On the face of it, the proposal by Iraq’s new President Jalal Talabani to use the country’s militias to end the insurgency is appealing. The sooner the terrorists can be beaten, the sooner the occupation forces can leave and Iraqis can get on with managing their own affairs.

But using the militias to crush insurgents who are primarily Sunni risks opening fresh wounds in Iraq that could fester and break out into civil war. Iraq’s police and armed forces are still not strong enough to function without the backing of the Americans and the dwindling number of countries that back Washington militarily. Some may argue that the slow progress in the reformation of the country’s forces of law and order suits the Americans very well because it enables them to perpetuate their occupation. Yet the US-backed idea of disciplined Iraqi forces, subject to the rule of law finally being in charge of protecting their country, is far preferable to the president’s suggestion.

However disciplined Talabani may believe that the 80,000 Kurdish Peshmerga fighters are, they would not be subject to proper command and control functions that are necessary for the security forces of a civilized country. Shiite militias, the most notable of which is the Badr Brigade, cannot make up by their enthusiasm what they lack in discipline and training. Turning these people loose against the insurgents would quickly prove counterproductive. The main argument against their use, however, is that if government rushed their deployment, they would rapidly alienate moderate opinion in Sunni areas and create more, not less, resistance.

Far from crushing the insurgents, any assaults that they make on suspected insurgent hideouts are likely to enrage the local population who will see these operations as sectarian attacks on their communities.

Decent Iraqis should not be looking at each other as enemies. If Iraqi soldiers and policemen attack insurgents, then it can be recognized that they are acting in the name of all Iraqis, not one specific part of the community.

There is also an irony to the president’s comment. The original plan had been that all the militias should be melded immediately into the new Iraqi armed forces and police. This was resisted, not least by the Kurds who, as part of the agreement to form the new government, have only consented to merge their men into the national force at a future date. However it takes time to train efficient soldiers at facilities such as the new Al Kaslik Army base outside Mosul.

The sooner even ten or twenty thousand of the Peshmerga fighters sign up to serve under Iraqi national colors, along with a corresponding number from the Shiite militias, the sooner Iraq will be able to confront the insurgents without the support of the Americans and their allied troops.

Deploying militias with no direct loyalty to the Iraqi state and therefore to all Iraqis would be a recipe for disaster.