It was almost four years ago when Muhammad Khatami, then campaigning for the presidency of the Islamic Republic, evoked the possibility of a “new beginning” in Iran-US relations. At first glance it might appear that there has been no “new beginning” and that relations between Tehran and Washington have remained as frozen as they were before Khatami won the presidency.
A closer examination, however, shows that some aspects of the relationship have undergone significant changes, thus generating hopes of further positive evolution.
The experience of the past four years has shown that there could be no quick and dramatic change. Too many powerful lobbies on both sides are opposed to such a development. On the Iranian side, many hard-line Khomeinists believe that feigned anti-Americanism is the last pillar of their failed ideology. On the US side, strong pro-Zionist lobbies are uncomfortable with the prospect of Iran re-emerging as a potential partner for the US in the Middle East, thus marginalizing Israel.
All that, however, does not mean that the quest for change should be abandoned. The past four years have set a pattern for a slow, incremental improvement in Iran-US relations. The two sides can move toward eventual normalization through small moves in a number of fields rather than chasing the one big move that fails to materialize.
During the past four years, Washington has lifted the ban on certain Iranian exports to the US. Non-oil trade between the two countries has risen more than fourfold since 1997. The US has also lifted restrictions that prevented Iranian diplomats at the United Nations in New York to move outside the city. In the four years, the two nations have conducted a wide range of cultural, scientific and sports exchanges involving thousands of individuals. An estimated 85,000 American tourists translated the people-to-people contacts encouraged by former President Bill Clinton into visits to Iran since 1998. Although talking tough on a Congressional act that imposes sanctions on investments in Iranian energy industries, Clinton made no secret of his reluctance to implement it in an activist manner.
To all this must be added a string of complimentary comments made by both sides about one another. Clinton initiated the tradition of sending a special message for the Iranian New Year (Now-Ruz) and paid tribute to what he called “the glorious culture of Iran” on a number of occasions. For his part, Khatami spoke of the American struggle for independence and the US political values in such glowing terms that surprised many.
Also, in the past four years, Iran has met some of the concerns expressed by Washington in such fields as human rights and the free flow of information. It is remarkable that there have been no political execution in Iran since 1998, something unheard of since the mullahs seized power in 1979. Leaving aside the recent crackdown on dissidents, symbolized by mass arrests and the closure of more than 50 publications, the past four years amounted to an almost unexpectedly “liberal” period in the history of the republic.
All that, of course, may have been a result of the regime’s structural weakness and its attempts at defusing an explosive political situation. But the fact remains that, for the first time in two decades, some public space has been won for dissidence, at least within the system.
The most important aspects of the slow improvement in Iran-US relations have taken shape behind closed doors and in areas of little interest to public opinion on both sides. Iran, an ally of Russia in Central Asia, played a positive role in multinational talks on the future of Tajikistan. The result was that the pro-Russian ruling elite, backed also by Iran, was able to agree on a power-sharing scheme with the Islamist opposition supported by the US. Iran and the US have also worked together on Afghanistan where they have found a common enemy in the Taleban militia.
Yet another area where they have worked together is in Transcaucasia where Iran supports Armenia while the US backs Azerbaijan. Thanks to efforts by both Washington and Tehran, the two neighbors have respected a cease-fire and are now engaged in a process of negotiations brokered by a former Romanian foreign minister.
More importantly, Iran has improved its relations with virtually all of the United States’ allies in the region. The two exceptions are the United Arab Emirates, which has its own separate dispute with Iran over three atolls in the Strait of Hormuz, and Pakistan, which Iran regards as the Taleban’s puppet master. In the case of Egypt, formal relations have not been restored because of factional feuds in Tehran. But the two sides already have what amounts to full, working relations, with one of Khatami’s closest ideological allies acting as Iran’s representative in Cairo. Iran and Egypt now have full relations in all but name.
The most dramatic development in this slow and incremental improvement in Iran-US ties may yet come over Iraq. Until just a few months ago, the Tehran ruling establishment was divided over what strategy to adopt vis-a-vis Baghdad. A small group even advocated an adventurist tactical alliance with Saddam Hussein as a means of exerting pressure on Washington to lift all sanctions against Iran.
The internal Iranian debate seems to have been won by those who have always argued that Saddam Hussein represents an abiding threat to regional stability and should not be allowed to benefit from strained relations between Iran and the US. The recent change in Tehran’s propaganda line on Iraq clearly shows that the Iranian leadership is now united in its desire to see a change of regime in Baghdad. That impression is reinforced by the fact that Iran has allowed at least two Iraqi opposition groups backed by the US to open offices in Tehran. Last, but not least, Tehran has given the green light to the principal Iraqi Shiite opposition group to establish formal contracts with the new Bush administration in Washington. The Bush administration seems to understand that there could be no sudden, dramatic, CNN-headline change of relations with Iran, at least for the foreseeable future. It also understands that cooperation on issues of mutual interest could help ease tension and build confidence, thus smoothing the path of an eventual normalization.
More importantly, perhaps, the Bush administration understands one crucial point that escaped the Clinton crowd. The point is that any intervention by the US in the factional feud in Tehran would be counterproductive. The so-called “hard-line” faction is as willing to move toward normalization with the US, as is the so-called “reformist” one. What each faction does not want is for the other to take the initiative on the issue and thus strengthen its position on both domestic and foreign policy fronts. Normalization with the US is a popular proposition in Iran. A series of recent opinion polls conducted by various Tehran newspapers, including those that back the “hard-line” faction, show that there is an almost two-third majority in favor of a quick restoration of full relations with Washington.
This is not surprising since the people-to-people links between Iran and the US are far wider than it is often realized. There are an estimated 2.8 million Iranians, half of them American citizens, living in the US today. At least a quarter of them visit Iran at least once a year, ensuring human contact at all levels. The US, especially California, has also emerged as a major center for Iranian cultural production. The amazing spread of the Internet in Iran has created a new means of people-to-people contact at individual and collective levels. Iran is the region’s biggest importer of American cultural products, especially videos and musical cassettes. At the same time, American literature is the most widely translated of any foreign literature in the Islamic Republic. In exchange, the US leads the world in the field of Iranian studies. Last year alone a staggering 473 books on various aspects of Iranian culture, history and politics appeared in the US.
There is so much passion on both sides that a sudden, dramatic and, potentially smothering, embrace is best avoided. The wisest course is a slow but steady progress toward a new relationship based on mutual respect and joint interests.
