The media uses the term “crisis” so often that it is now devoid of any meaning. In the Arab world, to what extent can we use the term “crisis” without exaggerating the reality, and how can we determine whether something is merely a “problem”?
The defeat of 1967 shook many of the governing systems of the time. When Nasserism crumbled, the aftershocks affected even the more traditional Arab regimes. The 1973 victory brought back to life some of our shattered dreams, thanks mainly to the use of the oil weapon, which was used for the first time. But its use awakened the West to the frightening reality of its dependence on oil, bringing home that it was unable to stand on its own feet.
That shock prompted the West to preoccupy the Arab world with its internal problems so that neither its people nor its governments would turn to external matters except within narrow limits. There was to be no repeat of 1973; there were to be no more surprises. But how did the Arab world react to that Western policy? Did it respond by building a strong economic, political or developmental foundation? No. Most regimes proceeded to ignore the rights of their citizens, afraid what might happen if they empowered their people. That meant opposition to these regimes grew in an unbalanced atmosphere.
The worries of various classes within society, the yearning for participation in politics and social and economic justice, in addition to escalating racial and sectarian differences within some countries made it easy for the West to play the caretaker role, whether through conditional financial aid or the protection of the Arabs’ human rights or otherwise. Meanwhile, a number of disappointments among Arab populations fermented discontent.
In the opposition camp, it is the Islamic groups who have been the most visible in the past few years, spearheaded by groups who arrogated unto themselves the exclusive right to raising the religious banner in the face of their governments and anyone they saw as supportive of or associated with them. They declared it permissible to kill the innocent and terrorize everyone, all under the banner of religion.
Their identity became pan-Arab and pan-Islamic, widening their sphere of influence so much so that what happens in Egypt concerns the brethren in Jordan or Saudi Arabia. Their chief concern is to undermine the legitimacy of governing regimes or to weaken them by posing an external economic or security threat.
The irony is that the West, by hoping to benefit, has actually greatly harmed itself. But it is the people who in the end pay the highest price. If you were to give any Arab citizen the choice between a revolution in his country to replace the current government and the government at last turning its attention to the affairs and benefits of its citizens, he would choose the latter.
It is the continued absence of such attention that galvanizes the enemies of peace and provides the shelter, money, weapons and media platforms that empower them. We need to solve our internal problems effectively and with maturity so that they don’t escalate into crises. That we have reached a point where we cannot even agree on convening a meeting does not bode well for our seriousness.
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(Suraya Al-Shehry is a Saudi writer. She is based in Riyadh.)
