This year could prove to be critical for the security of the Gulf region. Current developments, unfortunately, do not leave much room for optimism. Throughout 2005, the Gulf security environment remained fragile. In fact, as the year progressed, there were increasing worries that the region was headed for another round of conflict. Iraq failed to calm down and Iran took an increasingly hostile position, raising concerns about its potential nuclear program. On their own, these issues could possibly be contained. However, without any conflict management system in place whereby regional and external states can interact on security issues, there is a distinct danger that events will begin to spiral out of control, thus opening the door to a new potentially devastating conflict.
Three conclusions can be drawn about the current Gulf security environment. First, the strategic significance of the Gulf region continues to increase. On the main issues of current international concern — Iraq, nuclear dilemma with Iran, wider implications of terrorism and political instability — the Gulf has retained its extraordinary importance. Regions such as Asia are paying more attention to the Gulf. Overall, recent events have underlined the fact that Gulf security is not a regional issue, but one where developments have global implications.
Recent developments suggest that the region’s vital role for the economic well being of the global economy will be even more critical in the coming decades. In less than two years, the price of oil has increased by 55 percent. Even around $100 per barrel is no longer considered absurd. This is because the surge in demand for energy supplies from Asia, as one factor, is bound to stay on the up and the shortage of refinery capacity, as a second factor, will take decades to be overcome. In that context, Russia has placed energy security on top of the upcoming G-8 Summit agenda.
Even though unsuccessful in causing disruption, the attempt by Al-Qaeda elements to attack the Abqaiq oil complex in Saudi Arabia immediately resulted in a $2 rise in oil price. Thus, on energy matters alone, the Gulf remains critical.
A second observation is that the Gulf’s actual security and outlook for stability is not improving. The recent history of conflict in the region suggests that the end of one crisis is not necessarily followed by a period of relative stability. The Iranian revolution led to the Iran-Iraq War, which, in turn, led to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Nothing indicates that following the Iraq war, the region is becoming more peaceful. Iraq is tethering on the brink of a civil war, the invasion has made terrorism more rather than less likely, and Iran, with a new sense of (false) confidence, is risking an outside intervention by thumbing its nose at the international community concerning its nuclear program. Both Iran and Iraq represent negative security factors at present. The result is that another round of conflict — or possibly a destabilizing arms race — is a distinct possibility.
Third, the Gulf security environment is marked by an increased “internationalization” of the issues that define it. The United States continues to play the predominant role, but other actors, including Europe, NATO, and Asia, are beginning to take a closer look at the region and including developments in their strategic calculations.
Regional security issues are now a part of their own national security calculations. This is reflective of a trend whereby Gulf security matters are no longer left as the sole prerogative of the United States. In order to protect their energy supply lines, countries like India, China and Japan are also not likely to depend on the US or some rudimentary regional security mechanism as a guarantee for stability. If energy lines were disrupted, it would hit these countries first and hardest.
Where does this leave us? The region requires a different approach and it needs this fast. A good starting point would be the speech delivered by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal during the 2004 Gulf Dialogue in Bahrain. Stating that there is an urgent need “for a collective effort aimed at developing a new and more solid framework for Gulf security,” he called on that framework to be based on subnational, regional and international components. By subnational, he referred to “actual and meaningful political, economic, social and educational reforms and not just cosmetic changes.” The regional component consists of “a unified GCC, a prosperous Yemen, a stable Iraq, and a friendly Iran.” Currently, none of those factors exist. Acknowledging that international help will always be needed to underpin Gulf security, the Saudi foreign minister called on guarantees provided by the international community and not “unilaterally...by the only superpower in the world.” This includes the positive engagement with Asian powers as well. Is such a beginning possible? Recent history does not give scope for optimism. The US is not about to relinquish its predominance to some wishy-washy form of potential collective security interaction. The GCC countries do not display a common front. Iran appears ready to risk another regional conflict. It is a frustrating situation and no one seems to want to take the first step.
— Dr. Christian Koch is the program director of GCC-EU Relations at the Gulf Research Center, Dubai.
