Saturday’s referendum in Ireland on the Treaty of Nice was an odd exercise in democracy. Effectively the Dublin government, and the European Union behind it, told the Irish that they had got it wrong when last year they voted against ratifying the treaty and that they had to change their minds. Hardly an advertisement for democracy. Not that the EU had much choice: the treaty, and with it the plan to expand EU membership from its present 15 states to 25 in two years’ time, would have been dead if last year’s Irish vote had been taken as final.

By changing their minds and voting "Yes", Ireland has allowed the European Union to grow. For that there will be a huge collective sigh of relief across Europe, not merely from the existing members and the candidates, but also from those who want to join but are deemed not yet ready, such as Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Turkey: clearly, the EU is not going to pull up the drawbridge and be a club solely for rich, developed, Western Europe. The move into what was once the closed, Communist east — probably the most important step since the EEC, the EU’s forebear, was created — is going to happen. It is a development of enormous international significance. The EU is already the world’s largest economic entity; the next expansion is going to make it even more powerful.

Meanwhile, though the Irish hurdle has been overcome, there are still considerable obstacles to be overcome if the ten applicants — Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak republics, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and, on the southern flank, Cyprus and Malta — are to join in two year’s time. The Dutch Parliament has to ratify the treaty before the Copenhagen summit in December, but the country is without a government; moreover, the Netherlands has already raised difficulties on Czech entry because of Prague’s subsidies for its steel industry.

The bigger problem, however, is the financial conditions demanded of candidate countries; they still have not been worked out and there is going to be a lot of argument, particularly in the case of Poland with its heavily rural economy. The Poles had been looking to the EU for a bonanza to transform them, as happened with Greece and Portugal. But it is not going to be: agricultural subsidies which along with aid to poorer economies ranks as the EU’s biggest expenditure, is going to be pared to the bone. Brussels has no alternative: it is difficult enough with the current eight million farmers; Poland alone will bring in another 10 million. Disillusionment could yet prompt the Poles to vote "No" to membership: the Maltese too are wary and in several of the other candidate countries there is a definite upswell in anti-EU sentiments as local populist politicians grab the issue and run with it. Nothing can be taken for granted.

But, despite the hurdles — and Cyprus brings its own unique problems — the EU will be much bigger in two years’ time. Of that there can be no doubt. It may not be all 25, but it will be near enough. All of which begs the question: if the Europeans can do it, surmounting such difficulties and complexities, why not the Arabs?