Following Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s victory in the Iranian presidential elections, the focus is on the impact it would have on the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program.
Surely the debate over the nuclear issue is one that contains grave consequences not only for the Gulf region, but also for the international community. It is certainly not an issue that can simply and solely be treated within the context of the current hostile US-Iranian relationship. Hence, the outcome of the current negotiations should not hinge only on this factor; it is indeed an issue for Gulf security as a whole.
So it is necessary to continue promoting a broad diplomatic engagement that can bring about a more realistic negotiation agenda with Tehran. Of particular importance will be the continued involvement of the European Union. Until now, the EU’s diplomatic success — in the context of the EU-3 (France, Germany and Great Britain) negotiations with Iran — has been limited and, given the general sense among commentators and analysts alike, there seems to be nothing to indicate possible change. In fact, given the portrayal of Ahmadinejad as a staunch conservative and former member of the Revolutionary Guard, fears have been stoked that Iran will abandon the path of negotiations and challenge the world community outright to try and stop its nuclear build-up.
At this point, however, there is no reason to classify recent developments as foregone conclusions. For his part, Ahmadinejad has so far simply repeated what has been the standard line of the Iranian argument over the past year — defending Iran’s legitimate right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency were also back at work immediately after the election, carrying out regular inspections. Further, Ali Agha Mohammadi, a spokesman for Iran’s top national security body that is handling the delicate nuclear talks with Britain, France and Germany stated,”the wider principles of our foreign policy will not change.”
Many within the EU appear to have taken a victory by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as a given and as such had prepared the future negotiations strategy on the basis of experiences in dealing with the former president. The fallout is evident in the mixed and confused message coming out of Brussels: EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana simply indicated that the EU’s Iran policy does not need to undergo any change and that it is simply too soon to say what would happen next. EU Justice Commissioner Franco Frattini further made it clear that unless there was progress on both the nuclear issue and human rights, the EU might have no choice but to freeze the current dialogue.
What is required at this stage, however, is a cold-headed, cost-benefit analysis based on existing facts and potential prospects — one that would keep the consequences of failed negotiations in mind.
From that perspective, there might be benefits from Ahmadinejad’s election, especially considering the fact that the president-elect has made the economy his primary area of concern. With Iran’s GDP only one-quarter of what it was in 1979, unofficial unemployment as high as 25 percent, and with required investment topping 100 billion euros in terms of job creation for the Iranian youth, Ahmadinejad’s administration will be focused on linking the country to trade incentives and economic opportunities. This is where the EU can play a key role, as foreign investment and access to global capital markets will be a key determinant in this equation.
Linking this to the nuclear issue is important and relevant. There are numerous reasons for the EU to ensure that further progress on the Iranian program is prevented. Were Iran to obtain a nuclear capability, it could spell an end to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and lead to an arms race in the region and there would be an increased possibility of extremists gaining access to nuclear materials; this is in addition to the environmental costs that would be borne by the Gulf region itself. Therefore, in order to prevent an Iranian nuclear capability, the EU understands that it has to be more direct with its Iranian counterparts, i.e. making clear the benefits from cooperation and the consequences of challenging the international community. The EU will also likely deliver the message to Iran to stop missing opportunities when they are being offered as has been done on numerous occasions in the past.
Equally important is the mobilization of a regional effort at defusing the tension, as it will be the regional countries that will be most directly affected. In addition to a more concerted high-level diplomatic consultation between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries touching on all sensitive issues between the two sides and not just restricting to diplomatic niceties and issues such as trade ties and oil prices, the GCC countries and EU should also maintain a constant dialogue in order to see how each side can support the other in achieving, what are essentially, common objectives.
In their efforts, the GCC countries should operate on the same basis as the Europeans, making clear to Tehran the stakes involved and the expected benefits or consequences. On numerous occasions in the past, the GCC leaders have stated that Gulf security can only be achieved through the involvement and effort of all adjoining regional countries. To increase the likelihood of a diplomatic effort with Iran becoming successful, it would be appropriate to stress with Tehran that the GCC countries see Iran as an integral part of a future Gulf security architecture.
For the moment, Europe retains political clout with Tehran that should be utilized. A European initiative together with the GCC on a regional security formula that provides Iran with the recognition of its legitimate security interests and provides the Iranian leadership with an avenue allowing for its concerns and views to be heard could be one way to move the nuclear issue into a more properly structured and contextual framework. Similarly, a developed EU program to assist the Iranian economy would be just the factor that would match the priorities of the Ahmadinejad administration.
After all, the interests of all concerned partners would be achieved if the goals of Iranian economic pragmatism are achieved.
To this end, the overall emphasis has to be on more negotiations in good faith rather than portraying the ascendancy of Ahmadinejad as one that can only lead to confrontation.
— Dr. Christian Koch is director of the GCC-EU Relations Program at the Gulf Research Center, Dubai
