None of the multifaceted challenges embodied in Ukraine seems open to an easy solution. The downfall of President Viktor Yanukovich began with a contest between Moscow and Brussels for economic and political influence. It ended when the beleaguered Ukrainian leader tried to crush crowds who were no longer demonstrating about Europe but about Yanukovich himself.
With the president gone, the issue of influence has returned. Putin’s Kremlin is less concerned with the economic opportunities at stake than with the military implications. If, in due time, Ukraine became a member of the European Union, membership of NATO would not be far behind. The Russians do not see NATO as a defensive alliance. In 1999 Poland became a member. Were the Ukraine to join, from Moscow’s point of view, potentially unfriendly tanks would be parked on its lawn, the full length of eastern Europe, from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
It matters not that European armies have long been shrinking and now US forces face drastic cuts. It matters not that Washington’s commitment to NATO is waning because of the unwillingness of EU states to shoulder their fair military share. Moscow knows that all of this could change. The West seems incapable of appreciating the depth of Russian concerns. These are based on bitter experience. There were around 30 million Russian civilian and military casualties in two world wars.
In addition, if Ukraine joined NATO, as things currently stand, the country would be unique in that it hosts a Russian naval base. Moscow’s Black Sea fleet is based in Sebastapol in the Crimea. Once a rusting memento of Soviet decay, today the base is brisk and business-like. Moreover the city and much of the Crimean peninsular is ethnic Russian. A stroke on the pen in 1954 made the territory an administrative part of Ukraine. Historically Ukraine has had little connection with the peninsular. Though nominally independent in Soviet times — it once had its on seat at the UN — the great landmass of Ukraine was always expected to be part of Moscow’s empire. Meanwhile, the Crimea was once the heartland of the Tatars. In 1944, after accusing them of collaborating with the invading Nazis, Stalin deported the entire Tatar population to what is now Uzbekistan. There are currently only about 250,000 ethnic Tatars in the Crimea.
At the very least, Russia believes that it has a crucial military stake there. At present the peninsular is an autonomous republic within the Ukraine. On Thursday pro-Russian demonstrators seized the local Parliament and administrative offices. The Ukrainian mayor has been thrown out and replaced by a Russian. Russian legislators have traveled to Sebastopol promising their support in the face of “Ukrainian aggression”. To all intents and purposes, it looks as if there has been a power grab in the Crimean capital at a time when, back in Kiev, a new and largely inexperienced government is still coming in to office.
Meanwhile the Kremlin has announced that it is holding unscheduled maneuvers involving some 200,000 troops near the Ukrainian border. Any sensible analyst would see that Moscow’s key concern is the Crimea and the home base of the Black Sea Fleet. Since pro-Russian elements appear to have seized the local reins of power, the excuse for a military intervention would have to be provided by Kiev. Such provocation might involve the sending of Ukrainian army reinforcements to the Crimea.
It must not be forgotten that Putin has been in a similar situation before. In 2008, Georgia was seeking to quell Ossetian and Abkhazian separatists, who wanted to link to Russia. Moscow organized military maneuvers on the Georgian border, which turned into a full-scale punitive invasion. It is also worth remembering that at the time, US forces were in the country, setting up radar bases and training the Georgians, while quietly encouraging a move toward Georgian membership of NATO.
The US and European response to the Ukrainian crisis needs to be informed by Russia’s anxieties and track record of intervention. Whatever the nationalist protests in Kiev, the Crimea cannot be allowed to divert attention from Ukraine’s other more pressing problems. Almost bankrupt, it needs international financial support. If possible Russia should be part of that process. The country needs a complete rebuild from its security to its constitution. Russia should be involved in that too. Western triumphalism at the overthrow of Moscow’s man must cease. Washington and Brussels should support, not dictate Ukrainian reforms. Subtlety and consideration should be the order of the day for Western diplomats. Certainly, no one should be trying to draw any more useless lines in the sand.
Editorial: West should support Ukrainian reforms
