The shooting death on Monday of an American soldier along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border has the distinct potential of cooling US-Pakistani relations. This, in turn, would weaken the anti-terrorism coalition which has propped up the Hamid Karzai government in Kabul. The shootout between Pakistani and coalition forces — including Americans — comes at a time when Pervez Musharraf’s government is facing intense domestic and American pressure, making an already volatile situation appreciably worse.
The US-Pakistani alliance has always been based more on strategic necessity than shared interests. While India became a leader in the Soviet-oriented Non Aligned Movement, Pakistan emerged as a key Cold War partner shortly after independence. Though the longstanding conflict between Islamabad and New Delhi is rooted in nationalism and religious identity, it was viewed by the superpowers through the prism of the Cold War. Both the Americans and Soviets supplied arms to protect their interests. Washington routinely ignored troubling aspects of Pakistan’s government. Supposedly, assistance of both the economic and military variety was intended to fuel Pakistan’s development. But the chief American concern was keeping Islamabad in Washington’s fold by strengthening successive Pakistani regimes.
To many Americans, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent cooperation with Pakistan justified the alliance and allocation of aid — which totaled $8.4 billion from 1947-1990. Pakistan’s involvement in the war was a critical factor in the Soviet defeat. But its efforts included — in cooperation with the US — supplying military hardware to Mujahadeen rebel groups and casting the conflict as a jihad. Though the degree of influence is debated, Pakistan’s continuing involvement after the Soviet withdrawal helped pave the way for the eventual Taleban victory in the civil war.
The end of the Cold War forced the US to revise its South Asia policy. With the Non Aligned Movement no longer a threat, US-Indian relations warmed. Moreover, America concluded that supporting Pakistan was no longer critical. Pakistan’s perceived warts could no longer be hidden from increasingly critical American policymakers. Washington grew concerned about the rise of Pakistani extremism and anti-Americanism. The continuing specter of war between India and Pakistan no longer served American interests; in fact, the Kashmir problem in particular became a potential threat to the US who now sought regional stability. Pakistan’s diminished status became clear when Washington cut off aid to Islamabad and blocked the delivery of F-16 fighters.
Throughout the 1990s, the US-Pakistani relationship remained frosty. To the chagrin of Islamabad, the Clinton administration failed to pressure India into talks about Kashmir. Even worse, Clinton engaged in continual dialogue with Atal Vajpayee’s Bharatiya Janata Party government — perceived with some justification as a Hindu extremist party. Nuclear testing in 1998 by both South Asian powers — first India, then Pakistan — cooled Washington’s relations with each. However, given India’s status as a democracy and growing economic power, New Dehli seemed to have the diplomatic upper hand.
At the outset of the Bush administration, the status of US-Pakistani relations were unclear. Little was known about Musharraf. Few Americans shed tears for deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who was viewed as weak and unreliable. There was cautious optimism that Musharraf would at minimum provide stability for the world’s newest nuclear power.
That optimism was justified in wake of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage bluntly told — or threatened — the Pakistani leader that he was either with or against the US. The pragmatic Musharraf joined the US coalition. His move paid direct dividends, as Pakistan reestablished its positions as a key American ally. Since 2001, Islamabad has been the recipient of $6.6 billion in US assistance. Military sales to Pakistan resumed on an unprecedented level.
But relations with Washington have been steadily deteriorating since late 2001. While Pakistan’s assistance was critical in ousting the Taleban, Washington does not believe it has been helpful to the Karzai government. In the face of the 2001 Western-backed military campaign, some military observers believe Pakistan allowed Taleban and Al-Qaeda fighters to escape. They now insist Mullah Omar, Ayman Zawahiri, and other Taleban and Qaeda leaders — perhaps even Osama Bin Laden — are hiding in Pakistan. Today Pakistan is seen as a safe haven for anti-Afghan rebels. Karzai, who is popular in the West, has repeatedly blamed Pakistan for his country’s continued unrest.
Pakistan, however, has defended itself against its critics. Pakistan concedes that it is unstable. Musharraf himself has been subject to repeated assassination attempts, in part because of his alliance with Washington. Islamabad has sent forces to its troubled border region, and suffered hundreds of casualties in the process. The president has also engaged in dialogue with India, and is open to brokering a deal which reduces tension with New Delhi. Additionally, since the embarrassing revelations about A.Q. Khan, Musharraf has worked to strengthen Pakistan’s nuclear security.
Yet the criticism remains. Pakistan’s decision last year to broker a truce with tribal factions along the Afghan border was denounced by Washington. This week’s events — a firefight between Afghan and Pakistani troops, the subsequent death of an American soldier, and the outbreak of anarchy in Karachi — could be harbingers of change. With the US already debating the merits of providing large-scale assistance to Pakistan, these events could once again lead to US-Pakistani estrangement.
— David Dumke is political analyst and principal of the Washington-based MidAmr Group. E-mail: [email protected].
