THE past few weeks of political turmoil in Egypt have certainly exposed limitations of the US and European Union’s abilities to pressure their longtime ally in the Middle East.
It is amply clear now that how much Washington tried and failed to influence events in Egypt. The US tried to persuade, cajole and even threaten to cut aid through its mediators — Congressmen John McCain, Lindsay Graham and Deputy Secretary of State William Burns — fell on deaf ears.
Even before the army stepped in to oust President Muhammad Mursi, the Obama administration did whatever it could to convince Gen. Abdel Fattah El-Sisi not to do so. Besides that US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel called El-Sisi 17 times on the fateful day. Again calls on the army to restrain and not to break the sit-ins by the Muslim Brotherhood by force were simply ignored. In fact Cairo was emboldened to announce the failure of international efforts led by the US and EU to find a solution to the political impasse at the time the mediators were waiting for a successful conclusion of their efforts.
On the face of it Washington should have an upper hand given its annual $1.5 billion aid to Egypt that has been going on for more than three decades in addition to other forms of support. But in reality it seems Washington is in need more of Cairo’s cooperation than the other way around. For one the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel represents the cornerstone of the US policy in the volatile Middle East region. Aid to Egypt could easily be viewed as a way to keep that treaty alive. More importantly and given Egypt’s strategic geographical location, it is hard for the US planners to find an alternative that can play the same role that Egypt has been doing. Its control of the Suez Canal had proven to be a valuable asset.
When friendly countries need a week’s notice to secure permission to cross the Suez Canal, Washington was given almost automatic permission whenever it applies. That became apparent when in 2003 two aircraft battle carriers were allowed to pass through the Suez Canal and compensate for the closure of Turkey before US troops planning to invade Iraq.
These facts were known from the start, but the deposed regime of former President Hosni Mubarak was not bold enough to use this card to its benefit.
El-Sisi on the other hand feels more confident to take a different route and challenge Washington on what it seems as leverage. Unlike Mubarak, El-Sisi has undeniable popular backing and regardless of how many Egyptians took to the streets calling on Mursi to resign there is clearly grassroots support for the takeover.
Besides, there is the regional support the new regime received economically and diplomatically. Immediately after Mursi was removed, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait pledged $12 billion. The figure equals eight times the annual aid provided by the US to Egypt and more than twice the loan promised by the International Monetary Fund that has been subject to negotiations for years now. Diplomatically, Riyadh has been in the forefront, lending its support in influential capitals like Paris. And when Riyadh gets proactively engaged others usually listen.
Threats to use leverage of cutting aid are more effective than when they are actually applied. When they come into effect they start to lose their impact, especially if an alternative is found. More importantly, the US and other Western countries will move into a weaker position in their efforts to influence the outcome of events in Egypt. Whether this is yet another signal of the declining US influence, particularly in the region or a change in the game, it remains to be seen. But clearly Egypt is becoming a new playground that needs to be watched carefully.
