GEN. PERVEZ MUSHARRAF’S government is facing an alarming military buildup on two fronts. On his country’s western borders US commanders are reportedly champing at the bit to enter Pakistani territory in hot pursuit of military units of Al-Qaeda and the Taleban who have reportedly taken refuge with friendly tribal chiefs. Meanwhile on his eastern borders, tension is once again spiraling, following last week’s murderous attack by militants in the disputed Kashmir.
On the face of it, the dangerous return of high tension with India is the more disturbing. India demands that further action be taken against Pakistan-based militants in the wake of last week’s attack. It has thrown out Pakistan’s high commissioner (ambassador) in New Delhi and has stepped up what had become, once more, a desultory exchange of small arms, mortar and artillery fire.
However, US pressure to act against Afghan forces in Pakistan’s tribal lands, or allow the US military to do the job for him, is arguably placing Gen. Musharraf in an even more difficult position. Many Pakistanis in the border region have strong political or blood ties to the Al-Qaeda and Taleban units who have fled to their territory. Islamabad’s writ only runs in these areas with the support of the local leaders. If Musharraf did send in his troops against the Aghans, they would probably find themselves opposed by fellow Pakistanis. The seeds of civil strife would be sown. The danger would be that, even though the border tribes have little direct influence outside their own regions, they could attract support from disaffected elements elsewhere in Pakistan. Such groups could perhaps include Kashmiri militants, furious at Islamabad’s crackdown, even though New Delhi claims this has been half-hearted.
Of even greater danger would be splits within the Pakistani armed forces, which have, for better or worse, proved to be the single truly constant factor in the country since its creation in 1947.
Even if Islamabad were to turn a blind eye to incursions by soldiers from the US, British and other forces in Afghanistan, the political price could still be high. If local Pakistanis sought to protect their Al-Qaeda and Taleban guests, they would doubtless also feel the full force of US military power. Gen. Musharraf would stand accused of sitting by while his country was being invaded and his people killed. Yet Washington is doubtless warning that it is only its influence which is keeping India from heading further down the slippery path of confrontation.
In truth, the Pakistani government does seem to be caught between a rock and a hard place. But there may be a way out. If Islamabad were to launch a compelling initiative on Kashmir, it could both wrong-foot New Delhi and oblige the Americans to support it.
Such an initiative might embrace Pakistani acceptance of the idea of an independent Kashmir. When India took over the territory in 1949, it promised the outgoing ruler that a plebiscite would be held on Kashmir’s future. That plebiscite was never held, partly because New Delhi first demanded the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the third of the country that they had occupied. Islamabad meanwhile has always made it clear that it would never accept independence for Kashmir, an option which the United Nations insisted be on the table.
If Gen. Musharraf now reverses this long-standing policy, he will put New Delhi on the back foot and place himself in a position to claim the support of the United Nations and Washington. The risk may indeed be that in an eventual plebiscite, Kashmiris will choose independence. But on balance, an independent Kashmir has to be better than a partitioned state which has provided a constant flash point for an eventual terrifying conflict between two nuclear powers.
At the moment Musharraf’s administration is being driven before the powerful winds of outside forces. By producing an initiative of such breadth and imagination, he could neutralize Kashmiri militants, Indian hard-liners and a meddling Washington.
