While the so-called Iraq debate is shifting to high gear in the United States and Europe, the Middle East has already concluded that Saddam Hussein will be removed from power by force sooner rather than later.
And what do the Arabs, and Iranians for that matter, mean to do about it? Notwithstanding the recent huffing and puffing at the Arab League’s ministerial conference in Cairo, the short answer is: nothing.
The "don’t-touch-Saddam" lobby in Washington and London has made much of two supposed threats.
The first is unspecified but supposedly explosive reaction from the Arabs. We can assure tem that there will be none.
The second is the claim that Iran and Turkey might seize the opportunity to grab chunks of Iraqi territory. For weeks Saddam’s emissaries have toured the Arab capitals to mobilize support for what Tareq Aziz has called "a resolute stance against American aggression." None has materialized.
The Arabs have even refused to commit themselves to minimal diplomatic gesticulations such as recalling ambassadors from Washington and London if and when military action starts against Iraq. The idea that Arabs should halt the flow of oil for one symbolic day has been dismissed as "out of the question" by Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal. A careful reading of statements made by Arab and Iranian leaders reveals no coherent opposition to plans to topple Saddam by force. The Kingdom has used such adjectives as "unwise" and "premature". The Egyptians searched the dictionary for even more anodyne adjectives, and found "unwarranted". President Hosni Mubarak has stated that relations between Egypt and US are "of a strategic nature" and shall "not be affected by developments regarding Iraq."
It is no secret that Washington’s Arab allies have assured it in private that, as long as a diplomatic fig leaf is provided by the United Nations, they would do nothing to oppose military action against Saddam Hussein. Jordan has adopted its own version of diplomatic duplicity. It has issued appeals to Washington not to attack Iraq but is playing host to American troops in the context of military exercises clearly related to any future action against Saddam Hussein. Prince Hassan, King Abdallah’s uncle, has emerged as an active supporter of the Iraqi exile opposition groups, and even attended their conference in London last July.
The latest indication that Arabs and Iranians have resigned themselves to Saddam’s imminent demise came this week in official news agency reports from Tehran and Riyadh regarding Iranian President Muhammad Khatami’s visit to the Kingdom. Both said talks between Khatami and Crown Prince Abdallah focused on "the aftermath of military strike against Iraq."
To calm those who fear an Iranian land-grab in Iraq, Iran’s Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani told a press conference in Tehran on Sept. 11 that Iran would not violate the Iraqi border in case of a US-led attack against Iraq. Iran has 2.5 million Arabs of its own and would not wish to add a further 15 million Iraqi Arabs, even though they are Shiites.
Similar assurances have come from Turkey. Former Foreign Minister Ismail Cem describes talk of a Turkish land-grab in Iraq as "nonsense." Turkey has no wish to add five million Iraqi Kurds to its own 15 million-strong Kurdish community.
The "don’t-touch-Saddam lobby" may rest assured: no one in the Middle East wants to carve up Iraq because no one has what it takes to tackle so risky an enterprise.
Over the past few weeks, Arab opposition to military action against Saddam Hussein has crumbled. There are two reasons for this. The first is that the Arabs have now concluded that Washington is no longer bluffing and that President George Bush is determined to topple Saddam Hussein. Arab leaders who have read the "Siasatnameh" (Book of Politics) by the 10th century scholar and statesman Nizam Al-Mulk, remember his celebrated dictum: "A man who sides with a loser is not fit for political office." When you know that the loser in question is also your bitterest enemy you would have even less reason to side with him.
The second reason why support for Saddam has collapsed is the intra-Arab rivalry around who would be America’s favorite ally in the changed context of regional geopolitics. Far from being short of operational bases for attacking Saddam, the Americans have en embarrass du choix.
Apart from the Saudi and Kuwaiti bases that may or may not be needed, there is the new giant-size multipurpose base in Al-Udaid, Qatar. There are also a string of smaller bases on the island of Massirah and in the Ras Mussandam Peninsula, in Oman, plus reserve facilities in Sharjah, in the United Arab Emirates. Then there is the new "facility" nearing completion in Assab, Eritrea. The US has some form of military cooperation with all Arab states with the exception of Libya, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.
But what about the so-called "Arab street ", the Middle Eastern version of the Loch Ness monster? Will it explode? Again the answer is: no.
In visits from one end of the Arab world to another one finds little evidence of any grassroots support for Saddam. He has antagonized traditional Islamists by preaching Baathism, seen by them as an invention of Christian Arabs. Radical Islamists have little love for him because he attacked Iran in 1980. Pan-Arab nationalists are suspicious of him because he has killed more Nasserists than anyone in history. The Arab left detests him because of his ruthless destruction of the left in Iraq.
Saddam has managed to hang on to power since 1991 because he has been almost everybody’s second choice. To the Americans, he was better than a mulla chaperoned by Tehran. To the Iranians Saddam was better than a pro-American strongman. The Kuwaitis wanted him to stay because they fear that a new, democratic and internationally accepted Iraqi regime might be in a better position than the pariah Saddam to pursue an annexationist policy toward its smaller neighbor. The Turks also favored Saddam because, cantoned in Baghdad, he was in no position to prevent the Turkish Army from coming and going in northern Iraq as it pleased. The Syrians wanted Saddam to remain, as a bogeyman, for the purpose of racketing the oil-rich Arab states of the Persian Gulf, and thus keep their sinking economy afloat. Finally, the Egyptians preferred Saddam because as long as he is in power Iraq wouldn’t be able to replace Egypt as Washington’s key Arab ally.
The second choice remained in power for as long as none of the players dared make a bid for replacing him by their first choice. The Bush administration now appears ready to dare. Not surprisingly, other players are trying to see whether or not Washington’s first choice could be their second, replacing Saddam in that position.
