I wrote last week about new Azerbaijan-GCC partnership, which was launched in Baku on June 12.

GCC states and Azerbaijan have much in common on which to base their newly founded partnership. They are major oil and gas producers. Both have adopted expansionary fiscal policies intended to finance ambitious development programs. In addition they have embarked on long-term investment plans abroad. On all of these three fronts, they can establish solid and mutually beneficial cooperation, both at the official and private levels.

But there is more. Azerbaijan is rich in culture. Over the centuries, it has been at the crossroads of several civilizations that have left their impact on the mix that is Azeri culture.

The most prominent of those influences is Islam, which has thoroughly permeated Azerbaijan’s culture and its everyday life since the faith spread to Azerbaijan in the seventh century, about (1400) years ago. Azerbaijan today is over 99 percent Muslim, despite Russia’s attempts during its 180-year control of Azerbaijan to dilute that fact. Russia succeeded during its rule over Azerbaijan in isolating Azerbaijan from the Arab and Muslim worlds. That has now come to an end.

One of the main challenges that the GCC and Azerbaijan have in common is how to deal with the menacing role of Iran. As in the Gulf, Iran has tried to foment trouble in Azerbaijan and export extremism and violence. Azerbaijan officials have repeatedly apprehended Iranian recruits and arms shipments from Iran, intended to stir trouble in Azerbaijan.

Not satisfied with having control of much of historical Azerbaijan and rule over the majority of ethnic Azeris, Iran seems to be bent on brining the rest of Azerbaijan under its control. Because of Armenia’s occupation of the Azeri province of Nagorno Karabagh, dividing Azerbijan in two separate sections, Azerbaijanis need to cross Iranian territory to get from one section to the other. Iran tries to take advantage of that fact in its attempts to undermine Azerbaijan, in addition to its covert support of Armenia against Azerbaijan.

Azeris in Iran constitute nearly 30 percent of the population, the largest minority after Persians. The majority of Azeris are concentrated in the eastern part of the historical territory of Azerbaijan, i.e., the northwestern part of today’s Iran. Many of them are dispersed throughout Iran, including the capital Tehran, where they constitute about a third of its population. They also represent an important part of Iran’s military and security forces, as well as its business community.

Because of those large numbers, the Iranian government is especially concerned about any cultural expressions of Azeri cultural identity, for fear that such expressions could evolve into a serious challenge to the official narrative of Iranian unity. It has forced them to assimilate and speak Persian. It has frequently reacted with disproportionate force to Azeri calls for cultural expression or for attempts to speak, teach or write in Azeri language in Iran.

Despite Iranian measures, it appears that there is a nascent movement among Iran’s Azeris for independence. If that movement succeeds one day, it could be the largest threat to Iran, more than the Kurds, the Balochs or the Araba, who constitute smaller proportions of Iran’s ethnic and cultural mix.

In addition, Iran’s Azeri territory is of great strategic importance, as it represents Iran’s links to the Caspian Sea as well as Turkey. Iran’s trade routes to Turkey, the EU, and much of Central Asia go through that territory. Azeris form also Iran’s links with other Turkish-speaking people, inside and outside Iran.

Using the pretext of suppressing anti-regime, post-election protests in 2009, Iran’s notorious militias such as the Basij and Ansar-e Hezbollah have deployed in key areas of Iran’s Azerbaijan, including universities and other places that may harbor Azeri cultural and national sentiments, such as sports clubs and football matches.

Outside Iran, there is little knowledge of Azeris’ aspirations for independence. As such, there have been very few expressions of sympathy with their plight.

Part of the problem is that the outside world has been so overwhelmed by the myriad of violations of human rights in Iran that it has found difficult to understand the extent of repression for which Azeris have been singled out within Iran.

Recently, repression has intensified in the run-up to the presidential elections on June 14, with pre-emptive arrests of opposition activists, in an effort to prevent a repeat of the “people power” protests following the 2009 elections.

Many have forgotten that the two main opposition candidates in the 2009 poll (Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi) have remained under house arrest since then.

In the recent carefully-managed elections, candidates were vetted by the Guardian Council which excluded all independent candidates. Their supporters were less lucky, as many of them were arrested or banned from expressing any dissenting voices.

According to human rights groups, there are thousands of political prisoners in Iran, among them hundreds of activists, students, lawyers, artists, politicians and representatives of ethnic minorities, including hundreds of Azeri activists.

Only a few in Azerbaijan expect that Iran’s new president, Hassan Rowhani, would try to chart a new approach for Iran’s relationship with its neighbors. Sadly, however, no one seems to think that he may be flexible in handling minority rights within Iran.

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