrative presented in the speech.

When the supreme leader explains the motives of what he calls the “enemy,” he is directing messages primarily to the Iranian domestic audience, which he seeks to fortify. He states that the “enemy” believed targeting the head of the regime and its leadership would spread fear and despair among Iranians, thereby realizing the “dream of controlling and dismantling Iran.”

This emphasis on the dangers of ‘control’ and ‘dismantlement’ appeals to the Iranian collective consciousness

Hassan Al-Mustafa

This emphasis on the dangers of “control” and “dismantlement” appeals to the Iranian collective consciousness and historical memory. It encourages greater caution and discourages engagement in antiregime activities — even among those who oppose or resent the system — out of fear of repeating past experiences. Before the revolution, Iran suffered from attempts to rebel against central authority. As a result, the preservation of “Iranian identity” remains a point of consensus, even if Wilayat Al-Faqih itself does not enjoy broad acceptance among the Iranian population.

The term “dismantlement” does not merely imply weakening the state; it signals an existential threat to the unity of the entity itself. By using it, the supreme leader elevates the conflict from the level of deterrence or retaliation to that of defending the very survival of the state.

To achieve this cohesion, Khamenei praised society for establishing “a broad defensive line across the country.” He went further, stating: “At present, due to a remarkable unity that has emerged among you — citizens of diverse religious, intellectual, cultural and political backgrounds — the enemy has suffered a critical breakdown.”

This portrayal is intended to make the Iranian people an integral part of the battle and an extension of it. “Unity” becomes an instrument of strength, complementing the “resistance economy” and thus completing the broader picture drawn by revolutionary discourse: a society ideologically mobilized, a cohesive state and an economy harnessed for resilience — all in support of the efforts of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the armed forces, operating under the command of the supreme leader.

These messages, the most significant for the Iranian domestic audience, complement those conveyed in Khamenei’s first message, broadcast on March 12, which revealed the foundations shaping his policies for the coming phase.

In that initial audio message, Khamenei sought to downplay any perception of personal ambition for the leadership position. He said: “I, your servant Sayyid Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei, learned of the result of the esteemed Assembly of Experts’ vote at the same time you did, through the national broadcasting authority.” He added: “For me, taking a seat once occupied by two great leaders — Khomeini the great and the martyred Khamenei — is no easy matter.”

These two statements serve a clear political function. Khamenei is well aware that both the general public and senior clerics in the religious seminaries do not support the idea of political inheritance. He understands that the legitimacy of the revolution rests on the fact that the people overthrew Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to establish a republican system based on the peaceful transfer of power, not its inheritance within a family.

Accordingly, he seeks to construct a new, less provocative form of legitimacy — one rooted in duty, restraint and humility, rather than claims of independent charismatic merit. It is as though he is saying: I did not seek this position; rather, I was brought to it by the choice of the scholars in the Assembly of Experts, whom you elected to represent you.

Additionally, in his first speech, the new leader emphasized that the true locus of strength is “society,” stating: “It was you, the people, who led the country and guaranteed its authority.”

This acknowledgment from the highest political authority in Iran is not mere flattery. It is an explicit recognition that the legitimacy of the office alone is insufficient at a moment of succession that only arose following the tragic assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his family. Hence, his son seeks to consolidate the new leadership’s position through organized and cohesive popular support.

While many have focused on the external political messages in Mojtaba Khamenei’s speeches, the more consequential messages, in my view, are aimed at Iran’s domestic sphere. The domestic arena is the most influential base — and it will serve as the real test and challenge for the new leader’s policies in the postwar period. It is then that Iranians will demand clarity about a future they refuse to leave as uncertain as it is today.

• Hassan Al-Mustafa is a Saudi writer and researcher specializing in Islamist movements, the evolution of religious discourse, and relations between the Gulf states and Iran. X: @Halmustafa