LONDON, 12 May 2004 — The West is losing the war on terror on a global scale. Despite the revelations of torture, the US-British policy is unchanged: See this historic struggle through to its conclusion for the sake of democracy and civilization; apply overwhelming force against terrorists and extremists; and show unremitting resolve to root out resistance wherever it is found. Whether it is Americans in Iraq, Israelis in Palestine or the West against Al-Qaeda, the approach is the same: A policy proclaimed in the name of freedom, tolerance and a decent world order that, ironically, could hardly be better calculated to produce the opposite.
The policy is lethally flawed by its unwillingness to contemplate what lies behind the hatred: Why scores of young people are prepared to blow themselves up, why 19 highly educated young men were ready to destroy themselves and thousands of others in the Sept. 11 hijackings, and why resistance is growing despite the likelihood of insurgents being killed. To deal with this reality, we first have to understand it.
The appeal of Osama Bin Laden lies in his capacity to radicalize and mobilize the world’s Muslims.
His denunciation of the US military occupation, his condemnation of Arab states — often seen as western inspired — his invective against US domination of the Middle East and protection of Israel, and his capacity to fight back have all resonated in the Arab street.
There are essentially three strategic responses to this. One, which President Bush has come dangerously close to voicing, is that this is a clash between Western and Muslim values.
In fact, this would play into Bin Laden’s hands. He wants further attacks by the US and its allies to draw in more Muslims and perhaps trigger the collapse of secularist traditions and western tendencies in the Islamic world. It would also have a dangerous impact in western countries with large Muslim populations.
A second approach, advocated by leading neocons, focuses on military and economic power. The Afghan and Iraqi wars were both geopolitical — focused on the establishment of bases in Central Asia and the Middle East — and oil-centered (securing the two largest remaining sources of hydrocarbons in the world). But this again is a losing strategy.
Afghanistan is gradually slipping from US hands, with resistance clearly mounting as the Taleban reorganize and Russian influence steadily grows. Two years after the war is supposed to have ended, violence still grips much of the country and there is no sight of an Afghan Army capable of offering security.
The Iraq imbroglio is even worse. The death of more than 10,000 civilians, with 20,000 injured and even higher Iraqi military casualties, is exacerbated, one year on, by the failure to deliver key public services, the rushed disbanding of the Iraqi Army, rampant unemployment and a gratuitously heavy-handed US military.
Nor has Al-Qaeda been broken. US intelligence estimates that it still operates terror cells in as many as 65 countries, with a 50,000-strong pool of cadres from two generations of Afghan war veterans. It is resilient for two main reasons: It is the symbol of resistance in the Islamic world against western domination, and it has built strategic depth by keeping operational links with some of the largest and deadliest Middle Eastern and Asian terror groups.
Soon after Sept. 11, Al-Qaeda had lost 16 of its 25 key leaders, but it adapted and rapidly transformed itself into a more mobile, flexible and elusive force than before. Despite the “war on terror”, over the past two years, in at least 18 attacks across the world, Al-Qaeda seems to have been more effective than in the two years before Sept. 11.
Military control, despite significant successes, shows little sign of being able to eradicate Al-Qaeda — indeed, the more it is cut back, the more it springs up elsewhere. But there is a third, alternative approach. Above all, the political dimension must now be given much greater prominence if the real and deep grievances that drive Al-Qaeda are to be addressed.
That will undoubtedly require some contentious policy changes to be made. In Iraq it means a clear UN mandate to cover coalition forces and an early date for their withdrawal. It means the US making clear that it will not maintain a long-term de facto occupation by retaining military bases, with effective control over oil, security and the economy.
The Al-Qaeda threat will never be resolved until the US adopts a more balanced Middle East policy and is prepared to put the necessary pressure on Israel to secure a viable Palestinian state.
And rather than pursue a self-defeating policy of enforced regime change against suspect countries, it would be much better to identify countries where conditions are likely to encourage the proliferation of terrorism, and to try to pre-empt this by well-structured international economic aid programs.
These are not utopian objectives, but the US will not budge without much more pressure from friendly governments. Britain needs to make the case strongly that continued British support cannot be unconditional. Given Bush’s acute concern for Tony Blair’s political survival — as revealed in Bob Woodward’s latest book — it is a message that should be well understood in Washington.
If the road from Bali, Kikambala (in Kenya), Casablanca, Riyadh, Jakarta, Istanbul and Madrid is not to pass through London or Boston, those policies would provide a much better defense than continuing to rely exclusively on military control or advance intelligence, vital though both are.
