WASHINGTON, 13 April 2003 — As military victory and the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime draw close, decisions are being made in Washington about how to shape the direction and development of post-Saddam Iraq. There was far too little public discussion of these issues before the war, so the American people haven’t focused sharply on what we seek to accomplish, how or at what cost. But how we handle “after’’ in Iraq will be as important as how we fought the war.
The first issue is more basic than the architecture of the postwar regime. It goes to our fundamental purpose. The president in his Feb. 26 speech before the American Enterprise Institute embraced an ambitious objective: that the war was not only about weapons of mass destruction and eliminating a despotic regime but also about bringing democracy to Iraq and, over time, transforming the Arab Middle East itself.
A decent, representative, outward-looking Iraqi government would be a compelling model for a largely stagnant, authoritarian region. But stabilizing Iraq — let alone transforming it into a democracy — will be an enormous challenge, which includes maintaining its territorial integrity; finding and destroying weapons of mass destruction; feeding 16 million Iraqis dependent on the UN oil-for food program; handling more than a million people who were forcibly relocated by the Saddam regime over the years; creating a secure environment in which relief and reconstruction can take root; securing the oil fields and repairing their deteriorating infrastructure; preventing internal “score-settling’’ while protecting US soldiers against lingering resistance; “de-Baathifying’’ Iraqi government institutions and ensuring that basic services — water, health, education — are provided; demobilizing and cleansing the remaining Iraqi military without dumping tens of thousands of young, unemployed men into society; and handling war criminals. And all of this comes before we get to the more difficult questions of Iraqi governance: which Iraqis are empowered and by whom.
Moreover, there will be serious counter-pressures on the United States to take a more minimalist approach. Arab countries will not want a heavy US military footprint in the region for long. Our military is not enthusiastic about the peacekeeping mission and will argue that it is overextended. Some US government officials remain leery of “nation-building.’’ If we truly are determined to help create a decent, representative government in Iraq that can affect the region’s future, we’d better be prepared to stay the course.
