The four-way summit of leaders from Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Israel in Sharm El-Sheikh today is being held against the background of the Battle of Gaza. That event naturally created a profound structural shift to the Palestinian problem. The fledgling government of Salam Fayyad has already gained regional and international support as well as recognition, with the US, EU and Israel all pledging to lift the economic embargo imposed on the Palestinians following Hamas’ election victory in 2006. Recognition and foreign aid alone, however, won’t guarantee success. Indeed, the success or failure of the new government, in maintaining security, re-establishing the rule of law and winning public trust, depends to a very large degree on the extent to which Hamas will be willing to cooperate and abide by its decisions. After having grudgingly lived with a two-headed leadership at odds with itself, the Palestinians now face a broader and more dangerous internal division. It seems that there is no choice now but to acknowledge there are two Palestinian peoples; this developed after a ferocious battle which resulted in a situation perhaps best described as “disengagement” between the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time it is true that the two Palestinian regions — the West Bank and Gaza — are no longer just geographically separated; they are also separated politically. Each now has its own agenda.
Guessing games abound regarding the future. If Hamas feels that the other parties intend to drive it into a corner, it may be spurred to act desperately. In that case, more attempts to attack Israel cannot be ruled out which in turn could lead to the Israeli re-occupation or partial re-occupation of Gaza. Such a development would do more than anything else to unite the Palestinian factions once again, behind the option of armed resistance, probably under Hamas’ leadership. Predictably, the new government in Ramallah will try to compensate for the loss of Gaza by controlling and manipulating the erstwhile empty, but soon-to-be replenished, coffers. Some erroneously assume that Palestinians will bow their heads and cease their support for Hamas on the grounds that he who pays the piper calls the tune. However, many Gazans will continue for many months to come to appreciate Hamas’ success in standing up to Israel and facing down Fatah.
Abbas and the emergency government have the following options: They can reject separation with Hamas in word but promote it in practice. They might seek to foment a wave of civil disobedience in order to topple the Hamas government and pave the way for the resumption of Fatah control. They might work toward linking the West Bank in a federation or confederation with Jordan or as part of a tripartite condominium that would also include Israel. They could declare an interim Palestinian state in accordance with the road map, even as differences remain over the final status issues. Israel is surely overjoyed with the now de facto partition, not only of the occupied Palestinian territories but seemingly the entire Palestinian national liberation movement. Israel may use the fragmentation of Palestinian unity to force a peace deal to its liking. Eventually, peace conditions once rejected may prove acceptable.
