US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s trip was a reminder of the calmer times that have come to define Pakistan-US relations. On issues like proliferation, democracy, defense requirements, F-16, the Osama hunt, dialogue continues. Disagreements are also there but engagement stays the course. There is no crisis in the Pakistan-US relations. Divergences remain yet both governments value the relationship.
The media in both countries tell another story. The US media generally attack the Pakistan government for not doing enough on proliferation, on Osama etc. The Pakistani media meanwhile, reflecting popular sentiments held also by some political figures, rightly condemn the US invasion of Iraq, the human rights abuses in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib.
But lost in this often-correct condemnation and in the resentments that politicians and opinion-makers have against the khaki-engineered democracy, is the beginning of significant changes in Pakistan-US relations.
There are also past ghosts that haunt the relationship. Since its inception in 1954 the Pakistan-US relationship has been a troubled one marked by turbulence, differing expectations and trust deficit. Its foundations were laid during the Cold War, went through a period of uncertainties and cooling off during the late sixties and seventies to climax again through the last Cold War competition in Afghanistan.
The post-Cold War period of the nineties marked a new phase of the relationship. It was the “divergence” period. The causes of divergence were the proliferation, the Taleban and the diplomatic-cum-military turbulence of Pakistan-India relations.
Although through the various phases of Pakistan-US relations, their respective “national interests” were promoted, their threat perceptions and end objectives often varied.
Convergence often on operational tactics coexisted with divergence on strategic objectives. This strategic divergence made relations perpetually vulnerable to accusations and counter-accusations.
After 9/11 the two estranged allies went back into an embrace. Pakistan became the “pivotal ally” for the United States in its global war against terrorism. For the United States the nature of the adversary had changed. The military, economic and diplomatic ascendancy that Washington experienced as the dominant power within the unipolar world, in and of itself, was insufficient to respond to what was a nebulous, dispersed and covert threat. It is more complex involving both state and substate actors. Accordingly, the US response has been different in addressing the multidimensional threat. In addition to use of force, the United States views elaborate socioeconomic and political reforms, as potent tools for addressing the threat.
The environment within Pakistan itself was ready for engagement. President Pervez Musharraf began promoting the sociopolitical ideology of Enlightened Moderation, as a response to the growing divide between the Muslim and the non-Muslim world.
The post-9/11 period of bilateral engagement has changed the historical pattern of tactical convergence versus strategic divergence. In the post-9/11 phase there are shared threat perceptions and common national and global objectives that the two partners seek.
Some people in Pakistan hold the view that in the post-9/11 phase Pakistan is waging a proxy battle for the US’ anti-terrorism war at the cost of its own sovereignty, security and stability. Additionally this partnership with the US will help further strengthen unconstitutional military control over the levers of state power and undermine Pakistan’s democratic evolution. Many argue that US is using Pakistan as a “junior mercenary” to implement its military strategy.
Yet the facts including the structure and content of this relationship suggest that the Pakistan-US relations in the post-9/11 period have expanded in direct correlation to Washington’s growing realization that counterterrorism requires pursuing a broad, all-inclusive security agenda; that ideological, socioeconomic and democratic development of state and society are central to combating terrorism.
This post-9/11 engagement promises a more sound partnership with the US. Provided Pakistan plays it competently and provided the chronic internal instability problem is tackled. At this point Musharraf maybe a critical factor in this relationship but ultimately a genuinely democratic government and a credible state apparatus will enable Pakistan to use its post-9/11 relations with the US to its advantage.
