Why Iran cannot win by closing the Strait of Hormuz

In the escalating rhetoric surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, one narrative continues to surface with alarming persistence: that Iran holds a decisive card via its ability to take the region — and, by extension, the world — hostage by closing this critical waterway. It is a narrative built on geography, amplified by politics and sustained by fear. But it is also fundamentally flawed.

The Strait of Hormuz is indeed one of the most strategic chokepoints in the global system. Nearly a quarter of the world’s seaborne oil trade flows through this narrow passage, making it indispensable to global energy markets. Yet the assumption that its closure translates into an Iranian strategic victory misunderstands a far more important reality: in any sustained disruption, Iran itself would be the first and most consequential loser.

Iran’s economy is deeply dependent on the very waterway it threatens to disrupt. Between 70 percent and 80 percent of its exports — and as much as 95 percent of its oil shipments — pass through the strait. In other words, closing it is not an act of leverage, it is an act of self-strangulation.

Unlike global markets, which can adapt, reroute and absorb shocks over time, Iran’s economic system lacks the flexibility and reserves to withstand prolonged isolation. Estimates suggest that a sustained closure could wipe out tens of billions of dollars in Iranian revenue within months, triggering severe contraction, inflation and internal instability.

Even recent developments reinforce this imbalance. As tensions have escalated, efforts to restrict maritime flows have already translated into direct economic losses for Iran, with analysts estimating hundreds of millions of dollars in daily export disruptions. The message is clear: the weaponization of the Strait of Hormuz does not create asymmetry in Iran’s favor — it exposes its vulnerabilities.

This is where the Iranian strategic calculus appears dangerously misguided. The assumption that the Gulf can be held hostage ignores two critical dynamics: Arab adaptability and global redundancy.

First, the Arab Gulf is not without options. While the Strait of Hormuz remains central, it is not the sole gateway. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have already developed alternative export routes that bypass the strait, including pipelines to the Red Sea and the port of Fujairah. These routes are not sufficient to replace the strait entirely, but they are strategically significant. They represent a foundational shift: the recognition that dependence must be mitigated, not managed. 

The weaponization of the Strait of Hormuz does not create asymmetry in Iran’s favor — it exposes its vulnerabilities.

Hani Hazaimeh

More importantly, these alternatives are not static. In times of crisis, they can be expanded, reinforced and supplemented through regional coordination. This is where the concept of a “northern gateway” becomes strategically relevant. Through integrated infrastructure linking the Gulf to Jordan and onward to Mediterranean ports, Arab states possess the geographic and logistical potential to reorient part of their energy exports toward Europe and beyond. Such a shift would not be immediate but it is entirely feasible — and increasingly necessary.

Second, the global system itself is not as fragile as it appears in moments of crisis. Yes, disruption in the Strait of Hormuz can trigger price shocks, supply chain stress and economic turbulence. But global markets are adaptive systems. Strategic reserves can be released. Alternative suppliers can increase output. Shipping routes can be recalibrated. The initial shock may be severe but it would not be permanent.

Iran, by contrast, does not operate within such a flexible framework. Its economy is constrained by sanctions, has limited access to foreign reserves and contains structural inefficiencies. It cannot simply wait out a crisis of its own making. Every day of disruption compounds internal pressure, erodes state capacity and narrows strategic options.

There is also a deeper geopolitical miscalculation at play. Closing the Strait of Hormuz does not occur in a vacuum. It invites a response — not just from the US but from a coalition of global and regional powers whose interests are directly threatened. The notion that Iran could control the escalation ladder is, at best, optimistic and, at worst, dangerously naive.

Recent events underscore this reality. Moves to disrupt the strait have already triggered direct countermeasures aimed specifically at Iranian exports and maritime activity. The objective is not merely to reopen the waterway but to ensure that Iran pays a disproportionate price for its disruption. In such a scenario, escalation does not enhance Iran’s leverage — it accelerates its isolation. 

Moves to disrupt the strait have already triggered direct countermeasures aimed specifically at Iranian exports.

Hani Hazaimeh

But perhaps the most overlooked factor in this equation is the Arab dimension. For too long, the region has been framed as a passive space — reacting to external pressures rather than shaping its own strategic environment. The Strait of Hormuz crisis challenges this perception.

If there is a lesson to be drawn, it is this: fragmentation is vulnerability, while coordination is power.

An Arab strategy built on integration — economic, logistical and defensive — would fundamentally alter the equation. By linking Gulf energy infrastructure to broader regional networks, by investing in alternative export corridors and by coordinating maritime security, Arab states can transform the Strait of Hormuz from a point of weakness into one element within a diversified system.

Such a strategy would not eliminate risk. But it would ensure that no single actor — regional or otherwise — can hold the entire system hostage.

This is precisely why the idea of Iranian dominance through the strait is ultimately an illusion. Power in today’s world is not derived from the ability to disrupt but from the ability to sustain. Disruption is temporary. Sustainability is strategic.

Iran can threaten to close the strait. It can disrupt, harass and escalate. But it cannot endure the consequences of its own actions in a prolonged scenario. The economic, political and strategic costs would accumulate far faster in Tehran than in any Gulf capital or global market.

• Hani Hazaimeh is a senior editor based in Amman.

X: @hanihazaimeh