The Iran nuclear deal posed a simple trade: In exchange for Tehran agreeing to limit its nuclear capabilities, economic sanctions would be lifted. But the devil is in the details concerning, for example, a role for missiles on the nuclear side of the equation and state sponsorship of terrorism on the sanctions relief side.
Signed in Geneva July 14, 2015, the deal’s first anniversary is coming up — a good opportunity to reflect on the economic, nuclear, and regional implications of the accord, as the debate rages on in Washington between the executive and legislative branches.
In Washington, support is growing for the notion that the Obama administration has failed to hold Tehran accountable for nuclear violations, downplayed Iran’s economic windfall from sanctions relief, and ignored the deal’s negative regional implications for state sponsorship of terrorism.
Critics hoped in vain that the nuclear deal would place explicit limits on ballistic missiles. The burden, however, was left to the UN rather than the parties to the deal.
On March 31, 2016, GOP Reps. Mike Pompeo of Kansas, Peter Roskam of Illinois, and Lee Zeldin of New York reminded Secretary of State John Kerry that in selling the nuclear deal he assured Congress that the administration would provide a robust diplomatic response to Tehran’s missile launches. Sadly, such was not the case.
Before the deal, Iran was expressly prohibited by UN resolutions from launching ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. In exchange for Tehran’s agreement to the nuclear deal, the Obama administration unwisely granted Iran flexibility for ballistic missile testing.
Security Council Resolution 2231 certified the deal, replacing the prohibition with accommodating language: “Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.”
As Foreign Policy’s Colum Lynch wrote on March 16:
“The updated measures are neither legally binding nor as restrictive as the measures in place at the time of the nuclear pact. In essence, resolution 2231 provides Iran with a loophole big enough to develop medium- and long-range missiles without the risk of running afoul of Security Council dictates. It also complicates efforts to define what kinds of missiles are capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.”
Lynch was spot on. The Obama administration failed to hold Tehran accountable for nuclear violations. But the appeasement of Iran is also tied to state sponsorship of terrorism. In selling the nuclear deal, the administration expressed a hope and implied an expectation that Tehran would moderate its participation in terrorism, for which it has quite a history. In an interview with NPR’s Steve Inskeep, Obama said it was possible that as a consequence of the US engaging Iran via the nuclear deal, Iran would start “making different decisions that are less offensive to its neighbors.”
More to the point, Obama told the Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg: “Iran, since 1979, has been an enemy of the US, and has engaged in state-sponsored terrorism, is a genuine threat to Israel and many of our allies, and engages in all kinds of destructive behavior.” That acknowledgement is insufficient to absolve Obama of his tolerance for Tehran’s business-as-usual practice of terrorism, while accepting Tehran as a suitable partner with which to cut the deal.
The NPR and Atlantic interviews laid bare the president’s faith that Iran’s terrorism can be moderated, which has not been borne out by the facts.
Even more troubling is the Obama administration’s continued support for sanctions relief, irrespective of Iran’s behavior.
Mark Dubowitz, executive director of FDD and also a critic of sanctions relief divorced from Iran’s behavior, told the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs: “Iran is engaged in a robust effort to legitimize its financial sector despite a decades-long rap sheet of. . . illicit financial activities that it shows no sign of curbing."
In other words, since the conclusion of the nuclear deal, the Obama administration missed several opportunities to push back against Iran’s successful efforts to gain sanctions relief and legitimize its financial sector to the international community, despite state sponsorship of terrorism.
Regardless of who is in the Oval Office, she or he could work with our partners to counter Tehran’s provocations. Such actions might include the interdiction of illicit arms shipments and sanctioning terrorism financing by the Iranian regime. There also is a need to fix the gap in the nuclear deal — which offers no agreed-upon penalties for Iranian violations of the deal’s terms, short of the last-resort punishment of a “snapback” of UN sanctions against Iran — as Rob Satloff, executive director of the Washington Institute, proposed in August of 2015.
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www.washingtonpost.com
Signed in Geneva July 14, 2015, the deal’s first anniversary is coming up — a good opportunity to reflect on the economic, nuclear, and regional implications of the accord, as the debate rages on in Washington between the executive and legislative branches.
In Washington, support is growing for the notion that the Obama administration has failed to hold Tehran accountable for nuclear violations, downplayed Iran’s economic windfall from sanctions relief, and ignored the deal’s negative regional implications for state sponsorship of terrorism.
Critics hoped in vain that the nuclear deal would place explicit limits on ballistic missiles. The burden, however, was left to the UN rather than the parties to the deal.
On March 31, 2016, GOP Reps. Mike Pompeo of Kansas, Peter Roskam of Illinois, and Lee Zeldin of New York reminded Secretary of State John Kerry that in selling the nuclear deal he assured Congress that the administration would provide a robust diplomatic response to Tehran’s missile launches. Sadly, such was not the case.
Before the deal, Iran was expressly prohibited by UN resolutions from launching ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. In exchange for Tehran’s agreement to the nuclear deal, the Obama administration unwisely granted Iran flexibility for ballistic missile testing.
Security Council Resolution 2231 certified the deal, replacing the prohibition with accommodating language: “Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.”
As Foreign Policy’s Colum Lynch wrote on March 16:
“The updated measures are neither legally binding nor as restrictive as the measures in place at the time of the nuclear pact. In essence, resolution 2231 provides Iran with a loophole big enough to develop medium- and long-range missiles without the risk of running afoul of Security Council dictates. It also complicates efforts to define what kinds of missiles are capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.”
Lynch was spot on. The Obama administration failed to hold Tehran accountable for nuclear violations. But the appeasement of Iran is also tied to state sponsorship of terrorism. In selling the nuclear deal, the administration expressed a hope and implied an expectation that Tehran would moderate its participation in terrorism, for which it has quite a history. In an interview with NPR’s Steve Inskeep, Obama said it was possible that as a consequence of the US engaging Iran via the nuclear deal, Iran would start “making different decisions that are less offensive to its neighbors.”
More to the point, Obama told the Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg: “Iran, since 1979, has been an enemy of the US, and has engaged in state-sponsored terrorism, is a genuine threat to Israel and many of our allies, and engages in all kinds of destructive behavior.” That acknowledgement is insufficient to absolve Obama of his tolerance for Tehran’s business-as-usual practice of terrorism, while accepting Tehran as a suitable partner with which to cut the deal.
The NPR and Atlantic interviews laid bare the president’s faith that Iran’s terrorism can be moderated, which has not been borne out by the facts.
Even more troubling is the Obama administration’s continued support for sanctions relief, irrespective of Iran’s behavior.
Mark Dubowitz, executive director of FDD and also a critic of sanctions relief divorced from Iran’s behavior, told the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs: “Iran is engaged in a robust effort to legitimize its financial sector despite a decades-long rap sheet of. . . illicit financial activities that it shows no sign of curbing."
In other words, since the conclusion of the nuclear deal, the Obama administration missed several opportunities to push back against Iran’s successful efforts to gain sanctions relief and legitimize its financial sector to the international community, despite state sponsorship of terrorism.
Regardless of who is in the Oval Office, she or he could work with our partners to counter Tehran’s provocations. Such actions might include the interdiction of illicit arms shipments and sanctioning terrorism financing by the Iranian regime. There also is a need to fix the gap in the nuclear deal — which offers no agreed-upon penalties for Iranian violations of the deal’s terms, short of the last-resort punishment of a “snapback” of UN sanctions against Iran — as Rob Satloff, executive director of the Washington Institute, proposed in August of 2015.
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www.washingtonpost.com
