In nuclear politics, every action is justified by the response it provokes. The US explains its missile defense program by claiming that other states are developing new weapons systems, which one day it might need to shoot down. In response, Russia has activated a new weapons system, the Topol-M, designed to “penetrate US anti-missile defenses”. Israel, citing the threat from Iran, insists on retaining its nuclear missiles.

Threatened by them, the Iranian president says he wants to wipe Israel off the map. Israel sees his response as vindicating its nuclear program. It threatens an airstrike, which grants retrospective validity to Ahmadinejad’s designs. And so it goes on. Everyone turns out to be right in the end.

British defense secretary explains that a new missile system is necessary because “some countries” have not been “complying with their obligations under the non-proliferation treaty”.

In response, therefore, the UK will refuse to comply with its obligations under the non-proliferation treaty. This provides other countries with their justification for ... well, you’ve got the general idea. Last week, France joined the exclusive club of responsible nations (the UK, US and North Korea) which have threatened other countries with a pre-emptive nuclear strike. What greater incentive could there be for the rogue states Chirac spoke of to “consider using ... weapons of mass destruction”?

Unlike the British Parliament, the US Congress has been permitted to vote on such matters, and despite a great deal of bellyaching from the administration, has bravely sought to block a new nuclear weapons program.

For two years in a row it has refused to approve the money for George Bush’s “robust nuclear earth penetrator”, a mini-nuke which could have reduced the threshold for first use. But now it seems to have been duped.

Last year it approved initial funding for something called the “reliable replacement warhead” program. The administration maintained that this was nothing more than the refurbishment of existing nuclear weapons.

The legislators chose to believe it. David Hobson, a Republican who sits on the House Appropriations Committee, and has led the fight against new weapons, was persuaded that “this is not a sneaky way to get a whole new powerful warhead type of thing in the future. We’re not trying to do separate missions than those the warheads were designed for today.”

Ellen Tauscher, a Democrat who is fiercely opposed to proliferation, insisted “this is about tinkering at the margins of the existing weapons systems, nothing more”. The program would concentrate on replacing a few non-nuclear components, such as wires and electronics, in order to extend their life.

They seemed naive then and they seem more naive today. The US has already spent about $60bn maintaining and refurbishing its weapons under a separate program, called “stockpile stewardship”.

It wasn’t easy to see why it needed a new scheme. Even before the reliable replacement warhead program had been approved, the outgoing deputy head of the Nuclear National Security Administration (NNSA) had let slip that a new generation of weapons was “not the primary objective, but (it) would be a fortuitous associated event”.

The new warheads would be bigger than the old ones. This is beginning to look like “a whole new powerful warhead type of thing”.

Writing in the online magazine OpenDemocracy a few days ago, the professor of peace studies Paul Rogers suggested that an early candidate for replacement under the new program would be America’s Trident missiles. If this is the case, it “would suit the British very well, with the prospect of close collaboration and maybe even the sharing of some development costs”.

So, without any proper public debate on either side of the Atlantic, both nations might have begun developing a new nuclear weapons program which could last for 40 or 50 years. Throughout that period, their missiles will continue to provide everyone else with an excuse to flout the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

The refusal of the members of the security council to make any moves toward disarmament, their threats of pre-emptive bombing and their quiet development of new weapons systems guarantees the failure of both the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Nothing could make us less secure than the billions we are spending in the name of security.