Since the success of the Tunisian revolution against the dictatorial regime of Ben Ali, protest movements have been snowballing across several Arab countries. The new Arab revolution, unlike the old one, is not directed against the control by foreign powers of Arab lands. Instead, it is directed primarily, if not exclusively, against Arab regimes or "the enemy within."
The circumstances, which triggered the revolution in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and the ongoing popular revolts in Jordan, Syria, Yemen, Morocco and Algeria are somewhat similar. The revolution is mainly led by Arab youth protesting against the many negative aspects dominating the societies in the Arab world. But while economic grievances like the unfair distribution of wealth and unemployment provided a major reason for the protests, one must also admit that the Arab popular revolts in 2011 are not “food” or “bread” riots, or a revolution of the “have-nots.” In fact, the political dimension is equally if not more important than the economic demands as the main driving force of the new Arab revolution. As such, the focal point in these revolts is the protest against injustice, disrespect of human rights, abuse of power, lack of democracy and representation, lack of accountability and transparency, outlawing of civil society institutions, widespread corruption, and the theft of public wealth.
Gulf societies suffer from similar symptoms, but the main difference is that relations between the ruling families in the Gulf states and their citizens are based on a different premise. The question of legitimacy is the key issue in this regard. Indeed, only a very small number of citizens cast doubt or challenge the legitimacy of the ruling families in this region, while the great majority supports their role. The voices asking for change of regime, therefore, represent a rather small minority whose main demands center around the need for political reforms. So far, three countries in the GCC — Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia — have witnessed public protests of varying degrees. In Bahrain and Oman, the government offered financial and economic incentives as well as introducing a number of economic reforms. The governments also tried to open communication channels with the protesters in addition to adopting several fast-track political measures ranging from the replacement of unpopular ministers and officials to the dismissal of the entire Cabinet. All these steps were accompanied by solid promises to introduce, in the very near future, major political reforms including constitutional amendments to guarantee greater popular participation in the decision-making process, more accountability and transparency, and respect of human rights.
In Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, the government has faced low-key sectarian protests organized by the Shiite minority in the Eastern Province. But overall, the government has been more concerned with the impact that the dramatic events in Tunisia and Egypt would have on its population, in particular the unemployed and frustrated youth, than the protests of the Shiite minority. In order to prevent the protests from developing into a large-scale movement that spreads to the major cities in the Kingdom, the government quickly announced large-scale economic benefit packages that it felt would deal with the existing economic grievances. These announcements underline the fact that the government firmly identifies youth unemployment and the low income of a large section of the Saudi society as the key factors that could generate widespread popular protest. Thus, as a fire-fighting measure, the government started throwing money on the problem, hoping to eliminate any chance of a spark that might flare into a large-scale uprising. Up to this point, more than $130 billion has been committed by the government to ease the problem of unemployment and to improve the living standard of the citizens.
Along with the economic packages, however, no measures related to political reform have been promised or taken. This is despite the fact that it will simply not be possible for the issue of political reform to be ignored indefinitely. A key point to understand is that the Saudi society in 2011 has moved a long distance away from the Saudi society of the past hundred years. What was acceptable then is no longer sustainable now and it has to be accepted that change will come, whether on the initiative of the ruling elites or by the force of popular pressure.
Relying on its wealth to resolve existing issues might work in the short term, but it cannot be the only solution to the country's youth unemployment dilemma or to the rising cost of living and a host of related problems. Given its response at this stage, it is clear that the Saudi government suffers from a lack of vision, absence of long-term planning, and most importantly, the inability to understand the many predicaments facing the Saudi society. The result is that the trust between the government and its citizens is eroding fast and it is likely that the financial rewards made to reflect the generosity of the government will soon be forgotten even as the real problems remain.
