“I came to rid Basra of its enemies: I now hand it back to its friends.”
— Maj. Gen. Graham Binns
In March 2003 Maj.Gen. Graham Binns had led the British forces into Basra. On Dec. 16, 2007 he formally handed over Basra, the last of the four Southern provinces, to Mohammed Al-Waili, the governor of Basra. The responsibility for the security of Basra now rests with the Iraqi Army and police and not the coalition forces. His comment was fitting for the occasion but it only told a small part of the story. David Miliband, Britain’s new and young foreign secretary, witnessed this ceremony on his first visit to Iraq in that capacity. Such an historic event might have taken place in the heart of Basra City, or in Umm Qasr Port which the British have done much to improve, watched by a crowd of thousands. The security situation was thought to rule out such locations, and the departure lounge of Basra Airport, still a British base, was used instead.
David Miliband told the invited audience of local tribal leaders, Iraqi security officials, British diplomats and soldiers:
“The Basra story is two years of the situation getting better, two years getting massively worse and then six months getting massively better on the security front.”
Outside Basra Palace, Saddam Hussein’s base in Iraq’s second largest city and Shiite stronghold, which 500 British troops evacuated on Sept. 2, a parade of Iraqi Army trucks and Humvees took place in a show of military strength.
In private British Army officers who have served in Basra are deeply disappointed that, for a host of reasons, since 2003 only limited progress on vital reconstruction and civil matters has taken place. At the start expectations were high and many promises made. Troops patrolled in berets and not helmets, and the emphasis was on winning “hearts and minds”. However, the whole concept of invading Iraq to liberate the people and impose a model democracy that would be copied by other states in the region, was fatally flawed and Iraq drifted into civil war. The coalition forces were too few for the given task, detailed planning had never taken place within the Pentagon, and the political leadership given to Iraq in the first years was deplorable. In particular, the Iraqi Army was disbanded and had to be rebuilt. Britain was a senior partner, but its experience in that part of the world and advice were largely ignored.
After a while British soldiers found the people they had liberated had become their potential enemies, and armored vehicles had to be driven around the streets with their hatches closed. The provincial governor of Basra refused to cooperate with them; their task was to support the civil power! Months passed before the electricity and water supplies improved. Street violence and political and religious intimidation increased.
By 2007 most of the attacks by the militias in Southern Iraq — some of whom were armed by Iran — were against British troops. The militias took control of many police units — the very same units which the coalition had been responsible for training and supplying. Many locals who had worked for the coalition were killed for doing so. The civilian authorities were plagued by a high level of corruption linked to massive oil smuggling.
Britain’s overstretched troops were now powerless to prevent Iran-backed clerics from forcing their strict traditions and conservative views on the local people in Basra. Shiite women who dressed “incorrectly” have been murdered on a regular basis, and their bodies dumped in the streets to set an example.
The British Army in Iraq has also been hampered by serious equipment shortages due to the defense budget not rising fast enough to match the new commitments. Patrols in Southern Iraq had to use highly vulnerable “snatch” vehicles. There has been an obvious shortage of all types of helicopters to back up the battalions in combat. The United Kingdom now intends to reduce its military presence from 4,500 to 2,500 by next spring. I would regard that as being only a token force in 2008, and I am not sure it will really have a combat role. It will continue to train the Iraqi 10th Division, which is said to be a good formation; but British soldiers will continue to spend most of their time on “force protection” — guard duties and guarding convoys.
The Ministry of Defense in London insists that British troops could intervene in Basra City if asked to do so. I doubt if that will happen; in fact they have not been patrolling there for many months.
The British never intended to remain long in Southern Iraq. It is now up to the local people to come together, and there have been some signs that the political parties are attempting to do that.
