Northern Ireland’s rival Republican and Unionist politicians have been given an eight-month deadline to reach agreement on a power-sharing executive for the British province by the London and Dublin governments. Deadlines are dangerous things in conflicts as seemingly intractable as the Northern Irish standoff, which saw the suspension of the original power-sharing executive in October 2003. Almost a year later fresh elections to this body, which is a key part of the Good Friday agreement, saw voters polarize toward the political extremes of Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party and the Republican Sinn Fein, the political arm of the Provisional IRA.

Though there was initial optimism that these two could reach agreement where the more moderate Unionist and SDLP parties had failed, for the last two years the province’s politics have been in stalemate. Even though the IRA has apparently put all its weapons beyond use and renounced the armed struggle, Paisley’s Unionists remain deeply suspicious of Republican intentions and have refused to work with Sinn Fein. They cite continued lawlessness by IRA members, including the pub murder of Robert McCartney, just this week the killing of IRA informer Denis Donaldson and a $46-million bank robbery. Sinn Fein for its part has not helped by refusing to take its place on the Northern Ireland Police Authority, which would give Republicans an important voice in how the province is policed.

In announcing the deadline, British Premier Tony Blair and Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahern did not spell out what would happen if local politicians did not finally cut a new power-sharing deal. However London has made the point, which may have some personal impact on all parties, that there seemed no point paying some $140,000 a year to each of the elected Northern Ireland politicians if they are not representing the best interests of their voters by working together.

At stake here, however remotely it may seem, is continued peace in this once terror-torn province. The only thing it seems that all sides can agree on is that they do not want a return to violence. Yet without the stability of a functioning executive made up of all parties, the end of violence cannot be guaranteed.

The movement from internecine strife to politics, where positions are argued and compromises made by everyone, is never easy. The people of Iraq would love to at least enjoy the peace that has come to Northern Ireland. But in both countries, deep political enmities are frustrating the final move to successful representative politics. It is easy to demand vision of political leaders. But each is trapped within the carapace of opinion that they were elected to represent. A leader who takes the risk of agreeing a point not accepted by his supporters is not only vulnerable in his own constituency but also to betrayal by opponents. In the end in Iraq as in Northern Ireland, the solution lies in the hearts of ordinary people. Can they suspend fear and instead trust enough to give the politics of compromise a real chance?