WHEN, this week, members of Islamic Jihad take part in a meeting of the PLO’s executive committee to help cement the March 17 truce between the Palestinians and Israel, the gathering will appear, to the untrained eye, to be the norm. It is not that at all. It will, in fact, be the first time an activist Islamic organization sits in on a PLO meeting and could be the first step toward full Jihad membership in the PLO. And that too will only be the beginning. If the PLO and Islamic Jihad can see eye to eye on some basics, this will most likely induce the group’s bigger brother, Hamas, to join the PLO as well. Hamas has been contemplating such a move for some time and if it transpires, the landscape of inter-Palestinian politics and the conflict with Israel will change dramatically.
That Hamas in particular should want to join the Palestinian political mainstream is odd. Islamic Jihad and Hamas have long objected to joining the PLO, opposing its peace moves with Israel. That Hamas’ top two leaders were assassinated last year by Israel, which is now on tentative peace terms with the PA, makes such a goal even stranger.
But the death of Yasser Arafat, who founded the PLO in the early 1960s and was a staunch opponent of Hamas gaining any political foothold in his Fatah, along with the election of Mahmoud Abbas who has repeatedly called on Hamas to play a more active political role set the stage for a Hamas debut. Add to this Hamas’ agreement to a temporary halt to attacks against Israel and the setting for an institutionalized role is created.
Despite its battle against Israel in the uprising, Hamas has until now had little impact on the formulation of general national policies affecting the Palestinian people. Hence membership in the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the main national decision-making body, will enable the movement to translate its standing in the Palestinian street to proportionate political influence.
The participation of Hamas will certainly raise questions about the future of peacemaking. It is still unclear how Abbas can reconcile between the PLO Charter that recognizes Israel’s right to exist and the strategy of the groups that seek to eliminate Israel. Hamas will most certainly reorient the PA to prevent it from making concessions to Israel and the United States and safeguarding Palestinian rights.
Of course, a PLO holding fast to Palestinian national aspirations might in the end be a blessing for Israelis who will doubtless use the inclusion of Hamas into the PLO as a pretext and justification for prolonging the occupation.
This is the risk involved in Hamas throwing its hat in the political ring but it seems the latter is an inevitability. Hamas will contest parliamentary elections in July for the first time and is expected to emerge from the elections an even more powerful political force. It must become a welcome and full partner; it cannot and should not be ignored.
