What do to about Iraq? This is the question most frequently asked in Washington’s political circles these days. The theme of Iraq has become the raw material of a veritable industry of research and speculations. Even the current conflict in the Palestinian territories has not been able to divert attention from Iraq. Right now no fewer than 11 think tanks and more than a dozen foreign policy pressure groups are engaged in special projects concerning Iraq. They are producing an avalanche of ideas and proposals, including some that could be described as outlandish.
There are indications that the Bush administration is heading toward a policy of increasing pressure on Iraq in the hope of bringing about a change of regime. The “green-light” is expected to come from President George W. Bush before the end of June.
That would require a substantial review of other aspects of US policy in the Middle East, including relations with Iran, the Arab-Israeli conflict and ties with moderate Arabs.
“ We are moving toward an active roll-back option,” says a senior administration adviser here.
This is echoed by others.
“ There can be no lasting peace in the Middle East and the Gulf region unless we solve the Iraqi problem,” says Tom Lantos, the ranking Democrat in the Foreign Relations committee of the Congress..
William Safire, a prominent Republican columnist agrees. “ Saddam Hussein’s presence is a constant element of instability in a vital region,” he muses.
While some catchwords like “smart sanctions” are no longer mentioned, new ones such as “dynamic containment” and “roll-back” are becoming popular. A consensus is taking shape that President George W Bush should complete his father’s work and help bring about a change of regime in Baghdad. Jim Hoagland of the Washington Post, acting as an unofficial spokesman for the “ end-Saddam”, party argues that “containment” can be acceptable only as a prelude to “ overthrow”.
There is also consensus that the system of sanctions currently in place must be reorganized to deprive Saddam Hussein of his chief propaganda weapon and allow his opponents to focus on his failure to bring Iraq back into the international fold.
When it comes to the issue of sanctions the
“overthrow” party is as convinced of their inefficiency as are those who want the sanctions lifted immediately.
Those who call for sanctions to be lifted offer two contradictory arguments. The first is that the sanctions have no effect apart from giving Saddam Hussein legitimacy in the eyes of his people and the Arab nations in general. The logical extension of that argument would run like this: since we want to get rid of Saddam Hussein it is better to lift the sanctions so that he cannot blame his shortcomings on them. Also, as long as daily life is crippled by sanctions, the Iraqi people will not have the energy to seek change.
The second argument is based on the assertion that the sanctions are effective but should be lifted regardless of political calculations simply because their continuation imposes human suffering.
The latest report on Iraq by UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan, however, states that Baghdad, with abundant money to spend, “is in a position to address urgently the nutritional and health status of the children of Iraq.” The report states that during the four years that the UN implemented the oil-for-food program the number of neighborhood health-care centers for children in Iraq rose from just 100 to 2388, the highest ever in Iraqi history.
Since 1996 Iraq has sold over $40 billion worth of oil, more than half to the United States. More than $10 billion in goods needed to meet civilian needs have been distributed with a further $8.8 billion in goods bought waiting for the Iraqi green light to be distributed. An additional $3.3 billion is held in an escrow account supervised by the UN.
According to UN estimates the various accounts controlled by the Iraqi authorities in the year 2000 held $12 billion, making Iraq the richest OPEC members in terms of liquidity.
The reason for Saddam Hussein’s stance is clear. For the past 10 years he has claimed that, although he lost “ some battles” in the Gulf War, he is going to win the war.
“Ten years ago, Saddam Hussein promised our people that the sanctions will crumble,” says Abdulrazzak al-Hashemi, an aide to Saddam and a former Iraqi ambassador to Paris. “We don’t want the sanctions to be lifted in a quid-pro-quo. We want them to collapse. We cannot admit a linkage of the sanctions and our defense programs.”
Saddam is looking for a clear diplomatic victory not a compromise that would solve the problem but deny his triumphalist claims.
Analysts say Saddam Hussein has been able to sustain himself in power thanks to a complex strategy of bribery and brutality. He has concluded a series of pacts with the 60 or so tribal chiefs who control large chunks of central and southern Iraq. In exchange he has allowed them a wide measure of autonomy in their own regions plus substantial financial handouts and other advantages, including a share in the flourishing contraband trade. The tribes accounts for no more than 15 percent of Iraq’s population. They are important because of large territories they control and their readiness to use weapons in the service of the regime.
(To be continued)
