With midterm elections ushering in a new Democrat-dominated Congress, US policy on Iraq is likely to change. So far, a number of approaches have been put forth, ranging from increased securitization of Iraq and a concomitant surge in troop levels, to phased troop withdrawal and the three-state partitioning of Iraq into a northern, Kurdish state, a central, Sunni state and a southern, Shiite state. The latter has become somewhat of a convenient policy-du-jour for policy makers bent on proposing something, anything for Iraq.
Iraq, however, will neither be saved by stand-alone increased securitization, nor by a three-state partition coupled with some degree of troop withdrawal. Increasing troop numbers and their visibility may, rather than increase stability, inflame anti-US feelings among Iraqis and further endanger troops as ready targets. (Polls indicate that, while a majority of Iraqis are dissatisfied with the US occupation, half of Iraqis approve of attacks on US troops.) Similarly, partitioning is sure to cause a descent into ethnic cleansing with grave regional repercussions. Such proposals remain deeply problematic in their failure to recognize the complex sociopolitical dynamics on the ground.
So what needs to be done?
First, US policy-makers and the media must stop framing the situation in purely ethno-sectarian terms. Today, despite the spread of sectarian violence, a large number of Iraqis continue to be active in civil life, working across community, sectarian and religious lines, and remain committed to change at the grass roots level. This is especially evident in the vibrancy of the press, the activism of women’s and youth groups, and the growth of artists’ and literary unions, all typically inter-ethnic and inter-communal. Moreover, Iraq’s sects are anything but driven by unified interest in an ethnically divided Iraq. For example, although some Shiite factions are clamoring for greater regional autonomy, others have stood against federalism, suspicious of what they perceive to be a US-engineered break-up of Iraq. Continuing to emphasize sectarian differences, then, undermines Iraq’s nation-state potential and exacerbates latent ethnic and sectarian tensions. Iraq, the country, must be the moniker under which Iraqis rally and identify. Anything else will fuel sectarian dynamics.
Secondly, Washington must take into account the psychological dynamics behind the hardball power politics that dominate Sunni-Shiite relations. While there is little to substantially divide Shiite and Sunnis at the religious level, the tragedy is that political rivalries, mutual suspicions and zealotry are based on memories of dominance and oppression experienced during the Baath years. The Shiite leadership, anxious to preserve its current political pre-eminence after thirty years of Baath regime oppression, is largely unreceptive to political accommodation, while many Sunni leaders, now bereft of substantial political engagement, are fearful of political isolation and are reacting defensively to the experience of being treated as a minority. Ultimately these reciprocal fears will be assuaged only by the operation of an Iraqi government in which minority rights are adequately protected and by serious efforts to promote reconciliation among Iraq’s various communities.
Thirdly, the US must dramatically re-envision its modus operandi in Iraq if it truly desires a reduction in sectarian violence. In addition to suffering from growing insecurity that has taken the form of a raging insurgency in parts of Iraq, the average Iraqi is experiencing the progressive deterioration of social services, inadequate access to clean water, a deteriorating health system, sporadic provision of electricity, and high unemployment. Economic decline has spawned unrestrained corruption, of which the kidnapping industry is only one manifestation. Youth — 65 percent of Iraq’s population — have become easy targets for militia, insurgents, and death squads. If Washington wants to ease anxiety on the streets, then it must redirect reconstruction efforts toward improving economic stability.
Fourthly, the US administration and Congress must begin listening to what Iraqis want — and adhering to their demands. Polls state that a majority of Iraqis believe in the viability of a central government, support the one-state solution, and retain a modicum of confidence in Iraq security forces. While Iraqis are in desperate need of creative solutions, the three-state partition will invariably move Iraq further into the throes of chaos. Iraqi voices must be at the forefront of US policy making and strategy sessions. It is time for Washington to listen.
— Michael Shank is a Ph.D. student at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. Patricia Karam is Senior Iraq Grants Officer at the US Institute of Peace.
