More recent Palestinian infighting has naturally prevented even more the narrowing of the gap between Hamas and Fatah. Efforts to form a national unity government have crumbled while a proposal to form a government of technocrats for a year or two has been pushed aside. At the same time, the situation in the Palestinian territories is deteriorating because of the continuation of the financial embargo from abroad and also the Israeli siege in Gaza.
The differences between Fatah and Hamas might in the end be impossible to bridge. Hamas leaders are holding on to their ideological agenda. Anything but the liberation of the whole of Palestine is apparently unacceptable. The leaders do not accept the Arab initiative — proposed in Beirut in 2002 — which offers Israel full normalization in return for its full withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories. As for the idea of holding US-funded early elections with the purpose of ousting Hamas and bringing in Fatah, it is difficult to imagine how this could bring the type of settlement the Palestinians are looking for. The ploy is more likely to strengthen Hamas instead of weakening it. It could well precipitate civil war.
Yet the differences that exist between the two factions revolve basically around means, not aims. It makes little sense to draw an imaginary line dividing what we are calling “moderates” and what we are calling “extremists.” Everyone, including Hamas, is prepared to negotiate a peaceful settlement on the basis of an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 borders and the creation of a fully sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.
Hamas’ position toward such a peace package has not been tested yet for a simple reason: There hasn’t been a settlement process to test it against. In order to test the Hamas position, the Israelis have to prove that there exists a process offering a possibility of achieving Palestinian rights.
However, Israel is trying to compensate for its setback in Lebanon by getting tough on the Palestinians in Gaza. Figures from the last three months of Israeli violence in Gaza indicate the policy: 270 Palestinians killed and many more maimed and mutilated and only one Israeli soldier killed. In other words, Israel wants to ensure that the wanton killing of Palestinians remains as cost-free as it has been up to now.
Recent signals from Israel suggest it has nothing to offer as a basis for a settlement that would be acceptable to either Fatah or Hamas. It is clear that Israel is keen to aggravate the conflict between the two factions so that it can point to them both as the cause of the collapse of any future peace settlement. Israel appears hopeful that in case the Hamas-led government survives, at least a civil war between Fatah and Hamas would be triggered. It is a miscalculation for both Hamas and Fatah do have one common denominator. They both understand they can retain their support bases primarily through fighting the Israeli occupation which is of course the root of the Palestinian problem.
