Any hope that the storming of the Red Mosque in Islamabad would restore stability in Pakistan has vanished. On the contrary, it appears to have unleashed a storm of fury. Over 100 people, mainly soldiers and policemen but civilians as well, have now been killed in suicide attacks; yesterday’s bombings in Hub near Karachi, in the northwestern town of Hangu and in Kohat bring the number to seven in just over a week.
Inevitably there are fears that Pakistan is descending into the lawlessness of Iraq or Afghanistan. In fact, despite the latest attacks it is a long way from that. Yesterday’s bombings were uncoordinated and, the attack near Karachi notwithstanding which was directed at Chinese workers, the violence is still almost wholly limited to Waziristan in the northwest on the border with Afghanistan.
The situation has now reached a crisis point. If the authorities fail to contain the growing violence and administer a crushing blow to the terrorists, then there is every chance that the insurgency will spread across the country. The problem is that Waziristan has been allowed to become a no-go zone for the government.
As with yesterday’s attacks, the opposition to President Musharraf is not coordinated either. However, the danger now is that if the authorities fail to put down the Waziristan insurgency, it will be seen to be winning and public opposition will rally round it elsewhere. The government has to reimpose its authority throughout Waziristan. The only way to do that and ensure that it remains pacified in future is not by simply going for the rebels. It has to overcome the region’s ingrained tribalism which like that in neighboring Afghanistan finds a natural ally in any movement that opposes central authority, be it the Taleban or anyone else. Tribalism not the Taleban is the real problem in Waziristan. The Taleban would be powerless there but for it.
President Musharraf’s government tried to work with the tribes to control the Taleban. That has been a mistake because it is trying to work with a force that it inherently opposed to central government. It will always fail, as last year’s agreement to pull out large number of troops in return for the tribes dealing with the Taleban inevitably failed.
As students of Saudi history know, King Abdul Aziz dealt with the problem of tribalism here and forged national unity by military campaigns or diplomatically through marriages with the sisters or daughters of tribal heads. There are other ways, however. One that has worked elsewhere in the past is the enforced recruitment of sons of tribal leaders into the armed forces.
They effectively become hostages for the tribe’s good behavior but at the same time learn a new loyalty to the military and the country. But it takes a generation and should be pursued but President Musharraf cannot afford to wait that long. At the moment there is no immediate alternative but to coerce the tribes into loyalty.
