But to what extent the AKP can bank on the Clintonesque observation, Turkey's 50 million plus voters will have the final say when they choose their deputies for 550 constituencies across this strategic NATO country. Erdogan has presided over a decade of rising national prosperity and remarkable economic progress, which has seen the emergence of a solid conservative Anatolian-based middle class, at the expense and perhaps to the chagrin of the established secular metropolitan elites.
This change in the class demographics of the Turkish polity coupled with sociopolitical reforms relating to the outmoded constitution, a stagnant judiciary, deficient human and minority rights and of course the economic achievements and delivery has seen the AKP successfully shift the mindset of Turkish politics from the old and staid Kemalist authoritarian structure to a modern more European-style liberal democratic dispensation, albeit it remains "work in progress".
From taxi drivers to small businesses in Istanbul and elsewhere, not necessarily natural supporters of AKP, the clarion call is: "The economy is doing well. We are doing well. We have never had it so good. Why should we want to change things?"
Erdogan's stewardship of the economy has been nothing short of a miracle, which has drawn the admiration of the IMF and foreign diplomats in Ankara alike. This policy success in the economy is the platform for his intended reforms in the more contentious areas of the constitution, judiciary, individual rights and the role of the military in Turkish polity.
In many respects Erdogan has done Turkish politics a massive favor. Previous elections were characterized by the disarray and weakness of the Turkish opposition party, especially the Republican Peoples Party (CHP) founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk himself. He has forced the CHP and others to confront their past and to come to terms with the republic's modern future.
In this respect the new CHP leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, an ascetic former bureaucrat, has started to reform the party from its near-prehistoric past and embarked on engaging in former no-go policy issues like the rights of individuals and minorities such as the Kurds, which only a year ago was anathema to majority of Kemalists.
This election may prove to be an election too soon for CHP because changing a near century-old party and political culture does not happen overnight. The election rhetoric of CHP has changed from what one American diplomat called the "routine whining" relating to AKP's supposedly pro-Islamist leanings and therefore "hidden Shariah agenda" to a more pragmatic discourse on issues ranging from corruption, individual rights and even Turkey's intended membership of the European Union.
Kilicdaroglu may have the charisma of a bureaucrat, but he is far more respected than his predecessor, Deniz Baykal, a self-absorbed elitist who last year was only forced out of politics because of a scandal, which incidentally has also plagued the discredited ultra-nationalist National Action Party.
While Erdogan seems to be comfortably ahead in the polls, a fundamental realignment of Turkish politics is highly unlikely. If CHP manages to get 30 percent or more of the popular vote, then this will indicate that the realignment has started. Whether this is due to the changes within CHP or due to "Erdogan or AKP fatigue" amongst Turkish voters or signs that the economy may be overheating and that there maybe trouble ahead, remains a moot point.
The AKP Government has successfully managed the Turkish economy over the last decade during which the economy grew from being the 26th largest in the world in 2002 to the 16th largest this year and the old bogey of inflation has plummeted from over 70 percent in 2002 to a single digit figure in early 2011. Erdogan's policies have also seen the Turkish economy realigning more closely to the regional markets in the GCC and MENA countries through a shift in foreign policy which is now based on the concepts of "a dynamic equilibrium" and "strategic depth".
These concepts balance the policy masterminded by its urbane architect, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, between its international obligations as in its membership of NATO; its European Union membership ambitions, which has over the last few years been resisted by a near Islamophobic opposition from France, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Greece and Cyprus; and its new-found rapprochement with the MENA countries, especially the GCC, Syria, Iraq and Iran, and with neighboring powers such as Russia.
Before the crisis in 2008, total Turkish exports reached $132 billion, of which the largest share were to the industrialized markets, especially the EU countries such as Germany, Austria and the UK. After the crisis, total Turkish exports slumped 22.6 percent to $102.1 billion in 2009, of which exports to the EU-27 countries fell sharply by 25.8 percent to $47 billion.
In contrast, Turkish exports to the MENA countries, especially to the GCC region, and to African countries have witnessed dramatic increases of up to 20 percent. This shift in the Turkish trade profile has opened new and consolidated established synergies with the MENA region, although this could be undermined by the current situation in Syria and Libya — both established trading partners of Turkey.
For AKP and Erdogan, the success in this election will be the size of its majority. The AKP had earlier won a referendum to change the country's outmoded constitution which was drawn up by the military in 1983. It is also no secret that Erdogan wants to change the Turkish political system from the current one to a US-style presidential system, where the president exercises executive power.
An inevitable side-show will be how AKP internally navigates such a transition if it gets the required support, especially how the current incumbent of the Cankaya Palace, President Abdullah Gul, takes to this change and makes way for Erdogan himself.
Turkish politics threaten never to be the same again!
