ISLAMABAD, 1 May 2004 — The April 24th deal between the federal government and the tribal combatants in South Waziristan is a welcome development. An incipient “success” for Pakistan has been registered. It’s a hopeful beginning.
The deal was brokered by the MMA parliamentarians on the basis of Gen. Parvez Musharraf’s early March offer of general amnesty to the tribesmen in exchange for accepting the law of the land. The five most wanted combatants of the Zillikhel tribe including Nek Mohammad embraced the corps commander and presented him with symbolic gifts. They regretted the March battles, lamented past misunderstandings and vowed loyalty to Pakistan.
In his attempt at confidence-building the corps commander spoke warmly and compassionately, but firmly. He invoked brotherhood, praised their hospitality, commitment to national interest and shared his threat perceptions with the tribesmen. He also announced major development initiatives: Constructing roads and schools and providing medical care — above all, linking the area to the outside would through television booster besides rehabilitating displaced tribesmen and so on.
The deal was clinched through multiple-level negotiations with the combatants and the process involved many actors: Tribal elders, two elected parliamentarians, the Frontier Constabulary, army regulars, special forces, the political agent, the governor, tribal agents, FATA officials and the president himself.
Since the end of February top security agencies were communicating with the MMA chief minister of NWFP on the nature of the threat Pakistan faced in case the international concerns regarding the existence of Al-Qaeda network in South Waziristan were not sufficiently probed. This concern was subsequently repeated by the corps commander at Shakai when he reminded the grand jirga that Pakistan, while protecting its own people, territory and sovereignty, had to be mindful of the need to behave as a responsible state internationally; that Pakistan could ill-afford any “terrorists” operating from its territory.
Undoing structural wrongs with ideological underpinnings can never be easy. It calls for a combination of determined resolve and flexible methods, especially when the untangling of politico-military and ideological mess means confronting your own troubled past to define a confident future. You have to meet halfway without screaming “victory.” There are no clean victories, but settlements can be reached and peace can follow. Hopefully, it will at Wana.
The agreement is perhaps the beginning of a wise process adopted by the state in resolving its own lingering contradictions as well as those of the substate actors and the ideology sowed by the state during the Afghan jihad.
The good thing is that the state has devised a homespun approach to settling the Wana conflict, independent of external influences. Despite its deepening security ties with the United States the government has not worked with “derivative wisdom”. At home the operations have created misunderstandings and resentments even though much of the course correction is in Pakistan’s interest. The pressure from Washington to “do more” has complicated matters for a state in transition.
This is why the expectation from the US to “capture Al-Qaeda” elements in haste could prompt the Pakistani state to opt ill-conceived and harmful moves.
After March the state adopted a non-aggressive approach, determined but realistic. It factored in the centrality of dialogue in achieving the objective of engaging the tribesmen. The thrust was not to punish the militants, but to seek future “good behavior” through the device of the jirga. The problem was appropriately contextualized and backed by credible threat of use of force.
Clearing the mess is not about striking at religion or religiosity. When Nek Mohammad says that he will not give up the jihad, his assertion has to be put in a perspective. Jihad has multiple connotations and is central to the Muslim sociology; only in the post-1979 phase did it acquire a force structure that militarized the concept. The state is busy knocking down that infrastructure. It’s foolish to require or expect the operation to wean people from their sociological roots.
Today’s Wana is the creation of yesterday’s Afghanistan. The misdirected military-led state, “empowered” by the US, had popularized national security. For the Pakistani state Nek Mohammad represents its own creation. The state has to retake charge of its affairs and roll back that paradigm. But it has to go easy; there are no quick fixes here.
Wana operation acquired national and international significance. It became the acid test for Pakistan’s commitment to anti-terrorism. Concerns about the deal amounting to the state giving in to the combatants are simplistic, if not conspiratorial. Countering terrorism and establishing the writ of a reformed state is now in Pakistan’s interest.
Meanwhile built into Wana is also the broader challenge the state faces: How can it substitute a value-loaded dialogue with one that is more credible. Post-9/11 discourse has thrown up many labels like “Islamic extremist,” “Islamic terrorist” and “Islamic fundamentalist”. These labels cannot be treated generically. They are context-bound and hold different meanings for different power groups.
These are critical considerations and must be built into the state’s response to the multiple challenges it faces. The primary issue relates to extending the writ of the state through rule of law. In other words, the state has to justify its own writ by becoming legitimate through a process of governance that is acceptable to multiple actors.
— Nasim Zehra is Harvard Fellow, Harvard University Asia Center, Cambridge, Mass.
