He is back in his den after a European tour. He will do nothing but fight, as he has been doing for most of his life; not that he enjoys fighting, but he has no other choice.
In Europe, the veteran Afghan leader Ahmad Shah Masood, known as the Lion of Panjsher, unveiled another of his country’s faces, one hitherto unknown to the outside world. We in the Arab world need to hear from Masood since we are already involved in his country’s crises. Inviting him to visit will prove a smart move at the right time.
He is a true Afghan national leader who has been at the forefront of the Islamic movement as a freedom fighter. He has not known a single day’s rest since he fled as a refugee to Peshawar in Pakistan in 1973 when he was in his early twenties. His flight was in the aftermath of Muhammad Dawoud’s Communist-supported coup against King Muhammad Zahir Shah. A thorough examination of developments in his homeland convinced Masood in Peshawar that his country was heading for a crisis, threatening its centuries-old Islamic foundations.
Though trained as an engineer, he was a devoted student of social sciences and history. He read a great deal and familiarized himself with revolutions and movements that had caused fundamental changes in the world. He read communist literature carefully as well as the teachings of Abul A’ala Moudoodi whose influence on Muslim political thought in the Indian subcontinent and Afghanistan is still evident. He also read Hassan Al-Banna and Syed Qutub but took care to maintain his independent thinking style and to break himself free from inflexible political molds.
Probably it was his unwillingness to identify himself with any frigid religio-political thinking, coupled with a profound insight into the behavior and mindset of the Afghan people, that gave him the vital force to withstand decades of communist repression, internal wars and endless foreign interventions.
In 1975, Masood joined Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s forces which aimed to quash rebel movements in several parts of the country. Hekmatyar’s move failed on all fronts except where Masood was in charge. Soon Masood split away from Hekmatyar who demanded unquestioned obedience from his supporters and partners. In fact, Hekmatyar was responsible for the Mujahedeen’s failure after its victory over the Communist regime 15 years later. His dictatorial ways only led to his becoming a fugitive in Tehran. He insisted on everything for himself or nothing for anyone.
As young men, we considered Hekmatyar the most popular Mujahedeen leader. His harsh dictatorial style was interpreted as a sign of the leadership qualities essential for the difficult times in the movement’s early stages. Unfortunately, his blind insistence on being the unchallenged Afghan leader also sealed the fate of the Afghan jihad and handed Afghanistan to an obscure movement, the Taleban.
Taleban’s story has never been one of success. The Taleban came to power by sheer chance to fill a void created by the Mujahedeen’s failure to fulfill the hopes of the Afghan people who were weary of continuous wars and repressive reigns. To judge by its current style of government, the Taleban will never achieve stability in the country though stability is of paramount importance to Afghanistan at present.
What marks Masood out from the leaders of Taleban — or Hekmatyar for that matter — is his strong commitment to plurality, which could insure the country’s stability. For that reason alone, he is a better alternative for Afghanistan. Moreover, he is aware of the urgency of patching things up between the warring factions, both tribal and sectarian.
Access to inexhaustible sources of weapons and increasing foreign meddling will never let Afghans heal their wounds and achieve stability which would be possible in a democratic Islamic system. Such a system would familiarize Afghans with the principles of democratic elections and the peaceful transfer of power. This was what Masood aimed at when he freed himself from Hekmatyar. Instead of founding yet another movement, he joined hands with the Jamiah Islamiyah (Islamic Society) under the leadership of Burhanuddin Rabbani.
All through the years of jihad, Masood remained in the Panjsher Valley close to his own people. He made his own independent decisions. He visited Pakistan only once during the yeas of Jihad or Soviet occupation, few months shortly before his victory in Kabul. During his visit, he tried to reassure the Pakistan Army but it seemed that his reassurances could never succeed because Pakistan would not overlook that he had never sought its support as all other jihad leaders had. Nor did he seek Pakistan’s advice on any issue though Pakistan was already imagining Afghanistan in its sphere of influence. After the Russian defeat and withdrawal in 1990, the Mujahedeen were on course for an inevitable showdown with rival factions unless they settled their own internal squabbles and agreed to form a single government.
As later events illustrated, they failed to adopt a unanimous stance and two years later, Masood entered Kabul in triumph as Najeebullah’s government was dying. When for all practical purposes, Masood’s forces controlled the capital, he sent messages to Rabbani in Peshawar to “prepare yourselves to enter the capital in unity with other Mujahedeen leaders.” It was a bold and unique stance by a victorious general though he could have declared himself master in Kabul.
In those days I was as a journalist covering the end of Afghan Jihad from Surkhab village, south of Kabul, which Hekmatyar took as a base for launching campaigns against the capital. I heard Muslim scholars on the radio attempting to narrow and eliminate the differences between the two leaders. I also heard the triumphant Masood inviting Hekmatyar most politely, “O respected leader, Kabul will not be conquered twice. It is now in your hands. I will never do anything without seeking your advice. I ask you to proceed to Peshawar and coordinate with the seven leaders there so that all can enter Kabul united.”
Sadly, however, Hekmatyar wanted Kabul as his bride — and a bride is, of course, never shared. He marched to Kabul to drive Masood out. The Mujahedeen fought a bloody war and the people rejected both sides. In their place, the Afghan people welcomed Taleban, the school students, as an alternative. Any alternative that guaranteed security was welcome to the battle-weary population of Afghanistan.
The Taleban and their leader, Mulla Muhammad, nevertheless, made the same mistakes which Hekmatyar had made. The Taleban does not understand that its victory was not the result of any plan that it formulated. On the contrary, it was the result of mistakes committed by its opponents. If the Taleban continue to ignore the multitribal aspects of Afghan life, both factional wars and tribal struggles for power will continue indefinitely.
It is not a welcome idea that all Afghanistan’s leaders should come submissively to Kandahar to declare allegiance to a “commander of the believers” who came to power not by merit. At the same time, the leaders are aware that the Taleban is not popular with the majority of Afghans. The Taleban’s view that all who disagree with it are outlaws does not help its popularity and is unacceptable to most people.
The great difference between Masood and the Taleban is that if Masood wins in his efforts to regain power in Kabul, the Taleban will be invited to participate in his government. In contrast to Masood, both the Taleban leader and Hekmatyar believe: “I am the state. I am the law. I will share power with anyone I choose and eliminate those who disagree with me.” History shows those who rule in this way cannot last.
