US is encouraged to give diplomacy a chance since Bush heard Washington's own misgivings about an Iranian nuclear program being echoed in the European capitals. Europe's three, Germany, France and Britain (E-3), may be using a different approach but it is definitely one that seeks to deny Iran the opportunity to develop nuclear weapons.
Europeans have been consistently advocating a policy of engagement. By contrast the Israelis have consistently called for an air strike against Iran. This trans-Atlantic coordination over Iran will dilute, though not diminish, Israeli influence on Washington's Iran policy.
In Washington some rethink on Iran is evident given that US-E-3 engagement over Iran has intensified.
Meanwhile Iran's rhetoric against the West and especially the US notwithstanding, a section of Iranian policy-makers are also pragmatists. As they have shown in the past when in the eighties Tehran bought weapons from Israel during the Iraq-imposed war. For Iran its dialogue with E-3 can facilitate its reintegration into the global economy and help avert a US or Israeli military attack.
Under the last November agreement Tehran agreed to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities that could help make a nuclear bomb. E-3 pledged to resume dialogue on trade partnership and support Iran's membership of WTO.
At the heart of the immediate crisis is the question of Iran's capacity to produce enriched uranium. A signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran is allowed uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes. Iran responded by opening its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections. And it did not entirely help. Questions regarding how did Iran's centrifuge machines have traces of uranium enriched at levels used for weapons still remain unanswered.
Of late Tehran has been queried by the IAEA on the latest revelations regarding Tehran's negotiations with A.Q. Khan regarding the purchase of weapons technology for making a bomb in the late eighties. Iran was obliged to share the correspondence with IAEA. This is evidence that despite it being on offer they did not acquire the technology, Iran claims. And indeed the information does cut both ways.
Significantly IAEA continues to maintain it has found no concrete evidence of Iran already headed in the nuclear weapons direction. Still it faults Tehran for holding back vital information.
IAEA has a list of complaints against Iran linked to undertaking work at nuclear plants without informing IAEA. Iran has its own explanations.
Clearly intangibles like motives, intentions and good faith have factored in the nuclear negotiations. A broader engagement framework is required. Most importantly any workable agreement will require US as its guarantor.
Ultimately concerns on both sides will have to be addressed to make the negotiations succeed. An agreement framework that will work for Iran must include:
- The US as a party in any serious negotiations related to Iran's nuclear program and security.
- The US and the E-3 must publicly guarantee Iran's security. Iran needs assurance especially against Israel's public threat to attack its nuclear plants. As a logical counter to Washington's not so subtly articulated 'regime change' agenda and its troops in Iran's bordering countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, Tehran's key focus is regime survival.
- Washington must end verbal hostility against Iran. Discontinue crass rhetoric like "Axis of Evil."
- Put solid economic incentives for Iran on the table.
Similarly for the US, the E-3 and the IAEA what will work is if Iran can cooperate.
The NPT does not ban nations from uranium enrichment yet in its agreement with the E-3 Iran agreed to freeze its uranium enrichment program. Tehran recognized that given its past history of distrust Iran would have to go the extra mile to reassure E-3 of the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.
Iran, as a signatory to the NPT and the E-3-Iran Agreement, must ensure complete transparency of it various nuclear programs and will retain the right at an appropriate time and under mutually agreed arrangements to enrich nonweapons grade uranium.
Clearly the multilateral dialogue track is positioned to resolve the Iran nuclear crisis. If it moves ahead, with Washington and Tehran predisposed to genuinely resolving the nuclear crisis, then the possibility of military action can be ruled out. Instead an agreement can help ensure that Tehran stands by its NPT commitment, that Iran's security is not undermined, that it can retain its peaceful nuclear program and above all it can be fully rehabilitated into the international economic context.
