Iran’s efforts to impose a new reality in the Strait of Hormuz

In the last week, US Central Command has carried out strikes against more than 170 Iranian military targets. The targets have been varied and examining them provides a picture of the current nature of US military conduct.
The targets have included coastal radar systems, air defense systems, command-and-control networks, antiship missile capabilities, drone storage facilities and more than 60 small boats belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This indicates that the objective has been to reduce the infrastructure that enables Tehran to disrupt navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, while avoiding any expansion of operations to include Iranian energy facilities and commercial ports. In other words, Washington is pursuing a strict policy without, at the same time, allowing it to escalate into an open confrontation with Tehran.
The US strikes were not arbitrary. Rather, they came after the IRGC targeted three commercial tankers in the strait, including the Saudi vessel Wedyan and the Qatari tanker Al-Rekayyat. The attack affected the already slow pace of shipping through the strait. According to tracking data reported by Reuters, only two tankers crossed during the early hours of last Thursday, while other vessels switched off their Automatic Identification System transponders to avoid being tracked by the IRGC.
This disruption to the smooth and safe flow of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz not only harms the economies of the Arab Gulf states but also puts pressure on Iran’s own ability to export oil. It thus expands the number of countries affected worldwide, brings Gulf, Asian and European positions closer together around the demand for freedom of navigation without Iranian control or conditions, and provides Washington with a political basis for continuing to target Iran’s naval military capabilities.
Iranian policymakers believe that the Strait of Hormuz has now become a winning card for raising the cost for their adversaries. However, this belief overlooks an important point: the negative consequences of this tool extend beyond the US to Iran’s Gulf neighbors and influential countries that import oil through the strait, such as China and India. Consequently, the medium- and long-term political and even economic costs for Iran will be high.
According to the IRGC’s vision, the strait’s strategic value lies in dispersing means of attack against tankers using missiles, drones and fast boats while simultaneously maintaining plausible political deniability. Under this strategy, the objective is to keep the strait in a state of uncertainty, allowing limited shipping traffic without imposing a complete closure.
The US strikes have targeted this equation, particularly as some reports emerging from Iran attributed the recent attacks to “a rogue faction within its regime.” This narrative places Tehran before a problem that is difficult to overcome both practically and legally. If the leadership does not exercise full control over the units operating in the strait, then its assurances are insufficient to guarantee safe navigation. 

The US strikes were not arbitrary. Rather, they came after the IRGC targeted three commercial tankers in the strait.

Hassan Al-Mustafa

This is why US President Donald Trump’s administration has insisted on a public Iranian commitment to cease targeting ships and to open all shipping lanes without imposing transit fees.
At the same time, Trump announced Washington’s agreement to continue peace talks at Iran’s request, adding that the ceasefire had “ended.” This indicates that negotiations will proceed in parallel with sustained military pressure, as the objective is to compel Tehran to comply with the provisions of the memorandum of understanding signed last month.
The Iranians, who now find themselves pursuing a policy that is not matched by their Arab Gulf neighbors, are relying on diplomacy spearheaded by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, supported by President Masoud Pezeshkian and coordinated with Parliament Speaker Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf. This diplomacy seeks to reduce escalation, although it remains inflexible on two issues: the Strait of Hormuz and the frozen assets abroad.
However, this diplomacy loses its credibility in the face of IRGC attacks on oil tankers and against Bahrain and Kuwait. This comes despite the fact three Arab Gulf states participated in the funeral of late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, while Qatar, with Saudi and Pakistani backing, remains active in mediation efforts between Iran and the US.
Nevertheless, Tehran is displaying a stark contradiction in its foreign policy behavior that goes beyond what some consider a mere distribution of roles, reflecting instead conflicting policies and decision-making among competing centers of power, as well as the desire of the more hard-line faction to consolidate a fait accompli. This is particularly so because a segment of Iran’s political and security establishment has come to believe that tightening its grip on the Strait of Hormuz constitutes a more enduring and effective asset than its nuclear program, which has suffered extensive destruction.
Most likely, an influential current and part of the Iranian regime’s hard-line core believes it must reap the political and military gains of the war, convinced that Iran emerged victorious. As Saudi political analyst Abdulrahman Al-Rashed wrote in Asharq Al-Awsat: “Since Geneva, the Iranian side has felt and acted with alarming high confidence. It is exerting pressure and threats. It has not reciprocated the American gifts with tangible concessions. Even the opening of the strait was accompanied by a condition obliging ships to acknowledge its right to question them, provide their data and await its approval,” adding that this “establishes new rules of control.”
In my view, these are rules that the Arab Gulf states will not accept and will confront through various means, without entering into a costly military war with Tehran that would fail to achieve the desired results.

• Hassan Al-Mustafa is a Saudi writer and researcher specializing in Islamist movements, the evolution of religious discourse, and Gulf-Iran relations.
X: @Halmustafa