ISLAMABAD, 27 November 2004 — Kashmir has been the bone of contention between Pakistan and India right from the day the two countries became independent. For 57 years now, Pakistan has been trying to change the status quo in Kashmir, essaying through bilateral and multilateral means for a negotiated settlement.
Well...even through war. First, Pakistan tried a conventional war, and failed. Subsequently, she tried supporting the guerrilla warfare in the Indian-held Kashmir, which also proved futile and disastrous. Having spent more than half a century in mutual unfriendliness, it is now being realized by the two hostile neighbors that after 1998, war — whether conventional or irregular — has become a highly dangerous course for both, given the perils of escalation to the nuclear threshold.
On Oct. 26, 2004, the Pakistan President Gen. Pervez Musharraf said that the stage to move forward for a solution to the Kashmir issue had come, since a great deal of progress in this direction had already been made.
“I see light at the end of the tunnel,” the president said and asked the media to initiate a debate on the various options for a solution on Kashmir. The idea was to arrive at a national consensus so that Musharraf could discuss the most realistic options with Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh in their forthcoming meetings. “We are at a stage where options acceptable to Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris ought to be considered.”
But he lamented that such a debate had yet to start in Pakistan. India and her media also have taken a skeptical view of the “mediation via media” course suggested by Musharraf. While India has reacted cautiously with the caveat that such issues need to be discussed behind closed doors rather than through the media. In Pakistan the usual chorus of voices condemning Musharraf for “betraying” the Kashmir cause has been heard without much surprise. Both in India and Pakistan, it is strongly felt that serious engagement with the problem and Musharraf’s ideas for a possible solution are still inadequate. But, hopefully, as time goes by, things will take shape on both sides.
Musharraf has revealed some of the ways he would like the Kashmir dispute with India to be resolved. But, as media observers put it, his effort to wrap his proposal around oblique frameworks, contexts and references may not long endure the spin, which the Kashmir experts in India and Pakistan are wont to put on it. There will be flutters in the hard-line dovecotes on both sides, and warnings are likely to be delivered on the same formulation, typically making the world wonder about the “win-win” scenario earlier held out by the Pakistani president. Optimistic as he is, Musharraf refuses to accept — what he says certain people believe — that it is not possible to find a solution to the Kashmir issue other than through mustering consensus via polls.
“I strongly believe there are options and solutions, and now is the time to consider these options,” he stressed, adding that consensus simply could not be built by going to the polls. “It would have to be through a debate in the media.” Musharraf offered food for thought by suggesting that the debate could be initiated in the context of a three-pronged discourse. First, identify the region at stake. Second, demilitarize it. Third, change its status. He suggested there were many options which could then be considered, and legal experts on both sides could then look at the pros and cons of ideas for a joint Indo-Pak control, UN-mandates, condominiums, and so on.
As such, India is never willing to accept the plebiscite mechanism contained in the UN resolutions. The resolutions are under Chapter VI of the Charter and, therefore, non-enforceable. The UN can only intervene if both parties agree to its mediation. India shot down the idea long ago and, as things stand, there is no way she can be made to accept it. At any rate, in the event of a plebiscite, Pakistan will have to withdraw all her troops, down to the last soldier, from Azad Kashmir and what are now known as the Northern Areas, even as India will continue to retain a specified number of her troops in areas she controls. Pakistan, meanwhile, has not accepted the proposal floated by some quarters to turn the Line of Control (LOC) into international border and, as Musharraf clearly stresses, “will not do so.” There are two strong reasons for Pakistan’s stand. One, the issue relates to Kashmiris’ right of self-determination, not territory. Two, if the LOC were to become an international border, Pakistan will lose any standing as a party to the dispute. Indeed, there would be no dispute after that. India will be left alone to deal with her part of Kashmir as she deems fit. While Pakistan is just not ready to accept the LOC as a permanent border, and India refuses to hold a plebiscite in Held Kashmir, she (India) is also not ready to accept a religion-based solution.
“So,” Musharraf makes an offer, “let’s talk about it in geographical terms.” Explaining the geographical status of Kashmir, Musharraf says that it is divided into seven regions — five of which are with India and two with Pakistan. “The beauty of these regions is that they are still religion-based even if we consider them geographically,” he woos the Indians and, probably, the Kashmiris. The debate automatically takes an interesting twist when Musharraf says that the Indian-held Kashmir comprises five regions — whether we bifurcate it geographically or on grounds of religious followings! Technically, the Indian-held Kashmir is a state with only three provinces: Jammu, the Valley and Ladakh. And Pakistan only has Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas. But, if Musharraf suggests that the Indian side is in control of five regions, it could only be possible if the areas or regions were indeed divided on the basis of religion, or geography.
For example, on the basis of how the River Chenab runs through Kashmir. As some experts see it, the five geographical regions, to which Musharraf is referring, and which also conform to the religious map, are: Ladakh (the Ismaili part between the Himalayas and the Indus), Kargil/Dras (Muslim), Poonch (Muslim, contiguous to Azad Kashmir), Jammu (Muslim-majority districts) and the Valley (Muslim). On the Pakistani side, a third part could be Gilgit Agency, as distinct from Baltistan, because it was never conquered by the Dogra ruler but rather attached gratuitously to Kashmir by the British in 1889 and then taken back on lease. It is unclear whether Musharraf simply wants contiguous Muslim areas to fall to Pakistan or if he is thinking in military terms based on a general’s view of the terrain.
Then, again, one can hardly say whether his mind will be focused on the future of Indo-Pak relations when river waters become scarce and water treaties come under pressure. Or maybe he wants a line drawn along the Chenab River, making Pakistan safe against any future Indian trespass into waters that belong to Pakistan under the 1960 Indus Water Treaty. It may not be accidental that the parts, or regions, in Indian-held Kashmir he has presumably specified are located along the Chenab. But the famous Chenab Formula was the subject of discussion at the track-two level between the governments of prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Atal Behari Vajpayee in 1999. The Chenab Formula purports division of Kashmir along the River Chenab, which flows down from Kashmir into the Punjab (Pakistan), separating the Muslim majority areas from the Hindu and Buddhist-dominated districts. The river flows through the mountainous areas of Doda, Ramban, Surukot, Salat, Reasi, Akhnoor and enters into the Punjab (Pakistan) at Head Marala. India has built Salal Dam on it under the Indus Water Treaty. The Kashmir Valley is already 98 percent Muslim while out of the six districts of Jammu province almost three Muslim-majority districts fall on the right bank of the River Chenab and will fall to Pakistan if the river is made the new boundary.
If agreed, according to the Chenab Formula of division of Jammu and Kashmir, 80 percent of the territory of the original state, including Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas, will become part of Pakistan. Or at least this is how some Pakistani experts see it. And, if it is the Chenab Formula Musharraf is going by, his proposal may well become the ingredient of a non-starter. The Vajpayee government had publicly denied ever discussing such a formula at the track two level. But if it is not the Chenab Formula, then one wonders if Musharraf is referring to the Owen-Dixon formula about regional plebiscites, meaning that the state of Jammu & Kashmir vote province-wise.
Since Islamabad did not subscribe to it entirely, the then foreign minister serving the Nawaz Sharif government, Sartaj Aziz, had suggested district-wise voting, clearly desiring to slice the cake neatly to hand-pick the tiny Muslim majorities within the non-Muslim provinces, Ladakh as well as Jammu. In 1953, when Sheikh Abdullah declared his government in Srinagar was in favor of the Owen-Dixon formula, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had him arrested and put in jail for 11 years. But there is no denying that this fact of geography works, albeit simply, into the process of normalization.
On the basis of ground realities, a way out must respect the sentiments of all the three parties involved in this problem: Pakistan, Kashmiris and India. Musharraf identified the factor of geography correctly but moved from that premise to a formulation that may not interest India and certainly is not acceptable to the Kashmiris. However, were the issue of control to be fudged — and it’s important to fudge it — the only way to go about it would be to allow the natural routes to open up and let the dynamics of economic integration come into play on the basis of geography.
The latest show of hands on Kashmir from New Delhi came as a statement by a senior leader of the Congress Party, Salman Khurshid, saying that India and Pakistan should look at the Irish Formula. In Islamabad, the head of a state-run research institution also had earlier supported the Irish Formula. But a closer look reveals that while the Pakistani side looks at the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 as one based on the principle of self-determination, the Indian side links the Northern Ireland solution to the merger of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland within the European Union. And so on.
In the present scenario, Musharraf not just seems to be talking practically but also appears to have come up with a proposal that has been pragmatically derived. Known for his last-minute, wise-headed decisions, it’s time Pakistan put some amount of faith and trust in his acumen as a leader who has safely driven the nation out of many a situation, even if it were not as grave as that of Kashmir.
There is no denying that Pakistan has also tried to settle the issue militarily, but in vain. If it had succeeded, there would have been no problem. India also cannot defeat Pakistan decisively in order to force Islamabad to sign on the dotted line. While war between the two countries is still possible at lower levels, the nuclear dimension has scratched the option for any head-on conflict. But both know full well that no state in recorded history has ever conceded territory under its control without being decisively defeated. Neither is going to accept territorial dislocations. Both have to find a solution within the evolving framework of the peace process and normalization. Finally, Pakistan cannot emphasize self-determination on the one hand and then talk in terms of territory on the other. Kashmiris won’t accept it. Recently Musharraf reiterated Pakistan’s proposal of demilitarization of Held Kashmir, and said that if India came up with a similar proposal asking Pakistan to do likewise in Azad Kashmir, these issues would need to be discussed, and Pakistan would have to build a consensus for moving forward. Although his proposal does not offer the final prescription for solving the Kashmir problem, it does help advance certain ideas for initiating a debate in Pakistan and India on the possible solutions prior to the initiation of talks on Kashmir between the two countries. It articulates Pakistan’s flexibility with new ideas for seeking a pragmatic solution of the Kashmir problem. The proposal is not entirely new. What is important about Musharraf’s statement is the fact that for the first time, the top Pakistani leader has publicly proposed a solution reaffirming Pakistan’s willingness to move away from its traditional position on Kashmir. It is a unilateral gesture, but it cannot become operational unless India also exhibits flexibility. Musharraf gave the first indications of flexibility in Pakistan’s stance on the eve of the Agra Summit in July 2001 when he suggested, “Pakistan would accept any solution acceptable to the people of Kashmir.” After the failure of Agra Summit, Pakistan resumed its traditional position. On Sept. 20, 2002, Musharraf suggested a four-phase approach for evolving an agreement on Kashmir “on the basis of (the) alternatives to (the) long-held positions.”
On Dec. 18, 2003, he spoke of going beyond the stated positions for solving the Kashmir problem. He even went so far as to say that Pakistan would be willing to leave aside the UN resolutions if India showed flexibility. The latest statement, issued on Oct. 25, 2004, floats specific ideas involving a region-based partition for the final disposal of the Kashmir problem. No doubt, the underlying assumption in Musharraf’s statement is the flexibility leading to a solution of the Kashmir problem that is collectively acceptable to Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris. The perspective is widely shared in Pakistan. With the exception of the hard-line Islamist parties and jihadi groups, the general consensus is that Pakistan must strive for a pragmatic solution that protects its national interests and enjoys the blessings of the people of Kashmir. Several parties —including the PPP and the ANP — favor improved relations and peaceful settlement of disputes with India but are not expected to support Musharraf. Their opposition stems from the growing polarization between the government and the opposition. If the government wants to build support for its flexible approach toward Kashmir, it must improve its relations with the opposition.
Musharraf’s proposals as possible platforms for a Kashmir solution are largely an indication of his increasing authority as domestic opposition to his regime has weakened, allowing him to retain his military office beyond the end of the year. Although Musharraf’s proposals will not bring about a rapid settlement to the Kashmir problem, they may give him more room for negotiation in the current peace process with Delhi. Musharraf’s proposals have also committed Islamabad to consider alternative solutions to the dispute. The most controversial involves the breaking up of the state into seven local units, some of which would become neutral zones, which an international body, most likely the UN, would monitor. Although the proposal is not new, it marks a sharp break with Islamabad’s strategy in recent years, which has involved support for insurrections as part of a strategy to annex the entire province. Islamabad’s apparent change in strategy may not be radical enough to impress Delhi. Since India occupies two-thirds of the state, she refuses to make concessions. Militarily, she is also far more powerful, and thus would need more compelling reasons why she should change her stance now.
Musharraf Proposals Lead to Confusion in Kashmiri Groups
Musharraf’s proposals have led to confusion in Kashmiri groups. Recently, groups represented in the All Parties’ Hurriyat Conference (APHC) have become divided between hard-line proponents of Pakistani annexation and more moderate advocates of a negotiated settlement with India, which would give the state a special level of autonomy within India. While hard-liners have reacted angrily to Musharraf’s proposal, the reaction among the moderates may prove more significant. Musharraf’s proposal concerning international neutralization could become an alternative to provincial autonomy in negotiations with India.
However, Delhi is likely to be suspicious of Musharraf’s motives, which could complicate its own talks with APHC leaders and make it more difficult to bring them to accept a constitutional settlement. However, Pakistan has said any decision on Kashmir issue, which has bedeviled relations between Islamabad and New Delhi, would not be imposed on the Kashmiris. Besides Indian and Pakistani participation, the involvement of the Kashmiri leadership in the dialogue process for peacefully settling the issue is imperative. It is difficult to envisage a solution acceptable to all three parties — Pakistan, the people of Kashmir, and India — that would radically change a status quo that has not so far yielded to force or persuasion.
Therefore, the lines of a solution that suggest themselves are the existing status quo to continue, albeit with a winding down of militancy, the withdrawal of the vast numbers of Indian troops from Held Kashmir, the LOC and the working boundary, making the LOC a soft divide by allowing separated Kashmiri families to travel across it and meet their relatives and friends. Of course, it entails a negotiation process that involves Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris, and an internal political process within the Indian-held Kashmir to do away with the draconian regime in that unfortunate land.
