The heated battle between nonproliferators in Washington and the US businessmen and pro-India community has spilled over to Pakistan. In an unprecedented move, leading members of the US print media were far more critical of the proposed Indo-US nuclear deal than even the Pakistani officials and media.
In its March 8 editorial The New York Times wondered how a “war-on-terror” ally, miffed over the deal, would continue to cooperate with the US in the war. Questions about destabilization of the nuclear deterrent were raised. Others maintained that Musharraf would have difficulty placating Pakistanis criticizing his alliance with an ungrateful Washington.
It is unlikely that Bush will lose this battle. The businessmen, academics/analysts and lobbyists who are tied to India need this to work. Against these interests the nonproliferators will appear unconvincing moralists. Real politick would win. Islamabad understood this. This is why Islamabad’s response came later. First there was vacillation between Pakistan Foreign Office’s statement (this was before Bush’s arrival in Pakistan) demanding the “same treatment as India” and Gen. Musharraf’s statement that Pakistan must not have a tit-for-tat approach wanting everything India gets.
Although the Pakistani negotiators devising the joint statement counted the setting up of an Energy Security Dialogue as positive, the media focused on the stark contrasts. Musharraf had raised partnership possibilities with Bush for nuclear energy. Pakistanis were hoping for US consent to their request at a later stage, not immediately. The Chinese option was always an available one for Pakistan. As a man who speaks lightly and literally, Bush’s words squarely drew stark contrasts. India was Washington’s grand partner in global reform while Pakistan was an errant partner to be kept on track to fight terrorism.
Significantly while the nature of the Pakistan-US relations remains unchanged, the Indo-US nuclear deal has raised broader questions with bilateral, regional and global implications.
Five are noteworthy. One, would a deal that enhances Indian capability to produce nuclear weapons undermine Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence? Second, how would a growing Indian arsenal affect the other Asian countries like China and Russia and overall the balance of power? Third, the unlimited supply of nuclear fuel to India that frees up India’s own fuel supplies for production of nuclear weapons renders the Commission on Disarmament’s discussion on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty pointless. Fourth, the cumulative impact of all this amounts to giving India, a nonsignatory of the NPT, a special status as a nuclear power by violating both international and national nonproliferation laws. Fifth, the deal sends a clear signal to Pakistan that even at the “high point” of its cooperation with the US it will always remain an “under-trial” ally.
The Bush administration’s romance with India is fascinating if not unsettling. While India’s twin pillars of tremendous economic boom and its “miracle democracy” would be the envy of any nation, to portray India as the “perfect” force for global reform is both dangerous and naive.
Washington appears to be doing just that. It flows from Washington’s own global strategic picture.
