There have been two interesting recent developments in British politics, which are pulling in opposite directions. After nearly six years in office, Tony Blair believes that he has finally discovered how to be an effective prime minister. After doing what it was told for nearly six years, the Parliamentary Labour Party has rediscovered an interest in politics.

When Blair declared that his government was at its best when at its boldest, he was not only trying to inspire the troops. There was also an element of self-reproach. In two other respects Blair is right to reproach himself. From the outset he should have been much bolder on public services. At moments, he seemed ready to be convinced that only choice-driven and market-led reforms would work, but he always lacked the final impetus of courage. That was also true on the euro. If Blair had been bolder on the euro and on public services, he would have been steering his plane straight for the storm clouds. He would almost certainly have had a much smaller majority at the last election.

This highlights a basic difference between Blair and Lady Thatcher. Blair can never decide whether he is her heir or the man who liberated the country from 18 years of Thatcherite captivity.

But when it comes to popularity, he is no Thatcherite. She regarded popularity as capital to be invested and expended. Blair has been a miser of popularity, never happier than when sitting in his big tent counting his gold, desperate to ensure that not a single coin escapes.

He now assures us that this will change, and he cites the forthcoming war as evidence. He has a point for, on Iraq, he is in conflict with public opinion as well as his party. The big tent has been dismantled and folded away. Yet the PM is behaving as if the doubts of others are merely confirming him in his own moral certainties. But there is a difficulty, which he may not fully understand. Back in 1997, a large number of voters believed in him, while a large number of Labour MPs were awestruck. That sort of magic no longer works.

Instead, a lot of Labour MPs have remembered that they did not come into politics to let market forces loose in the health service and George Bush loose in Iraq. They are still not ready to overthrow Blair, but it is no longer inconceivable that they should do so. A year ago, who would have thought that the most secure party leader would be Charles Kennedy, the man who took the weight out of lightweight.

Equally, a large number of voters no longer buy the prime minister’s act. Excessive spin and insufficient performance have bred disillusion. They, too, are not ready to sack him, but these days, when he preaches, they laugh.

Some of No. 10’s advisers believe that this will all change after a successful war, and it is easy to construct a Blair-boosting scenario. This would involve a quick military win, with a minimum of casualties and a maximum of Iraqi defections, accompanied by the hard evidence of hideous weapons — but not used on allied forces. Blair could then fly in, looking somber in front of the weapons sites and covered in smiles as delighted Iraqi children festoon him with garlands — the mother of all photo opportunities.

This could happen, but even if it did, there might be no great impact on public opinion. A lot of voters could respond along the lines of: “OK, you were not as wrong about Iraq as we feared, but when are you going to do something about schools/hospitals/crime/transport? Stop crowing and get on with it.’’

That deals with the rosy outcome. But what if Saddam still has a few thousand loyal troops? Instead of sending them into suicidal combat with allied air power and armor, he might choose to scatter them in penny packets to hold towns and villages, while keeping a good force for Baghdad itself.

If so, there could be unpleasant outcomes. It is never easy for an army to fight its way into urban areas; in that type of warfare, smart weapons lose their advantages. It would, of course, be possible simply to besiege Baghdad, but that would mean terrible sufferings for the civilians.

We can only hope that Saddam’s powers disintegrate with the imminence of defeat, and that the Baghdadis of 2003 do not behave like the Berliners of 1945. But a messy, protracted endgame would create problems for Blair, especially if there is only ambiguous evidence on weapons of mass destruction — especially if the war began without a second UN resolution.

War is unpredictable. A lot will depend on luck. Blair may be buoyed up by self-belief and self-righteousness, but this will not necessarily endear him to the public mood. For the first time during his premiership, Blair has put himself at the mercy of events.

Opinion 4 March 2003