At the four-way summit that took place Monday in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert agreed to release some of the Palestinian Authority’s tax money that is being held contrary to written agreements and basic political logic. He also accepted a recommendation to release 250 of Fatah prisoners. The release of the funds and prisoners will not be accompanied by confidence-building measures such as the fundamental changes to the policy of the Israel Defense Forces in the Palestinian territories that would improve the West Bank’s quality of life.
Leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinians attended the summit.
Olmert’s actions and statements reinforce the impression that he does not appreciate the seriousness of the new reality after Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, concern is growing that Olmert and his coalition partners, among them the new-old Defense Minister Ehud Barak, are about to miss the opportunity to enlist moderate Arab countries to strengthen pragmatic forces in the Palestinian territories and prevent the West Bank from becoming a second Gaza.
Olmert and the international community assume that the release of frozen funds and the flow of financial donations will be instrumental in achieving prosperity in the Palestinian territories, and that the prosperity will have a moderating influence on young Palestinians. This assumes that improvement in living conditions can change perceptions, while in actual fact the opposite is true.
International donations saved the Palestinian people from starvation and made some leaders wealthy, but they do not serve to change the cultures and beliefs of “hotheads”.
With regard to prisoners’ issue, Olmert began preparing the Israeli public opinion for the release of Fatah prisoners during his visit in Washington a week ago.
“The prisoners issue is always on our agenda. The question is when and under what circumstances,” Olmert told journalists after his talk with US President George W. Bush. “Obviously the way to (abducted Israeli soldier Gilad) Shalit’s release is not through (Palestinian President Mahmoud) Abbas,” he said.
Olmert was looking for a way to escape from equating freedom for Shalit with the release of Palestinian prisoners. The Hamas conquest of Gaza provided the opportunity to break this linkage.
The trial balloon Olmert floated in Washington was intended to avoid possible claims that he had changed his tack. If attacked by Israeli opposition parties, he would say: “I didn’t say I wouldn’t release prisoners.”
Olmert explained Monday that he decided to release 250 Fatah prisoners from the West Bank with no “blood on their hands” for three reasons: The release would not harm Shalit; it would strengthen Abbas and would increase the pressure on Hamas, which failed to win the release any of its own prisoners in Israel.
Although releasing the prisoners would be the most significant gesture that Olmert has made toward the Palestinians since entering office, the number is small compared to Israeli gestures to Abbas in the days of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. The criteria set by Sharon’s government excluded Fatah veterans who have been jailed since before the Oslo agreements, or Marwan Al-Barghouthi. Therefore it is unlikely that the release would bolster Abbas’ status in the West Bank and turn him into a powerful leader.
But Olmert scored at least one victory with his surprising announcement of the release. He managed to even the score with Hamas, to a certain extent, for Hamas did steal the show by releasing the Shalit cassette a few hours earlier.
“This was not a coincidence,” said a Palestinian official. “This is a ploy by Hamas to divert attention from the summit and embarrass the leaders, especially President Abbas.”
With regard to building an alliance against Hamas, the common enemy for the meeting’s participants, and aiding Abbas with weapons, Israel will think twice before allowing this choice.
Palestinian President Yasser Arafat was once asked why, in the Oslo Agreement, he demanded that armored vehicles and heavy weapons be supplied to the “strong Palestinian police.” He raised an eyebrow and said: “What do you mean? I need to maintain law and order vis-à-vis Hamas.” Today, the “Oslo-armored vehicles” are in the hands of Hamas in Gaza.
The Gaza events presented Fatah in an unfavorable light. They proved that the long years abroad and the intermingling with Europe, Israel, and the United States made it different, more realistic, and less militant. The revolutionary zeal dissipated and it turned fat and more established, just like any Western organization. However, Fatah has not recognized this — it indeed wishes to be like the West, but without paying the price of joining up, such as launching a war against Hamas for example.
The problem with all these summits is that they don’t solve the fundamental problems of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. From summit to summit, from ceremony to ceremony, hatred mounts and blood flows.
If Abbas and Olmert are unable to present the beginning of a diplomatic process to the conflict as soon as possible, the two-state solution, and with it the Arab peace initiative, will quickly go the way of Oslo and the road map.
