ISLAMABAD, 19 February 2004 — So far so good. The two nuclear-armed neighbors, who had moved from a near-war to a Cold War, are now tracking ways of constructive engagement. Solutions to complex problems are some way off, but concrete decisions on the way forward have been made. The modest yet important objective of finalizing details for the Pakistan-India composite dialogue has been achieved during the Feb. 16-18 Islamabad talks. The two countries are now past the post of the somewhat tenuous phase of “talks for talks” agreed upon in the Jan. 6 statement.
Only five weeks after the commitment made in the Jan. 6 statement for revival of the composite dialogue, the two governments have agreed on the content, level and timeframe for the dialogue. Dialogue on Kashmir and peace and security will begin by early April. Issues of concern like induction and deployment of ABMs will also be discussed, as will a Strategic Restraint Regime to reduce the risk of accidents. At the Islamabad talks there was an agreement to add new confidence-building measures. These measures include revival of the inter-ministerial Drug Committee between Pakistan and India that was established in 1994 and disrupted in 1998. Similarly there will be resumption of meetings between senior officials of the Pakistan Rangers and India’s Border Security Force. This discontinued after Kargil. Ways to strengthen the existing weekly contacts between the directors general of the two units will also be explored.
This is the fourth round of Pakistan-India talks that has been finalized to settle disputes. The first round took place during 1962 and 1963.Then, foreign-minister level talks between Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Sardar Swaran Singh were held against the backdrop of the Sino-Indian border dispute. The Anglo-American facilitation led to six rounds of talks. They ended unsuccessfully because India wanted the cease-fire line to become a permanent border while Islamabad wanted the Kashmir Valley and Kashmiri-speaking areas of Jammu to become part of Pakistan.
The second round, between Foreign Secretary Sheharyar and his Indian counterpart, also drew a blank. The third round did yield positive results. Indeed it led to the high point of Pakistan-India relations, the Lahore summit.
This fourth round, now, will take place against the many dark shadows that have fallen over the relations between the two countries since 1999. Yet the potential for these talks to actually deliver will depend on the political leadership and the establishments of the two sides. Since the Jan. 6 public thaw and the November 2003 behind-the-scenes talks, it appears that Vajpayee and Musharraf, at the helm, are keen to take the dialogue process forward. Vajpayee has shown this by telling his men to keep quiet on Pakistan’s embarrassing nuclear proliferation issue and giving the go-ahead on the much awaited cricket match series.
In Pakistan, there has been much goodwill for the process. The context setting for both the 1997 and the 2004 composite dialogues was leadership commitment, Nawaz Sharif and I.K. Gujral in 1997 and Musharraf and Vajapyee in 2004.
In 1997, the actual dialogue preparations went through two stages. Then — for the dialogue in the first round — a joint statement issued by the Foreign Secretaries Shamshad Ahmad and Salman Haider in Islamabad on June 23, 1997 first outlined the eight “outstanding issues of concern” and decided to set up “mechanisms and working groups to address these issues in an integrated manner.”
Later on Sept. 23, 1997 Shamshad Ahmad and K. Ragunath, laying down the content, level, dates and location for the talks issued another joint statement.
Significantly, this preparation of the 2004 composite talks, at a time when the two countries have gone through unprecedented lows in their relations (ranging from mini wars in 1999 to near-wars in 2002 and subsequent Cold War till mid-2003) indicates that behind-the-scenes official dialogue has paid dividends. Clearly the prospects for peace are encouraging, yet substantive progress will require genuine commitment by both sides to seek progress on the Kashmir dispute. Kashmir must be an integral part of the peace process. CBMs alone will not lead to mutual trust or expand options for solving the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people.
Meanwhile India and Pakistan will need to coordinate closer on the Kashmir policy. As a starter they must allow Kashmiris from across the LOC to meet. State violence against the freedom fighters too must be reduced — a fact clearly articulated during the Islamabad talks. It will take a visionary and iron-willed Vajpayee to convince the Indian establishment that any attempt to prevaricate on the critical issue of Kashmir will abort a peace process that has great potential to move the two countries toward constructive cooperation.
— Nasim Zehra, an Islamabad-based international security strategist is also a fellow of the Harvard University Asia Center.
